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 This dissertation consists of three essays that address recent developments in international 
financial markets that have been of concern for scholars, policymakers, and practitioners. The first 
essay examines how cultural factors can influence individual investors’ trading behavior in 
response to risk in nine Eurozone countries. The markets studied were particularly affected by the 
global financial crisis, the subsequent European banking crisis, and the European sovereign debt 
crisis. Using mutual fund flows as proxy of investors’ trading behavior, our evidence indicates that 
a country culture variable significantly affects investors’ trading responsiveness to risk. 
Specifically, the impact of risk on fund flows is significantly positive and is larger in scale in 
countries with individualist cultures.  
The second essay attempts to investigate the effects of negative interest rate policies (NIRP) 
on foreign exchange and equity markets of eight European countries and Japan. To see the impacts 
of these policies, event studies and regime-switching vector autoregressive regression analyses are 
conducted for the nine countries that implement NIRP. The results provide valid evidence that the 
announcement of NIRP has a transitory effect on currency depreciation; long term effects are less 
evident. On the day of NIRP implementation, both currency and equity market returns reacted in 
response to the event efficiently and negatively, especially in Switzerland’s case. These outcomes 
suggest that simulative monetary policy by lowering interest rates below zero might have counter-
effects from those observed when interest rates are lowered, but to rates that remain positive. 
Additionally, findings from the long term analyses explain that interest rate term structure and 
cointegration level of local and the U.S. equity index may be related to effectiveness of NIRP in 
currency and equity markets, respectively. 
The last essay examines the determinants of the price of the leading cryptocurrency, 
Bitcoin. The analyses identify a number of factors that significantly affect the returns to 
investments in Bitcoin including: trading volume, high-low price spread, and extreme price change 
in the previous period. The latter result supports the assertion that recent severe price fluctuations 
in Bitcoin markets are primarily due to speculative investment activities. Furthermore, evidences 
suggested in this study explain possibility of market compromise and inefficiency of the 
cryptocurrency market, implying pivotal risks for Bitcoin market participants. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
My dissertation consists of three essays studying current issues on international financial 
markets, covering diverse topics that include: a) the influence of culture on risk taking, b) the 
impact of negative interest rate policies, and c) the behavior of cryptocurrency markets. These 
topics are relatively new in finance, and the literature is still in a nascent stage. However, given 
the increased recognition of the pertinence of these topics for global financial markets, we believe 
that they are worthy areas for investigation. 
The first essay investigates how culture moderates the impact of risk on small investors’ 
investment behavior in certain European countries. In this study, we look at investor responses to 
risk, using both traditional and extreme risk measures for countries particularly affected by the 
global financial crisis, the subsequent European banking crisis, and the European sovereign debt 
crisis. Specifically, we construct standard risk measures based on the logarithmic percentage 
changes of stock prices over different holding periods, with the assumptions of normality and 
symmetry of return distribution and risk averse investors. The standard deviation of returns is also 
an essential component of the traditional value-at-risk (VaR) measure. Such risk has been the 
focus of regulators in seeking to establish how much financial institutions should put aside to 
guard against the types of financial and operational risks banks (and the whole economy) face. 
However, because the standard deviation does not capture the risk to the investor when the 
distribution is non-symmetric, the traditional methods of calculating conventional value-at-risk 
(VaR) measures that are based on a normal distribution are problematic and need to be interpreted 
cautiously. Our second measure of risk that focuses on the distribution around the tail falls under 
the rubric of extreme value theory. Extreme risk observations are identified as the mild outliers 
in our samples, using the Tukey (1977) definition. They are computed using the percentage of 
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extreme days, weeks, and months over a specific year. One advantage of this extreme measure is 
that we can decompose the total risk measure into a positive shock component and a negative 
shock component, so that we can observe accurately the behavior such investors whose utility 
responses to stock price change are asymmetric. Comparing the risks based on those two measures, 
our results show that the extreme measures do not always cohere with the classical standard 
deviation measure of risk for the countries considered. 
Previous studies that examine these issues on large developed countries. In this study, we 
examine nine relatively small European countries that have been exposed to several external 
financial shocks over the past decade. More specifically, during the Global Financial crisis of 
2007-08 and its aftermath, as G-7 countries generally recovered, relatively small economies such 
as Belgium, Greece, Ireland, and Portugal became the main epicenters of continued instability. 
For example, two of Belgium’s largest banks: Fortis and Dexia, underwent reorganization and 
restructuring in order to survive. Fortis was spun off into two parts, while the Dutch group was 
nationalized and the Belgian component was sold to the French bank BNP Paribas. Ireland and 
Greece also went into a debt crisis in 2010. Allied Irish Bank and the Bank of Ireland received a 
€7 billion rescue package in 2009 and went into recapitalization. The four largest banks of Greece, 
National Bank of Greece SA, Piraeus Bank SA, Euro-bank Ergasias SA, and Alpha Bank AE, 
have been the regular recipients of emergency loans from the European Central Bank (ECB). 
Portugal applied for bail-out programs to cover its insolvent sovereign debt, drawing a €79 billion 
from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the European Financial Stabilization Mechanism 
(EFSM), and the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF). The debt crises of Ireland, Greece 
and Portugal marked the start of the European sovereign debt crisis. One might posit that the 
behavior of investors in such countries experiencing protracted financial instability may not be 
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consistent with those in larger countries that have more or less recovered. Therefore, in this paper, 
we focus on individual investors’ response to the two aforementioned risk measures in those nine 
relatively small Eurozone countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Ireland, 
Norway, Portugal, and Sweden that were epicenters of continued instability. By using mutual 
fund flow as proxy of individual investor’s trading behavior, our results show significantly 
different behavior of investors in those countries in terms of their sensitivity to risks. 
We use the Hofstede (2001) culture dimension score on individualism vs. collectivism, as 
the culture factor. The detailed score for each country can be found in Table 1. Based on 
Hofstede’s classification, a country with higher cultural dimension score is classified more as 
individualism culture. Individualism cultures describes societies that emphasize the moral worth 
of the individuals, the exercise of individuals’ goals, desires, freedom, independence, and self-
reliance, and advocate that interests of individuals should be priority. Considering these culture 
characteristics, we hypothesize that subjective assessments among individuals may explain the 
differential or contrasting behaviors to risk: individual investors are more likely to take the 
initiative in actively trading in response to market signals. In addition, investors may have high 
risk tolerance, or are even adventuresome so exhibit “flight to risk” preferences, in the sense that 
they invest more, rather than liquidating their investments when they sense risk. On the other 
hand, societies with collectivist traditions emphasize cohesiveness amongst members, and 
individuals in these societies are more likely to adjust their behavior with that of their cohorts, 
rather than maximizing their own private benefits. Therefore, we propose that more collectivist 
cultures constrain the initiative for investors to actively trading in response to market signals, and 
individual investors with these cultural attributes are more likely to exhibit herding behavior and 
are less sensitive to variations in the risk environment.  
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Our results support our hypothesis. We find that small investors’ responses to risk (both 
traditional and extreme risks) in those small Eurozone countries are significantly influenced by 
country culture. In other words, the culture variable affects the impact of risk on investor’s trading 
behavior. The impact of risk on fund flow is significantly positive and are larger from countries 
with more individualistic cultures.  This implies that individual investors from these countries are 
more sensitive to variations in risk, in terms of engaging in active trading in response to risk 
changes. On the other hand, when controlling for the culture variable, small investors trading 
behavior is not directly affected by risk. Our results emphasize the importance of cultural factors 
in determining individual investor’s behavior in response to risk in small Eurozone countries. To 
the best of our knowledge, our research is the first study that provides a detailed examination of 
individual investor’s trading behavior and its key determinants in relatively small Eurozone 
countries that were particularly affected by the European banking and European sovereign debt 
crisis. 
My second essay studies the impact of the negative-interest-rate-policies (NIRP) on 
foreign exchange and equity markets of eight European countries and Japan. Recently, several 
countries lowered their policy rates below zero percent as a means to emerge from severe 
recessionary conditions. One could argue that Japan provides the archetypical case of NIRP 
implementation. The country’s long recession, the so-called “Lost 20 Years,” has been one of the 
most troublesome episodes for the world economy in recent decades. In order to stimulate the 
Japanese economy, after unsuccessful attempts through public sector spending, quantitative 
easing, and deregulation, the Japanese government went beyond its long-standing zero-interest-
rate policy as the Bank of Japan (BOJ) announced that the deposit rate for its accounts would be 
-0.1 percent from February 16, 2016.  
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The execution of NIRP was not unprecedented. Prior to the Japanese experiment, several 
European countries including Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland implemented 
negative interest policies at various times. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, and Hungary joined 
the negative-interest-rate group in 2016. These three countries lowered their interest rates below 
the zero bound to maintain the interest rate differentials between themselves and the eurozone 
region, which were narrowing, as a result of the quantitative easing policy conducted by the ECB. 
Policymakers in other countries have also considered NIRP as one of their monetary policy 
options in order to overcome the possible recession or even stagflation.  
Most studies on the economic effects of interest rate changes on financial markets have 
been conducted for regimes characterized by positive interest rate bounds. The empirical literature 
aimed at assessing how negative interest rates actually affect markets is still relatively limited. 
Moreover, numerous questions about the negative interest rate concept still remain to be clarified. 
This study aims to shed new light on the impact of NIRP on financial markets, and in turn enhance 
our understanding of the limitations of stimulative monetary policies through lower interest rates. 
I provide new evidence on the impact of negative interest rates on country exchange rates and 
equity markets over various time horizons. Specifically, I analyze cases of Europe and Japan 
using standard event studies as well as regime-switching vector autoregressive regression models. 
The results suggest that NIRP has transitory effects on local currency returns. Longer term effects 
are observed for only a few countries. 
My last essay is an empirical analysis of the market for the world’s leading cryptocurrency, 
Bitcoin. Bitcoin’s unprecedented price appreciation in 2017 was deemed by many observers of 
international financial markets to represent a modern analogue to the Dutch tulip mania of the 17th 
century. It is difficult to infer an appropriate/efficient market price for virtual currencies such as 
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Bitcoin.  Simple expectations models are confounded by the limited historical data series available 
since its inception, which hampers even rudimentary backtesting exercises.1 Bitcoin and other 
cryptocurrencies that have emerged have achieved notoriety for several reasons including: a) 
allowing transactions among parties in a transparent manner; b) providing liquidity without 
arbitrary bounds set by centralized governmental authorities; and c) global compatibility. However, 
the acceptability of Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies remains a matter of controversy due to 
factors that include: a) anonymity of wallet ownership permitting its use for money laundering and 
other criminal activities; b) security issue of the virtual exchange system; and c) market instability, 
reflected by extraordinary levels of volatility through time. These latter features are often used as 
a key deterrent to widespread adoption of cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin in the real economy. 
Public pricing for Bitcoin commenced with the launch of the platform: BitcoinMarket.com in 
March 2010. The price of Bitcoin at the outset of trading was a mere $0.003. After16 months, it 
soared to $31. From that time forth, Bitcoin’s price has experienced periods of extreme volatility 
characterised by episodes of explosive appreciations and depreciations, unhampered by regulated 
price limits or circuit breakers such as prevail in many organized exchanges. Bitcoin’s appreciation 
from under $1,000 to over $18,000 in 2017-18 has been viewed by numerous market 
commentators as clear evidence of a classic irrational bubble. 
As of December 31, 2017, the total market capitalization of Bitcoin was $237,466,518,547, 
and its 24 hours trading volume recorded $12,136,306,688 with circulating supply of 16,774,450 
BTCs.2 The sheer magnitude of this market has served as lightening rod for government regulators 
                                                     
1 The origin of Bitcoin remains nebulous. In October 2008, an unknown developer, Satoshi Nakamoto presented a 
nine-page paper explaining the principal of a peer-to-peer electronic money system with blockchain technology. The 
program named Bitcoin Core was opened to the public in 2009 which inaugurated the world’s biggest cryptocurrency 
to date. This virtual currency was expected to become an attractive medium of exchange to compete with and even 
supersede extant government-issued currencies. 




concerned with the integrity of international financial markets. Monetary authorities have begun 
to address several questions in this regard including: a) the potential for Bitcoin and other 
cryptocurrencies to substitute for and perhaps replace government-issued currencies; b) weakening 
the ability of central banks to conduct monetary policy; and c) exposure to excessive speculative 
behavior apart from that could creating instability in global financial markets. 
Our contribution in this paper concerns c). Our focus is on whether Bitcoin prices are 
determined in an efficient market.  We address this issue from several perspectives.  First, we 
examine whether the pricing of Bitcoin can be explained by fundamental factors, as opposed to 
technical perturbations reflected by excess speculative behavior. Our focus here is on markets in 
which the cryptocurrency’s trading volume is highest: the U.S. Dollar, Chinese Yuan, Japanese 
Yen, Euro, and South Korean Won, respectively. The study also examines the impact of several 
macroeconomic drivers in the pricing of Bitcoin. Overall, the results support the assertion that 
speculation can be considered the decisive factor underlying extreme volatility in the market. We 
also test for pricing efficiency based on deviations from no-arbitrage between spot and futures 
markets, using all CBOE and CME contracts traded from January 2018 contracts to March 2019. 
The findings are not consistent with market efficiency for the futures prices. Furthermore, we find 
that deviations from no-arbitrage prices widen during episodes of hackings, frauds issues and new 
alternative cryptocurrency releases. 




Chapter 2: Risk, Culture and Investor Behavior in Small (but notorious) Eurozone 
Countries 
2.1 Literature Review: 
How investors respond to risk has been a fundamental question in finance over the past 
several decades. Most studies that use the traditional volatility measure (standard deviation of 
stock returns) as it relates to investors’ trading behavior find mixed results. For instance, Sirri and 
Tufano (1998), Barber, Odean, and Zheng (2005), Spiegel and Zhang (2013), and Kim (2017) 
assert that fund flows are negatively related to risk. On the other hand, O’Neal (2004) and 
Cashman et al. (2014) show a positive relation between fund inflows and risk.  In a related vein, 
Clifford et al. (2013) show that fund inflows from small investors are positively related to 
unsystematic risk, while its relation to market risk is an open question. In a recent paper, Switzer 
et al. (2017) examine the responses of investors to both an extreme risk measure, and the 
traditional risk measure. They find that individual investors in G-7 countries have different 
reactions and sensitivities to these two types of risk. 
Why investors from those countries exhibit different responses to the same risk measures? 
This is a critical important research question addressed in this study. Previous literature in this 
line of research show cross-country investor behavioral variations. For example, Statman (2008) 
investigates twenty-two countries and identifies significant differences in stated propensities for 
risk taking of investors. Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001) emphasis culture variables in explaining 
stockholder’s behavior. Eun, Wang, and Xiao (2015) find that culture influences stock price 
synchronicity by affecting correlations in investors' trading activities and a country's information 
environment.  
While these studies typically show that individualism plays a significant role, they do not 
explore the actual trading behavior of market participants across different countries. Several 
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researchers endeavor to ascertain the influence of such cultural dimension’s influence on 
performance of financial markets. For example, by using use Hofstede’s culture dimension score 
of 26 developed countries’ data, Chui et al. (2010) assert that country individualist score is 
positively related to trading volume, volatility, and the magnitude of momentum profits. 
Schmeling (2009) examines the impacts of investor sentiment on stock returns over 18 
industrialized countries and finds that sentiment negatively forecasts aggregate stock returns. 
Chang and Lin (2015) provide comparable results. According to their findings, national cultures 
are associated with investor herding behavior.  Such herding behavior is particularly observed in 
countries where Confucianism is dominant and in less sophisticated stock markets. Although 
these studies provide insights about how cultural factors influence overall investing activities in 
equity markets, they do not consider investors’ attitudes against risk. Our paper provides new 
evidence on this issue, as we examine individual investor’s trading behavior directly, as reflected 
in portfolio position changes in response to changing risk, and how culture factor plays a role in 
deterring investor’s trading behavior based on different risk levels.  
2.2. Sample Construction  
The data of mutual fund net flows used in this study are obtained from Thomson Reuters 
DataStream and Thomson ONE. For each of the countries in this study, we choose the equity 
index with the longest history as the major stock index to use in this study. The historical prices 
for those indices are collected from Bloomberg and Thomson Reuters DataStream. Table 2 
presents the details of the indices, including the time period and the number of observations for 
each country when we use daily, weekly, and monthly data to calculate risk variables.  
[Insert Table 2 here] 
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The index for our sample countries start from as early as 1987, including Finland’s OMS 
Helsinki Index, Ireland’s Irish Overall Index, and Sweden’s Stockholm All-Share Index, to as late 
as 1995, including Norway’s OMX Oslo All Share Index. The index for each country covers more 
than 18 years, from as short as 225 months (19 years) to as long as 445 months (37 years). 
Therefore, our sample period covers major historical events and business cycles, allowing for a 
broad perspective for investigating investors’ behavior across different market conditions.  
 
2.2.1. Traditional Risk (bases on Standard Deviations) and Extreme Risk Estimation 
2.2.1.1. Traditional risk measure 
In order to calculate both the standard and extreme risk measure, we need to calculate 
returns from index prices first. Following previous literature, we use the logarithmic percentage 
change (L%) of the stock index closing price to estimate returns on a daily, weekly, and monthly 
basis, respectively. The summary statistics of logarithmic percentage changes for each country is 
shown in Table 3. Panels A, B, and C in Table 3 provide the statistics of returns based on daily, 
weekly, and monthly index prices, respectively. Panel D of Table 3 show the statistics during the 
crisis period of 2008-09, in addition to the whole sample period. 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
As shown in Table 3, Greece has the lowest average returns during over its sample period 
with -0.47% daily return, while Norway and Sweden have the highest returns during the sample 
period. For all countries, significant departures from normality are observed for all data 
frequencies, based on the Jarque-Bera statistics. At daily, weekly, and monthly frequencies, for 
all nine countries, the markets show negative skewness and leptokurtosis. Jarque-Bera test rejects 
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the normality of the return distribution, implying that extreme measure of risk which does not 
assume normal distribution may be better than standard risk measure. However, in this study we 
compare and use both measures comprehensively to check investor’s response.  
We then annualize the returns to get annualized geometric returns before calculating 
traditional and extreme risks, assuming 252 effective trading days over a year. The traditional risk 
measure is calculated as the annualized geometric standard deviation of the annualized return of 
index for each country. 
2.2.1.2. Extreme risk measure 
The extreme measure of volatility is estimated as the percentage of extreme days, weeks 
or months over a given period. Most researchers define the extreme value as the lowest or the 
highest daily return of a stock market index observed over a given period (see e.g. Longin, 1996).  
Jones, Walker and Wilson (2004) use the statistical distribution of annualized geometric return to 
arbitrarily assign the distribution percentiles of 5% and 95% as cut-off points to distinguish 
extreme values. In our study, we define the extreme dates as the observations that are less than 
the difference between the lower quartile (Q1) and the value of 1.5 times of the interquartile range 
(IQR, aka. the lower inner fence), or greater than the sum of the upper quartile (Q3) and the value 
of 1.5 times of the interquartile range (IQR, aka. the upper inner fence), following the traditional 
outlier classification methodology suggested by Tukey (1977): 
Extreme Observation < Q1 - 1.5 ×  IQR, or Extreme Observation > Q3 + 1.5 ×  IQR 
The range suggested by Tukey’s fence is slightly narrower than ±3σ in normally 
distributed dataset, which declares about 1% of outliers. The extreme risk for a given year is 
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determined as the percentage of outliers during a given interval over that year, i.e. Percentage of 
Extremes = No. of Outliers / Annual Trading Days (Weeks or Months).  
2.3. Comparison of Two Risk Measures  
One weakness of the traditional risk measure is that it is treats positive and negative price 
changes symmetrically. However, the extreme volatility method provides both positive and 
negative measures, and can be used to more accurately predict the behavior of risk-averse 
investors who responses are more dramatic to negative changes than to the positive changes of 
equity prices.  
Figure 1 portrays the time series of the extreme measure of risk for Belgium, Greece, 
Ireland, and Portugal from 1986-2016. As shown in these graphs, 35.8% of Ireland’s trading days 
were characterized by extreme volatility in 2008; Belgian and Portuguese markets experienced 
extreme volatility on more than 25% of their trading days in the same year, reflecting the strong 
and persistent influence of the Global financial crisis in 2008-2009. Greece has 16% of extreme 
days in 2015, somewhat higher than its experience in 2008, when 13% of annual trading days are 
identified as extreme. In sum, the countries of this sample display some commonalities as well as 
differences in regards to the timing and magnitude of their exposure to extreme volatility over the 
sample period. 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
In Table 4 to Table 6, we compare the traditional risk and extreme risk as measured by 
the percentage of extreme days, weeks, or months by each country, respectively. As Table 4 
shows, estimated from daily data, volatility rankings of conventional risk measure are similar to 
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those of extreme measures. In particular, the most volatile year and top ranked extreme years for 
each country are almost identical for all the nine countries.  
[Insert Table 4 here] 
Using weekly data to measure risk, as shown in Table 5, both methodologies almost 
cohere as well. In most countries, the most volatile 2 or 3 years are identical across risk measures. 
However, Greece and Sweden are exceptional cases. Traditional risk measure shows 1998, 2015, 
and 2014 as the most volatile years, while extreme measure suggests 2009, 1999, and 2011 in 
Greece. For Sweden, extreme measure approach indicates 2001, 2000, and 2002 are the most 
volatile years, whereas standard deviation catches 2008, 1998, and 2000 as the most unstable 
periods. 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
Using monthly data, we observe that in the majority of cases, the most volatile years based 
on extreme measure rankings also shown to be the most volatile based on traditional standard 
deviation analysis ranking. 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
According to Switzer et al (2017), for G-7 countries of their study, volatility as captured 
by the extreme measure shows similar patterns as the traditional volatility measure for most years. 
Many commonalities in the attribution of high risk by both measures are observed, consistent 
with Longin and Solnik (2001). However, differences are also observed, therefore, in our formal 
test, we use both risk measures in our analyses of investor behavior. 
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 2.4. Results Based on Individual Countries  
In this research, our objective is to explain investor’s reaction to both risk variables by 
measuring net flows to equity mutual funds against changes in both extreme volatility and 
standard deviation changes. In our initial specifications, our dependent variables is the net flow 
to equity mutual funds, with the risk measures lagged by one period in separate specifications. 
Our control variables include returns (GeoMean), linear time trend (Time) to account for possible 
secular growth in such funds, as well as a financial market crisis dummy variable (Crisis) in our 
following models. 
 
NetFlows(t) = α + βGeoMean(t-1) + γGeoStdDev(t-1) + δTime +λCrisis+ ε(t)                 Model 1 
NetFlows(t) = α + βGeoMean(t-1) + γTotalExtr(t-1) + δ Time + λCrisis+ ε(t)                   Model 2 
NetFlows(t) = α + βGeoMean(t-1) + γNegExtr(t-1) + ζPosExtr(t-1) + δ Time + λCrisis +ε(t)      
Model 3 
The variable NetFlow refers to the net flows to equity mutual funds, which are defined as 
new sales plus reinvestment of income less withdrawals and transfers; TotalExtr denotes the 
percentage of the number of extreme days over the measure horizon; NegExtr and PosExtr 
represent the percentages of number of negative and positive extreme days over the measure 
horizon, respectively; Crisis is a dummy variable to indicate the global financial crisis in 2008-9. 
We expect that regression coefficients for mean returns are positive, and for market volatility are 
negative, using the traditional or extreme day risk measures. In addition, when volatility is divided 
into negative and positive components, the coefficient for the negative extreme days should be 
negative since when stock market is negatively volatile, loss averse investors tend to hold less 
equity, and the coefficient for the positive extreme days probably positive.  
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In order to anticipate the effect of the crisis variable, we compare summary statistics 
during the financial crisis and the full sample period, based on Panel D of Table 3. In most 
countries, the average monthly logarithmic percentage changes are negative, ranging between -
4.53 to -8.86 percent in 2008, and between -0.08 to 1.00 percent across the whole sample period. 
The standard deviations also increase, during the financial crisis years, while Kurtosis decreases 
in both 2008 and 2009. To prevent possible “overfitting” using the crisis dummy variable, we 
also estimate our above three models with crisis dummy variable excluded.  
In Table 7, we provide the regression results for the nine countries. Panel A (B) shows the 
results for models 1-3 (4-6) that include (exclude) the crisis dummy variable.  
[Insert Table 7 here] 
There is no major difference in the results between Models 1-3 and Models 4-6, except 
for the case of Belgium. The regression data shows significant statistic values for the traditional 
measure of the risk in Austria’s case. Austrian retail investors also respond to extreme risk 
measures, according to the result of Model 2. Furthermore, they move into markets subsequent to 
negative extreme event. It is interesting to observe Austria’s case since the country is classified 
as a relatively less individualistic culture according to Hofstede (2001). The only other country 
in which investors respond to risk/extreme risk is Belgium, which is one of central figures of the 
European banking crisis, suffering from the default of its two largest banks. As shown in Model 
3, small investors in Belgium exhibit “flight to risk” behavior with increased negative extreme 
measures, while there was fund outflow when there are positive extreme outliers. This gives us a 
scenario that Belgian investors are attracted to negative extreme events (buying the dips) and exit 
the markets on positive extreme events (sell at the high). However, when we run regression 
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without financial crisis dummy variable, such behavior is no longer observable in Models 4, 5 
and 6.  
For both Portugal and Ireland, the crisis dummy variable plays significant role, though in 
different directions. With the crisis dummy included, funds flow out of the Portuguese market 
while the opposite happens in Ireland. Hofstede’s individualism vs. collectivism score classifies 
Portugal as a highly collectivist and Ireland as a highly individualistic culture. Indeed, investors 
in highly individualistic cultures such as Ireland show high risk tolerance or even risk loving 
proclivities.  Hence, during the crisis period, they are more inclined to exhibit “flight to risk” 
behavior. However, as we see from the separate country results, the impacts of risks on fund flow 
are not monotonic with respect to increases of Hofstede’s individualism score. For example, at 
the same level of individualism score, countries such as Sweden and Norway do not show 
consistent result. Mutual fund flows of Greece, Norway, and Sweden are not significantly 
responsive to changes in with any of the variables in the models. Norway and Sweden show high 
levels of the individualism index. So far, the influence of culture on investor responsiveness to 
risk is not clear-cut. 
[Insert Figure 2 here] 
These results are also depicted in Figure 2, where the relationship between investors’ 
behavior vs. extreme risk is shown for Belgium, Greece, Ireland, and Portugal. Figure 2.1 graphs 
the case of Belgium, which is classified as an individualistic. The investors’ tendency of “flight 
to risk” is evident in the graph, as it is observed that the increased risk of the equity market has 
the negative relationship with the equity market’s mutual fund inflow, especially in 2002, 2005, 
and 2008. In collectivist cultures, the relation between risk and fund flow is mixed. For example, 
Figure 2.2 shows that in Greece, the equity market volatility moves in the same trend with the 
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equity market’s mutual fund inflow. However, for another collectivist culture country, Portugal, 
the relation between risk and fund flow is negative, as shown in Figure 2.4. For Ireland, the mutual 
fund flow is not responsive to changes in equity market volatility. Therefore, we cannot conclude 
decisively that the cultural variable has monotonic impact on the relation between fund flow and 
extreme risk. 
The drawback of the regression based on individual countries is that we cannot incorporate 
the culture variable directly in the regression, since it is a highly persistent/time-invariant. As a 
consequence, in order to clearly understand the impact of culture in the relation between extreme 
risk and fund flow, in the next section, we perform a serious of panel regressions including all the 
nine countries with culture dummy variable added.  
 2.5. Country Culture and Panel Regressions  
One important research focus of this study is on the effects of cultural factors on small 
investors’ behavior in response to both traditional and extreme risks. In order to examine the 
influence of individualism or collectivism in the market, we import Hofstede’s cultural dimension 
score. As discussed in the previous section, according to the results of individual country analyses, 
investors’ reaction against risks by country are non-monotonic, considering the cultural 
dimension score. This may due to the fact the impact of cultural factors on the relation between 
investors’ response to risk factors are regime dependent, or there is a threshold level of culture 
score that affect such impact. Thus, in order to obtain distinct and intuitive outcomes, we separate 
the nine Eurozone countries into two groups: countries with individualistic cultures vs. countries 
with collectivist cultures, based on the median of Hofstede’s cultural dimension score. Countries 
with Hofstede’s score above the median are classified as individualistic, and we use a dummy 
variable, Individualism =1 to indicate this group. For our sample countries, Belgium, Denmark, 
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Sweden, Ireland and Norway are members of this group.  On the other hand, Finland, Austria, 
Greece, and Portugal are classified as collectivist societies (Individualism =0). 
With this country classification, we perform panel regressions using the country specific, 
time invariant cultural variables, and consider the interaction between the culture variable and the 
risk variable to determine how culture moderates the impact of risk on investor’s trading behavior. 
The maintained hypothesis of delayed responses of investors is carried forth from the previous 
regression models. In order to control for economic development for each country, we also add 
GDP per capita (GDP) to the analysis. The specific models follow:  
 
NetFlows(t) = α + β1GeoMean(t-1)+ β2GeoStdDev(t-1)+β11GDP(t-1 )+ β12Crisis+ ε(t)           1’ 
 
NetFlows(t) = α + β1GeoMean(t-1)+β2GeoStdDev(t-1)+β3Individualism +β11GDP(t-1) + 
β12Crisis + ε(t)   
2’ 
 
NetFlows(t) = α + β1GeoMean(t-1)+β2GeoStdDev(t-1)+β4Individualism*GeoStdDev(t-
1)+β11GDP(t-1) +β12Crisis+ε(t)                  3’ 
 
NetFlows(t) = α + β1GeoMean(t-1)+β5TotalExtr(t-1) + β11GDP(t-1)+β12Crisis+ε(t)                 4’ 
 
NetFlows(t) = α + β1GeoMean(t-1)+ β3Individualism + β5TotalExtr(t-1) + β11GDP(t-
1)+β12Crisis+ε(t)       
5’ 
 
NetFlows(t) = α + β1GeoMean(t-1) +β5TotalExtr(t-1)+ β6Individualism*TotalExtr(t-
1)+β11GDP(t-1) +β12Crisis+ ε(t)                6’ 
 
NetFlows(t) = α + β1GeoMean(t-1) + β7NegExtr(t-1) +β8PosExtr(t-1)+ β11GDP(t-1)+β12Crisis+ 
ε(t)                  7’ 
 
NetFlows(t) = α + β1GeoMean(t-1) + β3Individualism + β7NegExtr(t-1) +β8PosExtr(t-1)+ 
β11GDP(t-1) +β12Crisis+ ε(t)                8’ 
 
NetFlows(t) = α + β1GeoMean(t-1) +β7 NegExtr(t-1)+β8 PosExtr(t-1)+ 




In the regression models, Individualism is the cultural dummy variable. GDP represents 
for GDP per capita of each country at specific time point t. The definitions of the other variables 
are identical to the regression models in section 3. We also implement panel regressions that 
incorporate controls for year fixed effects. Table 8 below reports the results. Panel A provides 
results for models 1’to 9’ without country fixed effects and Panel B reports results that include 
country fixed effects in the analyses. 
[Insert Table 8 here] 
We observe positive coefficients for the interaction variables Individualism*Geo StdDev 
and Individualism*Total Extr., as shown in models 3’ and 6’ in both Panels A and panel B. 
However, it is interesting to note that neither the traditional risk nor the extreme risk measure 
affects fund flow directly, as shown by the insignificant coefficient of Geo.Std.Deviation(t-1) and 
coefficient of Total Extreme Value (t-1) in models 1’, 2’, 4’ and 5’ for both panels. We note that 
the culture-risk interaction variables show a significantly positive impact on fund flow (e.g., 0.163 
in model 3’ and 0.112 in model 6’) at the 1% significant level. This finding can explain why our 
previous tests in section 3, based on risk variables only, does not systematically predict investors 
trading behavior. Further looking at the sign of the interaction terms in models 3’ and 6’ in both 
panels, in contrast to investors from collectivist cultures, investors based in individualistic 
cultures are more responsive to changes in both traditional and extreme risk. In addition, the 
positive sign of the interaction terms shows that investors from individualistic societies exhibit 
“flight to risk” behavior, performing like risk seekers with high risk tolerance. We use country 
size, as measured by GDP per capita as a control variable in the regressions. However, it is not 
found to be a significant determinant of investors’ trading behavior. 
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Another noteworthy point is that when we further look at whether the positive extreme 
shock and negative extreme shock have different impact on investor’s response to risk, we find 
out that investors are actually indifferent in this regard. For example, for each of the negative and 
positive extreme risk variables, the coefficients are not significant, shown in the results for models 
7’ and 8’.  Similar results are also shown with the interaction terms (models 3’, 6’, and 9’).  
As a robustness check, we also separate sample countries into three groups based on 
Hofstede’s culture score, with individualism in the top tercile group, neutral in the middle tercile 
group and collectivism in the bottom tercile group. 3  Our results based on this alternative 
classification are qualitatively and quantitatively consistent with the previous findings: the 
culture-risk interaction term has a significantly positive impact on fund flows. In addition, small 
investors with individualism (or neutral) cultural backgrounds exhibit flight to risk behavior. 
[Insert Table 9 here] 
We also conduct a further robustness check using simultaneous equations to account for 
the possibility that both risk and fund flows are determined simultaneously. Table 9 present the 
results of the simultaneous regression analyses using 2SLS. The results are consistent with our 
previous findings that there is a significant positive impact of the traditional risk-individualism 
interaction term on fund flow, as shown in model 3’ that the coefficient of Individualism*Geo 
StdDev is 0.143 with 95% level. When we use extreme risk measure, the results are similar: the 
coefficient of Individualism*Total Extr in model 6’ is 0.101 with 5% level. Therefore, our results 
are robust to alternative classification of the culture dummy variable as well as simultaneous 
model specification. 
                                                     
3 Full sample results provide qualitatively and quantitatively similar findings, are available on request, and are 






Chapter 3: The Effects of Negative Interest Rates on Equity and Currency Markets 
3.1 Literature Review: 
Since Gesell (1891) suggested an idea of taxing on cash in the late 19th century, the 
concept of negative interest rate had not been broadly discussed until Japan’s long recession 
started in early 1990s. The global economy has been growing consistently for a century, except 
for several crisis periods. Therefore, it was deemed to be a natural phenomenon that money grows 
over time, and thus inflation and interest rates are positive in general. Is stimulative monetary 
policy through lower interest rates effective?  This is a basic question that has been debated in the 
literature for decades. Most of the empirical work on this question has been conducted in an 
environment where nominal interest rates have a zero lower bound. Negative nominal interest 
rates as a policy instrument are a fairly new phenomenon, and might be viewed as a consequence 
of the persistence of recessionary conditions in several countries, despite attempts by central 
banks to stimulate the affected economies through stimulative monetary policies such as 
quantitative easing.4  
In the aftermath of severe financial crises and recessions, several governments cut their 
interest rate to the “lower bound” of zero. After experiencing the Global Financial Crisis in 2007-
08, the Federal Reserve introduced the zero-interest-rate policy (ZIRP) in 2008, and the BOJ cut 
its deposit rate to zero in 2010. Subsequently, the ECB also decided to lower their deposit rate 
and maintain them to be pinned at zero percent in 2012. However, due to unsatisfactory outcomes 
of ZIRP and other expansionary policies, monetary authorities in some countries decided to 
pursue negative-interest-rate strategy as a viable alternative to stimulate their economies. 
                                                     




The analysis of NIRP in the literature is not unprecedented.  Flemming and Garbade (2004) 
analyze negative interest rates on certain U.S. Treasury security repurchase agreements. Redding 
(2000) observes that some U.S. Treasury bills generate a liquidity premium due to their heavy 
trading frequency. He shows that this liquidity premium is sufficient to lower the forward nominal 
interest rate below zero under certain conditions. Coenen (2003) asserts that the zero-interest-rate 
bound is economically insignificant under the Taylor’s interest rate rule. Correspondingly, Jarrow 
(2013) shows that requirement of a zero-lower bound on interest rates in markets is not a valid 
constraint. He asserts that in a competitive and nearly frictionless market, a negative risk-free 
nominal interest rate can be consistent with an arbitrage free term structure evolution. Buiter 
(2009) analyzes three specific methodologies for lowering the nominal interest rates to negative 
realm and tests their feasibility. His study shows that the interest rates can be dropped below zero 
percent by abolishing currency, paying negative interest on currency by taxing money, and 
separating the numéraire from the currency. Among them, the methodology of taxing currency is 
the approach of monetary authorities in most countries examined in this study. Danthine (2017) 
moves the possibility beyond just below the zero bound, suggesting that the nominal interest rate 
can be significantly lower than zero. 
Since employing and maintaining NIRP for a considerable period of time is a relatively 
recent practice adopted by a few central banks to date, extant evidence on its impact remains 
limited. On the other hand, the few empirical findings pertaining to this subject have shown that 
the effects of adopting a negative interest rate strategy can be significantly different in terms of 
direction, magnitude, and efficiency, not only across countries, sectors, and time horizons, but 
also across studies. The discrepancies in the results may be attributed to the differences in the 
objectives and motivations behind implementing NIRP, its launch date, as well as those in the 
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countries’ economic situations. These findings can also differ because of the various 
methodologies used in the literature to assess the impacts of the introduction of NIRP.  
Tokic (2016) discusses the rationale for setting negative interest rates. Through the 
analysis based on the yield curve, the author explains that central banks are compelled to go below 
the zero bound for the policy interest rate in order to maintain the curve spread (the differential 
between long- and short-term yields) at a certain level allowing to increase bank profitability and 
stimulate the economy during a recession. The author also analyzes the repercussions of NIRP on 
investors in the stock, fixed-income, real estate, or commodity markets. Jurkšas (2017) examines 
the motives and the impacts of NIRP implementations on various markets and economic sectors 
in the Euro Area. The author conducts statistical analyses that show that NIRP’s effects are 
significant and could be either positive or negative, depending on the sector and the time horizon 
over which these effects are assessed, while the local currency depreciates in short-term following 
NIRP. Siegel and Sexaue (2017) address the potential problems created by NIRP, as well as assess 
their impacts; they also put forward their recommendations on how to make and adjust investment 
decisions in such environments. Hameed and Rose (2017) investigate the effects of negative 
nominal interest rates on exchange rates (effective and bilateral). Their empirical findings imply 
that the behavior of exchange rates (e.g., volatility, deviations from uncovered interest parity) 
have not been substantially influenced by negative interest rates. Arteta, Kose, Stocker, and 
Taskin (2018) implements an event study to evaluate the effects of NIRP domestically in the five 
major economies that introduce the policy (the Euro Area, Japan, Switzerland, Sweden, and 
Denmark), as well as their potential global spillover impacts on several emerging and developing 
economies. These effects are examined over a 1-day event window around the implementation of 
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NIRP 5  on seven chosen variables, including interbank rates and bond yields with different 
maturities, swap rates, equity prices, and the nominal effective exchange rate. Their empirical 
results show that the effects of NIRP is in the expected direction of conventional monetary policy 
mechanisms. The authors argue, however, that financial stability could be threatened if these rates 
become more negative or should the governments need to continue applying the NIRP for longer 
periods of time. 
 
3.2 Hypotheses  
Manipulating the nominal interest rate has been a popular policy measure for central banks. 
The mechanism of the traditional monetary policy is based on the conventional economics theory: 
cutting the interest rate increases the aggregate amount of money in the market, and as the supply 
of money in the economy increases, more investment and consumption are expected as a primary 
following-up consequence. Unlike most historical cases, however, the nine central banks 
executed the policy by putting their steps into the negative interest territory. To identify the 
validity of the negative-interest-rate strategy as an expansionary monetary policy on the currency 
market returns, I set following hypothesis: 
H1: The announcement (or implementation) of NIRP results in statistically significant 
changes in the value of the local currency in international markets. Whether a currency 
appreciates or depreciates depends on country specific factors. 
                                                     
5 The authors argue that the event study is restricted to a 1-day window in order to ensure that the data is not influenced by 
factors other than the introduction of a NIRP. When a 1-month window is considered instead, the authors obtain larger effects but 
qualitatively similar.  
 34 
 
Lowering interest rates in general, with high capital mobility and flexible exchange rates 
can be viewed as a means to depreciate a currency, due to the short term violation of covered 
interest arbitrage conditions, which will create currency flows out of the country, as per the 
Mundell-Fleming Model.6  Negative interest rates should be particularly undesirable for investors 
who expect positive returns as a norm. Currency flights therefore might be observed in less 
developed countries with weak economic fundamentals which will be reflected as significant 
depreciation of the local currency vis-à-vis foreign currency benchmark.  For developed countries 
with stronger economic fundamentals, investors might perceive that negative interest rates will 
be particularly stimulative to GDP; higher GDP will be reflected in higher cash flows for investors, 
which would cause the domestic currency to appreciate in value. 
The effects of NIRP on equity markets are another aspect that I attempt to verify. 
Corresponding to the currency exchange market analyses, I suggest the following hypothesis for 
the equity market analyses: 
H2: The announcement (or implementation) of NIRP results in statistically significant 
change of the stock market returns. The direction of market reaction depends on country specific 
factors. 
Analogous to the argument for currency responses, we might expect that for developed 
countries with stronger economic fundamentals, investors might perceive that negative interest 
rates will be particularly stimulative to GDP; higher GDP will be reflected in higher cash flows 
                                                     
6  See e.g. Mundell(1963) and Fleming (1962). "Capital mobility and stabilization policy under fixed and flexible 
exchange rates." Canadian Journal of Economic and Political Science. 29 (4): 475–485. DOI:10.2307/139336. 
Reprinted in Mundell, Robert A. (1968). International Economics. New York: Macmillan. 
Fleming, J. Marcus (1962). "Domestic financial policies under fixed and floating exchange rates." IMF Staff Papers. 




for investors, which would cause the domestic currency to appreciate in value. For emerging 
economies, for which investors are leerier, capital flight might occur, which would serve as a 
retardant to GDP and equity markets.  
This study also investigates the influences of NIRP on the volatilities of both currency 
and equity returns. The question I address here is: Do the market participants accept this monetary 
policy as the same when it is executed in the negative territory? While most central banks 
introduce NIRP as a type of expansionary monetary policies, there exist some possible risks 
associated with the policy, according to previous literatures. For instance, Jobst and Lin (2016) 
point out that the negative interest rate may weigh on banks’ profitability. Correspondingly, 
Taskin (2018) asserts that maintaining negative rate considerably lower than zero or extended 
time period may undermine financial stability of the economy. Under such environment, if NIRP 
strategies are deemed to be undesirable events in the financial markets, the volatilities of financial 
market returns may be amplified, and investors can face higher risks than the past. To verify 
whether or not this assertion is valid, I suggest the following two hypotheses: 
H3: There is statistically significant change in the volatility of currency returns after NIRP. 
H4: There is statistically significant change in the volatility of equity returns after NIRP. 
 
3.3 Data Description 
Breaking the long belief that zero percent is the lower bound of the nominal interest rates, 
the ECB announced a negative deposit rate in 2014 and Japan decided to eliminate the zero bound 
of the central bank’s interest-rate policy in early 2016. Switzerland and Nordic countries such as 
Denmark, Norway, and Sweden introduced the policy a few years earlier than the Euro Area, 
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while Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, and Hungary announced the negative interest in 2016. 
Table 10 provides brief chronology of NIRP history for those nine countries. 
[Please insert Table 10 about here] 
In order to investigate NIRP’s influences on both currency and stock markets of the nine 
countries, their historical daily equity index prices and spot exchange rates are collected. (See 
Table 11 for the list of reference indices and currencies.) 
[Please insert Table 11 about here] 
The U.S. Dollar is solely set as the reference currency throughout this analysis, as it is 
widely recognized as the largest key currency in the global economy. Kwok and Brooks (1990) 
show that the U.S. Dollar functions fair as a numeraire in general foreign exchange analysis. 
Alongside with the U.S. Dollar, the EURO was considered as another reference currency for the 
study. The majority of countries in this research, however, are located in Europe, and some of 
them such as Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, and Denmark have pegged their currency to the 
EURO. In addition, most European currencies have relatively diminutive changes against the 
EURO over the time. Therefore, the EURO is not analyzed as a numeraire currency in this study. 
Table 12 presents the summary statistics of the data. 
[Please insert Table 12 about here] 
To investigate NIRP’s effects in longer term, I implement the regime-switching vector 
autoregressive regression analyses, defining regime 0 as pre-NIRP and 1 as ex-NIRP period. For 
the analyses, more than 2 years of historical daily index price data of the nine economies, the S&P 
500, and the EUROSTOXX50 are collected from Bloomberg, same as the source of currency spot 
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exchange rates. For the Euro Area, the German DAX Index is used as a proxy of the Euro Area 
Index. While the EUROSTOXX50 index serves as the representative equity market index of the 
Euro Area, it is not used as a proxy of the equity market. Since the EUROSTOXX50 is used as 
an explanatory variable, use of the index data causes collinearity problem in the regression models. 
Moreover, the index does not meet the comparability condition since this study is country by 
country analysis. 
Add to the equity index prices, historical policy rates data of the nine governments are 
obtained from FactSet and Thomson Reuter DataStream. Table 13 provides the summary statistics.  
[Please insert Table 13 about here] 
In order to estimate an appropriate value of the U.S. Dollar against another international 
key currencies, 6 years of Bloomberg Dollar Spot Index (BBDXY) data is obtained from 
Bloomberg. From the same source, 2 years of the nine countries’ overnight deposit rate, 5- year 
CDS spread, 2-year and 10-year national bond yields data are collected for the analysis. The yield 
curve of the sovereign bonds is defined as the differential between 2-year and 10-year bond yields. 
VIX currency index data is gathered from Chicago Board of Option Exchange (CBOE), in order 
to see the event’s impact on currency volatility change. Due to its availability, only Euro VIX and 
Japanese Yen VIX data are obtained. 
 
3.4 Research Methodology 
3.4.1 Definition of Currency and Index Return 
While the equity returns are computed with natural logarithm, it is not applicable for 
calculating the currency returns, recalling the Fisher effect. According to Fisher (1930), since 
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each currency’s value is relative to the numeraire currency, the interest rate differentials of local 
countries and numeraire country should be considered for appropriate calculation of currency 
returns. Kwok and Brooks (1990) suggest a relevant example of currency return estimation, 
considering the spot exchange rates and interest rates of the two countries compared. They define 
a currency return as currency exchange rate change less the interest rate differential between the 




− (𝑟𝑛,𝑡−1 − 𝑟𝑗,𝑡−1)           (1) 
Where 𝑅𝑗,𝑡 is the expected daily returns of currency j on date t; 𝑆𝑗,𝑡 is a spot exchange rates 
with respect to the numeraire currency n (U.S. Dollar). The daily interest rates of country j at time 
t is defined as 𝑟𝑗,𝑡, while the rates of the numeraire economy (the United State) at time t is 𝑟𝑛,𝑡. 
This model is using the arithmetic percentage in calculating returns of currency exchange rates 
from time t-1 to t. However, throughout this paper, we are using logarithmic returns for equity 
market returns. To be consistent with equity return computation, following equation is suggested 
to calculate currency returns. 
𝑅𝑗,𝑡 = 𝑙𝑛 (
𝑆𝑗,𝑡
𝑆𝑗,𝑡−1
) − (𝑟𝑛,𝑡−1 − 𝑟𝑗,𝑡−1)           (2) 
Over the period covered in this study, the policy rate of the U.S. Federal Reserve had 
several changes since 2015, subsequent to a long stable period. It had been 0.25% since 2009, 




3.4.2. Event Study 
The fundamental research methodology of this paper is conventional short-term event 
study with constant mean model. The primary event date is defined as the day of NIRP 
announcement. For comparison, the day when the policy rates were turned from zero (or positive) 
to a negative number is also considered as the secondary event date. In this study, the primary 
event window for the analysis is defined as 21 days [-10, +10], uniformly. This gives two trading 
weeks before and after the event date, and it is a generally fair event window as suggested by 
Kwok and Brooks (1990). For accurate event study results, a year of estimation window is used.  
The first model considered for measuring abnormal returns (AR) was the CAPM for 
equity market analyses. However, as I use the equity index returns as a proxy of stock market 
returns in this study, the equity indexes cannot represent the market. Thus, I lose the common 
proxy of the market variable for the analysis. The alternative model I suggest is the one factor 
model with constant mean return. According to Brown and Warner (1980 and 1985), despite its 
simplicity and restrictiveness, the results based on the constant mean model are as appropriate as 
those of other more complex models. Thus, it is used to find the significance of abnormal returns: 







     (4) 
𝑅𝑗,𝑡 represents the daily returns of currency and equity index of country j; 𝜇 is the constant 




3.4.3. Regime-Switching Vector Autoregressive Regression Model 
In order to see more general and longer-term effects of NIRP of each government, 1 year 
before and after NIRP data are tested by regression models with regime-switching dummy 
variable. The day of NIRP implementation was set as the regime-switching moment, and the pre-
event year is defined as regime 0, and post-event year is considered as regime 1. The length of 
each regime is 365 calendar days, 261 days after excluding Saturdays and Sundays. By using this 
methodology, it is feasible to verify whether there exists any evidence that the policy had a 
statistically valid change on each economy’s stock and currency exchange market in the longer 















𝑒𝑥 𝐸𝑈𝑅𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑂𝑋𝑋50𝑡−1 +  𝛽11,𝑗
𝑒𝑥 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑇𝐸 + 𝜀𝑗














𝑒𝑞 𝐸𝑈𝑅𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑂𝑋𝑋50𝑡−1 +  𝛽11,𝑗
𝑒𝑞 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑇𝐸 + 𝜀𝑗
𝑒𝑞
         (6) 
In the models above, variables 𝑒𝑟𝑗,𝑡 and 𝑐𝑟𝑗,𝑡refer currency and equity market return of 
country j at time t; 𝑂𝑁𝐷𝑅 , 2yby and 10yby are overnight deposit rate, 2-year and 10-year 
government bond’s yield, respectively; Abs_YCS refers absolute value of yield curve slope, which 
is defined as the difference between 10-year and 2-year bond yields; 5YCDS_Spread is 5-year 
CDS spread, and 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑗,𝑡 is regime dummy variable of country j at time t. Due to unavailability 
 41 
 
of the data, the two national bond yield variables are omitted for the analysis of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. For Hungary as well, 3-year national government bond yields are used instead of 
the 2-year bond returns. 
As previously mentioned, NIRP’s impact on the currency and equity market volatilities is 
another topic to be investigated in this paper. While the models suggested above considers 
appropriate variables which can potentially influence the dependent variable, they do not capture 
volatilities of the currency and equity index returns. In order to see the effects on currency return 














𝑣𝑖𝑥𝐵𝐵𝐷𝑋𝑌𝑡−1 +  𝛽10,𝑗
𝑣𝑖𝑥 𝑆&𝑃500𝑡−1 + 𝛽11,𝑗
𝑣𝑖𝑥 𝐸𝑈𝑅𝑆𝑇𝑋50𝑡−1 +  𝛽12,𝑗
𝑣𝑖𝑥 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑇𝐸11,𝑡
𝑣𝑖𝑥 + 𝜀𝑗














𝑣𝑖𝑥 𝐸𝑈𝑅𝑆𝑇𝑋50𝑡−1 +  𝛽11,𝑗
𝑣𝑖𝑥 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑇𝐸11,𝑡
𝑣𝑖𝑥 + 𝜀𝑗
𝑒𝑥           (8) 
However, these models cover volatilities of the EURO and Japanese Yen returns only. 
Therefore, in addition to the VIX regression analyses above, I conduct F-test and Bartlett’s test 
to verify equality of variances between before and after NIRP, for both currency and equity 
market returns. Since these tests might not catch the homogeneity of the variance when the 






The outcomes of this study provide clues for the two main questions: a) are the effects of 
NIRP consistent with those of interest cut in positive territory, and b) how the volatilities of 
currency and equity returns are influenced by NIRP. As the first step, the short-term event studies 
are implemented for the currency and equity markets of the nine economies.  
[Please insert Table 14 about here] 
Panel A of Table 14 displays abnormal return analyses with primary event days (NIRP 
announcement day). It is observable that Danish Krone, Japanese Yen, and Norwegian Krone 
show significant depreciations of its own currency against the U.S. Dollar, while the others do 
not. If NIRP implementation date is considered as the event day (secondary event day), somewhat 
different results come out. Cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) analyses within the short-term 
event window (-10, 10) are presented in Panel B of the table. Over the primary event window, 
currencies of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, the Euro Area, Japan, Norway, and Sweden have 
negative returns and value appreciations. Panels C and D of the table show ARs and CARs of the 
currencies with the secondary event days (NIRP implementation day). Reviewing Panel C, on the 
days, Danish Krone, and Norwegian Krone experience currency depreciations, while Swiss Franc 
is appreciated. Swiss Franc shows following two days of bounce-ups after the secondary event 
day. 
[Please insert Table 15 about here] 
Table 15 shows the short-term effects of NIRP on the equity markets. The announcements 
of NIRP are significant events in the equity markets of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sweden and 
Switzerland. Meanwhile the impacts are negative in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and positive in the 
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other two countries, according to Panels A and B of the table. Panels C and D display the impacts 
of NIRP on the secondary event days. The case of Switzerland is notable, since it is observable 
that the significant fluctuation in its own currency exchange market may influence the equity 
market returns. The country’s equity index also has significant two drops from the event day, with 
following bounce up on D+2. This consequence is understandable, recalling the economy 
structure of Switzerland. Since over 70% of the country’s GDP rely on exports of goods and 
services, the significantly negative impacts on the equity market returns are possibly derived from 
the turmoil in its currency market. Moreover, the country has unique financial industry with its 
reputation of a safe heaven for money savings. Therefore, it is possible inference that the shock 
on the equity market is an inevitable consequence of 25% of its own currency appreciation against 
the U.S. Dollar on January 15, 2015. 
 [Please insert Table 16 about here] 
If the event study is conducted with aggregated data by pooling all the countries as a 
portfolio, several more noteworthy outcomes are generated. From Panel A of Table 16, it is 
observable that the local currencies are depreciated on the event day, consistent with Jurkšas 
(2017). Besides, Panel B of the table shows more apparent evidence that supports the impact is 
valid in favor of the central banks’ aim. On the days when actual policy rates go below the 
negative bound, the exchange rates are bounced up. According to Panels C and D of Table 16, 
average value of local currencies of the nine countries is significantly appreciated. However, one 
possible discussion about these results is that this appreciation may be led by Swiss Franc. The 
currency market of Swiss Franc had been compromised since the Swiss National Bank (SNB) had 
pegged exchange rate policy in September 2011 to depreciate its own currency. However, the 
SNB abolished the lower limit of its currency exchange rate, one euro per 1.2 Swiss Franc on 
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January 15, 2015, simultaneously with NIRP implementation. These actions of the SNB result in 
the unprecedented appreciation of the currency in short period of time, deriving pivotal impacts 
on its own economy.  
The results explained above imply that the currency markets may react efficiently against 
NIRP execution, consistent with the efficient market hypothesis (EMH) of Fama (1998). However, 
those currency markets’ efficiencies over the time is not statistically verified in the previous 
models. Therefore, investigating whether those currency markets are efficient may provide 
additional implication about the monetary policy. According to covered interest parity (CIP), 
currency arbitrage opportunities with nominal interest rate differentials can be diminished, if 
currency exchange markets are efficient. Holmes and Wu (1997) provide relevant example to test 
market efficiency with CIP using the panel unit root test methodologies. Following conventional 
CIP equation, the deviation from CIP vis-à-vis the U.S. Dollar is defined as follows: 
𝑢𝑡 =  𝑟𝑗,𝑡 − 𝑟𝑛,𝑡 − (𝑓𝑡 − 𝑠𝑡) 
Using this error term, 𝑢𝑡, a number of unit root tests are implemented to verify covered 
interest arbitrage in the financial markets of the nine countries. Presence of unit root process in 
the error term can be interpreted as violation of no-arbitrage condition. The descriptive statistics 
of currency market mispricing term is presented in Table 17. 
[Please insert Table 17 about here] 
Table 18 shows the results of the panel unit root tests with various relevant types of tests: 
Levin, Lin, and Chu test, Im, Pesaran, and Shin test, Fisher-Choi Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) 
test, and Fisher-Choi Phillips-Perron (PP) test. Due to the data availability, six currencies are 
considered: Denmark Krone, the Euro, Japanese Yen, Norwegian Krone, Swedish Krona, and 
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Swiss Franc. Among these currencies, several have mixed backgrounds; Danish Krone and 
Swedish Krone are independent currencies, while those countries are members of the European 
Union (EU). Norway and Switzerland are classified as European countries due to their 
geographical location, whereas they are not members of the EU. Considering that the EU is 
representative economic and political union of European nations sharing monetary policies, 
investigating EU-specific factors may provide comprehensive insight about NIRP’s effects. 
Therefore, the tests are conducted with two subgroups: EU (Denmark, the Euro Area, Sweden), 
and non-EU (Japan, Norway, and Switzerland). Reviewing the test results of all the six countries, 
I cannot reject unit roots for CIP based on the Levin, Lin and Chu (2002) tests, which assume 
homogeneous panels.  
[Please insert Table 18 about here] 
By assuming heterogeneity of panel countries, Im, Persaran and Shin (2003) W-statistic 
also provide evidences of unit root process for CIP in those countries. The statistics are different 
once the tests are executed in different subgroups. According to the outcomes, there is no apparent 
covered interest arbitrage opportunities in the currency markets of the EU countries during the 
period of NIRP, while that is not the case for non-EU group. It is notable to see that Switzerland 
is included in non-EU group. As previously introduced, the country experienced abnormal 
exchange rate impacts during the days surrounding NIRP execution.  
[Please insert Table 19 about here] 
Table 19 presents the unit root test results with structural period break, before and after 
NIRP by country. By setting NIRP implementation as the breakpoint, unit root processes of before 
and after NIRP are tested. The test statistics imply different effects of NIRP on each currency. At 
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5% level of p-value, ADF statistics show unit root process in both pre-year and post-year of NIRP 
for the Euro, Japanese Yen, and Norwegian Krone, implying covered interest arbitrage of those 
currencies. Denmark Krone and Swedish Krona have unit root processes after NIRP 
implementation, while Switzerland presents unit root process in pre-NIRP period. The PP test 
results show substantial similarity with minor differences. 
[Please insert Table 20 about here] 
The effects of NIRP on equity markets stand in contrast to those on currency exchange 
markets, showing relatively undistinguishable outcomes. Table 20 provides the portfolio event 
study analyses results of the equity returns. While it does not show significant ARs on the primary 
event days according to Panels A and B of the table, the equity returns on the secondary event 
days and D+2 have significant negative ARs. Despite presence of significant and positive ARs 
on D-2 and D+7, narrowing down the event window, the negative impacts of the policy 
implementations are observable in Panel D. 
If the policies are sufficiently effective to increase aggregate amount of money in the 
economies, the local currencies are expected to be depreciated and equity indexes have positive 
returns with capital inflows. The outcomes from the event study show significant depreciations 
of local currencies on the days of NIRP announcement, while the currency appreciations and 
outflows from the equity markets are observed on NIRP implementation days. 
[Please insert Table 21 about here] 
Somewhat different outcomes are obtained if pre- and ex-year of NIRP are compared. 
Table 21 delivers the results of the currency return analyses using the suggested regression models. 
According to the table, significant differences of currency returns between before and after NIRP 
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are captured with STATE variable in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Denmark, Hungary and 
Switzerland. Another noteworthy point is that bond yields and its absolute yield curve variables 
have significant coefficient in case of Bulgaria and Denmark. Moreover, 2-year bond yields are 
correlated with the currency returns in Bulgaria, Denmark, Hungary, Japan, Sweden and 
Switzerland. These indicate that bond yields and yield curve variables may also be decisive 
factors for local currency returns of those countries.  
 [Please insert Table 22 about here] 
The regression results of the index return analyses are displayed in Table 22. For most 
countries’ equity market returns, NIRP is not a considerable event, as Switzerland solely has a 
significant coefficient on its regime dummy variable. However, consistent with the currency 
market analyses, Switzerland may need to be considered as an exceptional case in the equity 
return analyses as well, due to the extraordinary exchange rate shock occurred in the event day. 
Instead of the state variable, it is observable that national bond yields and its interest term structure 
have significant influence on the equity returns in Denmark, Norway, the Euro Area and 
Switzerland. Furthermore, the S&P500 index return variable is also significant in most developed 
economies including Denmark, the Euro Area, Japan, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland. These 
outcomes imply that possible cointegrations with the U.S. equity markets have stronger impacts 
on the domestic equity returns than the stimulative monetary policy by the central banks. 
The results of both currency and stock market return analyses generate additional issues 
to be addressed. For currency return regression analyses, I found evidence that currency return 
changes are possibly led by the interest term structures. However, the relation between the 
dependent variable and the interest rate curve is not clearly shown in the models. To investigate 
this issue, term structures of nominal interest rates of each country are compared. Table 23 
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provides the average bond yield curve slopes of the eight countries. Due to data unavailability, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina is excluded in this comparison. The term structure is defined as the 
differential of 10-year and 2-year government bond yields.  
[Please insert Table 23 about here]  
According to the table, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Denmark have relatively steeper slopes of 
the bond yield curves, while NIRP’s effects are notable in Hungary and Denmark. These results 
imply that NIRP may be more effective in economies which have less flat yield curves of 
government bonds with exception of Bulgaria. Switzerland, where NIRP is significant event, has 
relatively flattened slope of the government bond yield curve. One might argue that Switzerland’s 
case is a counterevidence of the relationship between the term structures and effectiveness of 
NIRP. However, as previously introduced, the country needs to be deemed as an exceptional case 
considering its currency market chaos on the event day (NIRP Implementation) caused by sudden 
exchange rate policy change announcement of the SNB on the same day. 
The results from equity market analyses also generate additional inquiries to be clarified. 
If NIRP is not the decisive event for those stock market returns, which factors drive changes of 
equity returns? As the coefficients indicate, the U.S. equity market may explain changes of the 
local equity index returns of the nine countries. To observe the linkage between the local and the 
U.S. equity market, I test degrees of market cointegration of the nine individual indexes and the 
S&P500. 
[Please insert Table 24 about here] 
Table 24 shows how those local indexes are cointegrated with the U.S. stock market, using 
the S&P as the benchmark index. Column 2) provides test results of period, covered by the equity 
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market return regression analyses. The Trace statistics of SOFIX, OSEAX, and SMI show 
cointegration of those indexes with the S&P500. If the period is narrowed down to the event 
window, somewhat different outcomes are shown. According to column 1), the Trace statistics of 
DAX, NIKKEI, OSEAX, and SMI are statistically significant, implying that those indexes are 
cointegrated with the U.S. equity market over the period. These outcomes are partially overlapped 
with the previous equity return analyses results, recalling those indexes have significant 
influences of the interest rate regime change in the longer-term regression analyses. On the other 
hand, with the extended period of time, the cointegrations of those indexes and the S&P500 are 
not captured. Japan’s NIKKEI solely and significantly cointegrated with the U.S. equity market, 
consistent with Switzer and Tahaoglu (2015)’s analyses of equity market cointegration. 
Although the analyses above provide comprehensive perspective about the effects of 
NIRP on currency and equity returns, its volatility factors are not captured by those models. I 
implement additional regressions with VIX currency volatility index data to examine the volatility 
changes by the negative policy rates. Although data of only the Euro Area and Japan are available 
for VIX currency index, it is noteworthy since they are only countries with no significant 
coefficient on its state variable in their currency markets returns. Meanwhile, EUVIX index has 
been influenced by 10-year bond yield and yield curve slope, and JYVIX analysis shows 
significant coefficients on the variable of BBDXY and S&P500. 
[Please insert Table 25 about here]  
Table 25 shows results of regression models on EUVIX and JYVIX. According to the 
table, no significant coefficient on variable STATE is observed for both EUVIX and JYVIX. This 
can be interpreted that no pivotal changes in volatility are captured in the models, questioning the 
effects of NIRP implementations in those two currency markets.  
 50 
 
Subsequently, to have more comprehensive investigation for the other markets’ volatility 
changes, several tests for equality of variance for all objective currencies and index returns. The 
F-test, Bartlett’s test, and Levene’s test are executed in order to see NIRP’s effects on return 
volatility in currency and equity markets. Table 26 shows variances, standard deviations, and test 
results of the nine countries comparing before and after the policies.  
[Please insert Table 26 about here] 
At first glance, for both currency and index return, only Bulgaria displays a significant 
change in variance with the regime-switching according to F-test results. Bartlett’s test results for 
currency returns show that none of these countries has significant statistics. The results are similar 
in stock market returns, showing that only Bulgaria and Switzerland are the two counties which 
have significant Bartlett’s test statistics. However, Levene’s test results suggest that there are 
statistical differences in variance between the two regimes. Considering currency return data, all 
the countries have significant Levene’s test statistics at 5% standard error level. For index return 
data as well, except for Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria and Japan, all the others have critical 
value. These results provide firm evidence in favour of the negative interest rate policy’s 
potentially influencing volatility of currency returns. Yet, its general direction is in ambiguity. 
Panel A of Table 26 shows Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Denmark, Hungary, Norway, and 
Switzerland have a decrease of volatility from regime 0 to regime 1, while variance of the 
eurozone, Japan, and Sweden move the opposite direction. Panel B exhibits mixed results as well, 
as the standard deviation and variance of four countries, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Denmark, 
Japan have decrease in volatility over the period, whereas the other six countries experience 
increases in the volatility.  
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In order to verify whether NIRP affects the structure of the volatility processes for 
currencies and equities, I implement GARCH models for all the currency and equity return data 
set. The GARCH (1,1) model is applied for currency returns consistent with the literature,7 while 
the EGARCH model is used for the equity returns, considering asymmetric characteristic of stock 
market return data. 
[Please insert Table 27 about here] 
The volatility test results of GARCH (1,1) model for currency returns are presented in   
Panel A of Table 27. According to the table, for the 2-year of overall period, which covers before 
and after year of NIRP, all the sums of ARCH and GARCH terms of GARCH (1,1) model are 
less than 1, implying volatility persistence is not apparent after NIRP for the currency markets. 
In order to investigate the period-specific volatility of the currency returns, two GARCH (1,1) 
tests covering different periods are conducted for each by splitting the period with the breakpoint 
of NIRP. Consistent with the previous results, the impact on currency returns’ volatility 
persistence is not indicated with an exception of Euro. Similar results are shown in the equity 
markets with the EGARCH model. Reviewing the corresponding EGARCH coefficient C(5) of 
Panel B, none of the equity indexes has a value more than 1 over the time. Overall, we can infer 
that the structure of the volatility process, is not affected by NIRP.   
                                                     




Chapter 4: Speculation, Overpricing, and Arbitrage in the Bitcoin Spot and Futures 
Markets 
4.1 Literature Review: 
The extraordinary appreciation of Bitcoin value over the year of 2017 is often considered 
as a result of speculative investment activities. However, it can be controversial to conclude the 
cryptocurrency as a speculative vehicle without relevant empirical evidence for the underlying 
determinants of the price of Bitcoin. In fact, several researchers argue that speculation is not a 
decisive factor of in the pricing of Bitcoin and regard the virtual currency as a type of commodity 
that is priced by interaction of supply and demand on the market. Bartos (2015) provides evidence 
that the pricing of Bitcoin is consistent with the efficient market hypothesis, and the speculations 
of investors do not significantly affect the price. Instead, he argues that positive and negative 
news for the cryptocurrency are key factors in Bitcoin pricing. Other papers examine a variety of 
external and internal factors that may influence the price of Bitcoin. Ciaian et al (2014) presents 
evidence that its price changes are affected by its attractiveness and vulnerability for investors, 
and the supply-demand fundamentals of the cryptocurrency. Bouoiyour and Seli (2016) show that 
geopolitical chaos such as China’s deepening slowdown, Brexit, India’s demonetization, anxiety 
over the U.S. President Donald Trump are significant determinants of Bitcoin price, using 
Bayesian quantile regression models. Jaroslav (2016) insists that emotional factors explain 
Bitcoin’s price volatility better than rational factors. 
Since mining of the cryptocurrency is quantitatively limited, its price behavior may be 
related to basic demand/supply factors. Its aggregate supply is constrained to be 21 million BTCs 
by its mining system, and no more Bitcoins will be mined beyond the amount. As of 29th 
December 2017, 16,770,512 BTCs have been mined, and its mining process is designed be slow 
down as time passes by. Tapscott (2016) anticipates that all the 21 million BTCs will be mined 
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by the year of 2150. Because of this structural limitation of Bitcoin’s supply in the market, as 
long as the speed of its demand upsurge is faster than its supply increase, the cryptocurrency’s 
price must be escalated as a consequence. 
On the other hand, Baek and Elbeck (2015) explain that the Bitcoin price movements are 
due to the behavior of pure speculators since they are significantly responsive to high-low price 
differentials. Yermack (2015) questions the function of Bitcoin as an appropriate currency in the 
real economy, showing that its returns are not correlated with any of key assets in the real world. 
Baur et al (2017) also provide similar results. They find the price of Bitcoin is not correlated with 
traditional asset classes, and thus conclude that Bitcoin trading is mainly executed as a speculative 
investment and do not function as a currency in current global economic system. 
In a more recent study, Baur and Dimpfl (2018) look at the linkages between the spot and 
futures prices for Bitcoin.  They show evidence that the futures price of Bitcoin is led by its spot 
price. This outcome is in contrast with most studies for financial and commodity futures whereby 
futures lead the spot, consistent with the informational advantages accorded to futures traders.  
They do not explore whether this result provides distinct arbitrage opportunities for traders, 
however. Such opportunities would be inconsistent with efficient markets.  Our paper will provide 
new evidence on this score. 
 
4.2 Data Description 
This paper attempts to identify the determinants of the price of Bitcoin, and the pricing 
efficiency for the Bitcoin market from the onset of the market in March 2014.  Throughout this 
study, the spot price of Bitcoin is defined as the spot exchange rate of Bitcoin against the U.S. 
Dollar. Using this benchmark, daily and monthly high, low, bid, ask and closings prices of Bitcoin 
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are collected from Bloomberg. The trading volume data of the cryptocurrency is from 
data.bitcoinity.org, which covers data of 39 Bitcoin exchanges, including Bit-x, Bitfinex, Bitflyer, 
Bitstamp, Btcchina, Coinbase, Gemini, Kraken, and Okcoin. Considering the data availability, the 
daily data from April 2014 to January 2019 are obtained. Monthly data span the period from May 
2010 to December 2018. 
Since Bitcoin transactions occur globally with various currencies, we use the data of 
several major Bitcoin trading countries. More specifically, the analysis focuses on markets in 
which Bitcoin’s trading volume is highest in the period of extreme volatility. Although the 
statistics have minor differences by the exchange venues, trading volumes in these five objective 
currencies in 2017 are reported the largest in the most statistic reports. Representatively, 
according to statistics by Bloomberg, as of January 10, 2018, 46.3% of Bitcoin transactions are 
by the U.S. Dollar, 38.4% are by Japanese Yen, 7.2% are by Euro, and 5.6% are by South Korean 
Won. Chinese Yuan had occupied the major part of overall Bitcoin transactions before the initial 
coin offering (ICO) ban was announced by the Chinese government at the end of January 2017. 
Based on these facts, four years of daily and monthly spot exchange rates data of Chinese Yuan, 
Japanese Yen, Euro, and South Korean Won against the U.S. Dollar are collected from the same 
source, to see the correlations of these currency rates on the price of Bitcoin. 
This paper also tests correlations of Bitcoin and equity markets. Therefore, the 
abovementioned five economies’ five-year historical equity index price data are obtained from 
Bloomberg. For the Euro Zone, the EUROSTOXX index is considered as the representative index 
of the economy. We also investigate the macro-economic indicators to capture their effects on the 
price of Bitcoin. For the five countries studied, economic statistics data including consumer price 
index, industrial production, and unemployment rate are gathered from the source of Thomson 
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Reuter One, the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, the Bank of Japan, the European Central Bank, 
and the Bank of Korea. The descriptive statistics of the aforementioned variables are displayed in 
Table 28. 
[Please insert Table 28 about here] 
Lastly, we incorporated a governmental regulation factor of the five major bitcoin 
currency areas in the models as risk factor. The validity and acceptability of Bitcoin as a medium 
of exchange is still not a settled matter agreed among many government authorities. China 
provides the archetypical case. The People’s Bank of China’s ICO ban for its financial institutions 
had a notable influence in Bitcoin exchanges in terms of its price and transactions. This regulation 
was influential since Chinese Yuan had an overwhelming volume of transactions at that time. 
According to the Morgan Stanley’s statistics, As of February 2016, 90% of the cryptocurrency 
was implemented in Chinese Yuan. However, this rate dropped to one-digit number immediately 
after the announcement. Along with such changes of transaction pattern, the price of Bitcoin 
dropped by $200 in major Bitcoin exchanges.8  Please see Table 29 for the chronology of recent 
government retardants for the cryptocurrency markets. We capture the effects of these events in 
the analysis with dummy variables in the analyses. 
[Please insert Table 29 about here] 
Both the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) and the CBOE introduced futures 
contracts on Bitcoin in December 2017. Our analyses of spot-futures pricing efficiency use all 
                                                     
8 See Cermak, L., (2018). “Morgan Stanley report: The Bitcoin thesis is rapidly morphing, cryptos highly 
correlated” J.P. Morgan Stanley. 
Graham, L., (2016). “Bitcoin price drops $200 after new ruling from Chinese regulators.” CNBC. 
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contracts on these exchanges from January 2018 contracts to March 2019. The CBOE data are 
obtained from the exchange’s website and the CME contracts are obtained from Bloomberg. 
 
4.3 Research Methodology 
As the first step to verify whether or not Bitcoin has been overpriced since 2017, an 
appropriate price of the cryptocurrency has to be defined and compared with the realized value. 
Abraham (1983) and Chatfield (2001, 2004) provide exponential smoothing methodology to 
estimate relevant price trends of the asset in the time series. In this paper, the single exponential 
trend values and the actual values are visually compared to see how much Bitcoin is overpriced 
over the period. The relation between actual value and trend value is defined as follows: 
𝑎𝑣𝑡 = 𝛼 ∙ 𝑡𝑣𝑡−1(1 − 𝛼) ∙ 𝑎𝑣𝑡−1, 𝑡 = 1,2, … , 𝑇 
and thus, 




∙ 𝑡𝑣𝑇−𝑘 + (1 − 𝛼) ∙ 𝑎𝑣0 
𝑎𝑣𝑡 is the actual value of the asset at time t, and 𝑡𝑣𝑡 refers the exponential trend value; 𝛼 
defines the smoothing parameter, which minimize the in-sample sum-of-squared forecast errors. 
With the definitions of actual value and trend value explained above, the residual 𝜀𝑡 is defined as 
the differential of the two values: 
𝑎𝑣𝑡 = 𝑡𝑣𝑡 − 𝜀𝑡 
As previously introduced, this study implements a number of regression analyses with 
macroeconomic indicators, index prices, and currency exchange rates to see the effects of related 
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international factors. More specifically, variables reflecting inflation, production, and 
unemployment rate data of the five economies are analyzed with conventional regression models. 
Add to these variables, the equity market indexes and currency exchange rates are also examined. 
The other important factors to be defined are variables reflecting speculative investment 
activities. One relevant example is a variable of high-low price spread of the Bitcoin. According 
to Baek and Elbeck (2015) the gap between monthly high and low price can represent an internal 
driver of the Bitcoin price changes. In this study, monthly and daily bid-ask spreads are brought 
as independent variables in order to observe the effects of liquidity of the asset. Add to these, 
trading volume of Bitcoin and notable price changes in the previous period are examined. Pooling 
all these explanatory variables, we suggest a model as follows:  
∆ 𝑟𝑡
𝐵𝑇𝐶 =  𝛼 + 𝛽0∆ 𝑟𝑡−1
𝐵𝑇𝐶 + 𝛽1∆ 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑡−1 + 𝛽2∆ 𝐵𝑖𝑑𝐴𝑠𝑘𝑡−1 + 𝛽3∆ 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑡−1 +











𝑛 + 𝛽10𝑆𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑡−1 + 𝛽11𝐶𝑟𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡                        Model (1) 
∆𝑟𝐵𝑇𝐶  refers change of exchange rate for Bitcoin to the U.S. Dollar; ∆𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑 is the 
monthly change in gap of monthly high and low price; ∆𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒  measures monthly changes of 
trading volume; ∆𝐵𝑖𝑑𝐴𝑠𝑘  is the monthly bid-ask spread change, and  ∆𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛  is 
governmental regulation dummy variable; ∆ 𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑡
𝑛, ∆ 𝐼𝑃𝑡
𝑛, and ∆ 𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑡
𝑛 are monthly changes 
in the consumer price index, industrial production, and unemployment rate of country n in time t, 
respectively. In the model, 𝑆𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑡−1 and 𝐶𝑟𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑡−1 are dummies referring the price appreciation 
and depreciation larger than the upper fence and lower than the bottom fence. The definition of 
the upper and bottom fences follows Tukey (1977), who explains the positive and negative 
extreme values using interquartile range. Following the literature, the upper and bottom fences 
are described as follows: 
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The upper fence > Q3 + 1.5 ×  IQR, and the bottom fence < Q1 - 1.5 ×  IQR 
While this idea of extreme outliers provides comprehensive and reasonable definitions of 
extraordinary price appreciation and depreciation, it is difficult to have an intuitive snapshot 
among models since the IQR values varies depends on the dataset. Thus, we also use a number 
of different dummy variables for price changes, including 𝑆𝑜𝑎𝑟_10%, 𝑆𝑜𝑎𝑟_20%, 𝑆𝑜𝑎𝑟_30%, 
𝐶𝑟𝑎𝑠ℎ_10%, 𝐶𝑟𝑎𝑠ℎ_20%, and 𝐶𝑟𝑎𝑠ℎ_30%, each refers the cases of 10%, 20% and 30% of price 
appreciations and depreciations in the previous months, respectively. By taking these variables, 
we also suggest model (2) as follows: 
 ∆ 𝑟𝑡
𝐵𝑇𝐶 =  𝛼 + 𝛽0∆ 𝑟𝑡−1
𝐵𝑇𝐶 + 𝛽1∆ 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑡−1 + 𝛽2∆ 𝐵𝑖𝑑𝐴𝑠𝑘𝑡−1 + 𝛽3∆ 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑡−1 +











𝑛 + 𝛽12𝑆𝑜𝑎𝑟_10%𝑡−1 + 𝛽13𝑆𝑜𝑎𝑟_20%𝑡−1 + 𝛽14𝑆𝑜𝑎𝑟_30%𝑡−1 +
𝛽15𝐶𝑟𝑎𝑠ℎ_10%𝑡−1 + 𝛽16𝐶𝑟𝑎𝑠ℎ_20%𝑡−1 + 𝛽17𝐶𝑟𝑎𝑠ℎ_30%𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡        Model (2) 
Additionally, to see the effects of price rises and drops independently, each of 10%, 20%, 
and 30% cases are separately regressed with the other explanatory variables. Therefore, we have 
six more subordinate models: 
∆ 𝑟𝑡
𝐵𝑇𝐶 =  𝛼 + 𝛽0∆ 𝑟𝑡−1
𝐵𝑇𝐶 + 𝛽1∆ 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑡−1 + 𝛽2∆ 𝐵𝑖𝑑𝐴𝑠𝑘𝑡−1 + 𝛽3∆ 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑡−1 +











𝑛 + 𝛽12𝑆𝑜𝑎𝑟_10%𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡             Model (2-1) 
∆ 𝑟𝑡
𝐵𝑇𝐶 =  𝛼 + 𝛽0∆ 𝑟𝑡−1
𝐵𝑇𝐶 + 𝛽1∆ 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑡−1 + 𝛽2∆ 𝐵𝑖𝑑𝐴𝑠𝑘𝑡−1 + 𝛽3∆ 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑡−1 +















𝐵𝑇𝐶 =  𝛼 + 𝛽0∆ 𝑟𝑡−1
𝐵𝑇𝐶 + 𝛽1∆ 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑡−1 + 𝛽2∆ 𝐵𝑖𝑑𝐴𝑠𝑘𝑡−1 + 𝛽3∆ 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑡−1 +











𝑛 + 𝛽14𝑆𝑜𝑎𝑟_30%𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡             Model (2-3) 
These models regress price soar dummies individually by the percentage of price increase. 
On the other hand, for crash dummy variables, we suggest following regressions: 
∆ 𝑟𝑡
𝐵𝑇𝐶 =  𝛼 + 𝛽0∆ 𝑟𝑡−1
𝐵𝑇𝐶 + 𝛽1∆ 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑡−1 + 𝛽2∆ 𝐵𝑖𝑑𝐴𝑠𝑘𝑡−1 + 𝛽3∆ 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑡−1 +











𝑛 + 𝛽15𝐶𝑟𝑎𝑠ℎ_10%𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡             Model (2-4) 
∆ 𝑟𝑡
𝐵𝑇𝐶 =  𝛼 + 𝛽0∆ 𝑟𝑡−1
𝐵𝑇𝐶 + 𝛽1∆ 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑡−1 + 𝛽2∆ 𝐵𝑖𝑑𝐴𝑠𝑘𝑡−1 + 𝛽3∆ 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑡−1 +











𝑛 + 𝛽16𝐶𝑟𝑎𝑠ℎ_20%𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡             Model (2-5) 
∆ 𝑟𝑡
𝐵𝑇𝐶 =  𝛼 + 𝛽0∆ 𝑟𝑡−1
𝐵𝑇𝐶 + 𝛽1∆ 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑡−1 + 𝛽2∆ 𝐵𝑖𝑑𝐴𝑠𝑘𝑡−1 + 𝛽3∆ 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑡−1 +











𝑛 + 𝛽17𝐶𝑟𝑎𝑠ℎ_30%𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡             Model (2-6) 
Models (1), (2) and their subordinate models are aggregate models which generate 
coefficients for all the key explanatory variables. However, we also put additional efforts to test 
for the robustness of the results considering the correlation structure of variables. According to 
correlation matrix for each variable presented in Table 30, it is observed that some index and 
exchange rate variables present significant correlations to each other. 
[Please insert Table 30 about here] 
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In order to mitigate the effects of collinearity problems for the regressors, we designed 
models which concentrate only on macroeconomic indicators, indexes values, and exchange rates. 
Firstly, to see the influences of the macroeconomic factors separately, we suggest the following 
models: 
∆ 𝑟𝑡
𝐵𝑇𝐶 =  𝛼 + 𝛽0∆ 𝑟𝑡−1
𝐵𝑇𝐶 + 𝛽1∆ 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑡−1 + 𝛽2∆ 𝐵𝑖𝑑𝐴𝑠𝑘𝑡−1 + 𝛽3∆ 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑡−1 +






𝑛 + 𝛽10𝑆𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑡−1 + 𝛽11𝐶𝑟𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑡−1 +
𝜀𝑡                 Model (3) 
∆ 𝑟𝑡
𝐵𝑇𝐶 =  𝛼 + 𝛽0∆ 𝑟𝑡−1
𝐵𝑇𝐶 + 𝛽1∆ 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑡−1 + 𝛽2∆ 𝐵𝑖𝑑𝐴𝑠𝑘𝑡−1 + 𝛽3∆ 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑡−1 +






𝑛 + 𝛽12𝑆𝑜𝑎𝑟_10%𝑡−1 +
𝛽13𝑆𝑜𝑎𝑟_20%𝑡−1 + 𝛽14𝑆𝑜𝑎𝑟_30%𝑡−1 + 𝛽15𝐶𝑟𝑎𝑠ℎ_10%𝑡−1 + 𝛽15𝐶𝑟𝑎𝑠ℎ_20%𝑡−1 +
𝛽15𝐶𝑟𝑎𝑠ℎ_30%𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡              Model (4) 
Considering the transactions of Bitcoin are implemented with various international 
currencies, it is pivotal to see how the cryptocurrency’s price is correlated with the currency 
exchange rates distinctly:  
∆ 𝑟𝑡
𝐵𝑇𝐶 =  𝛼 + 𝛽0∆ 𝑟𝑡−1
𝐵𝑇𝐶 + 𝛽1∆ 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑡−1 + 𝛽2∆ 𝐵𝑖𝑑𝐴𝑠𝑘𝑡−1 + 𝛽3∆ 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑡−1 +
𝛽4 𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝛽8
𝑛∆ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑡−1
𝑛 + 𝛽10𝑆𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑡−1 + 𝛽11𝐶𝑟𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡        Model (5) 
∆ 𝑟𝑡
𝐵𝑇𝐶 =  𝛼 + 𝛽0∆ 𝑟𝑡−1
𝐵𝑇𝐶 + 𝛽1∆ 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑡−1 + 𝛽2∆ 𝐵𝑖𝑑𝐴𝑠𝑘𝑡−1 + 𝛽3∆ 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑡−1 +
𝛽4 𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝛽8
𝑛∆ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑡−1
𝑛 + 𝛽12𝑆𝑜𝑎𝑟_10%𝑡−1 + 𝛽13𝑆𝑜𝑎𝑟_20%𝑡−1 +




Likewise, the index prices of the five countries are regressed separately in the additional 
models as well. The impacts of currency and equity returns are investigated with the models (7) 
and (8) as follows: 
∆ 𝑟𝑡
𝐵𝑇𝐶 =  𝛼 + 𝛽0∆ 𝑟𝑡−1
𝐵𝑇𝐶 + 𝛽1∆ 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑡−1 + 𝛽2∆ 𝐵𝑖𝑑𝐴𝑠𝑘𝑡−1 + 𝛽3∆ 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑡−1 +
𝛽4 𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝛽9
𝑛∆ 𝑋𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑡−1
𝑛 + 𝛽10𝑆𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑡−1 + 𝛽11𝐶𝑟𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡        Model (7) 
∆ 𝑟𝑡
𝐵𝑇𝐶 =  𝛼 + 𝛽0∆ 𝑟𝑡−1
𝐵𝑇𝐶 + 𝛽1∆ 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑡−1 + 𝛽2∆ 𝐵𝑖𝑑𝐴𝑠𝑘𝑡−1 + 𝛽3∆ 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑡−1 +
𝛽4 𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝛽9
𝑛∆ 𝑋𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑡−1
𝑛 + 𝛽12𝑆𝑜𝑎𝑟_10%𝑡−1 + 𝛽13𝑆𝑜𝑎𝑟_20%𝑡−1 +
𝛽14𝑆𝑜𝑎𝑟_30%𝑡−1 + 𝛽15𝐶𝑟𝑎𝑠ℎ_10%𝑡−1 + 𝛽15𝐶𝑟𝑎𝑠ℎ_20%𝑡−1 + 𝛽15𝐶𝑟𝑎𝑠ℎ_30%𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡            
Model (8) 
For models (4), (6) and (8), we also implement additional six subordinate models with 
individual Soar_% and Crash_% dummies with the same methodologies used for subordinates of 
model (2). It was inevitable to use the monthly data for abovementioned models since the macro-
economic statistics are announced monthly.  
However, Bitcoin transactions are implemented continuously without any stoppage, and 
its price changes show higher level of daily volatility than any other financial instruments. Thus, 
it is meaningful to conduct the analyses with the daily data, which is relatively continuous. 
Excluding the macroeconomic variables, we regress the Bitcoin price changes on all the 
abovementioned independent variables with the daily data. 
∆ 𝑟𝑡
𝐵𝑇𝐶 =  𝛼 + 𝛽0∆ 𝑟𝑡−1
𝐵𝑇𝐶 + 𝛽1∆ 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑡−1 + 𝛽2∆ 𝐵𝑖𝑑𝐴𝑠𝑘𝑡−1 + 𝛽3∆ 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑡−1 +








𝐵𝑇𝐶 =  𝛼 + 𝛽0∆ 𝑟𝑡−1
𝐵𝑇𝐶 + 𝛽1∆ 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑡−1 + 𝛽2∆ 𝐵𝑖𝑑𝐴𝑠𝑘𝑡−1 + 𝛽3∆ 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑡−1 +




𝑛 + 𝛽9𝑆𝑜𝑎𝑟_10%𝑡−1 + 𝛽10𝑆𝑜𝑎𝑟_20%𝑡−1 +
𝛽11𝐶𝑟𝑎𝑠ℎ_10%𝑡−1 + 𝛽12𝐶𝑟𝑎𝑠ℎ_20%𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡         Model (10) 
Unlike the models with monthly data, Soar and Crash of 30% dummies are excluded 
because there was no case of more than 30% of Bitcoin daily value rise or fall in the U.S. Dollar 
according to Bloomberg data. We also suggest subordinate models of model (10), which regress 
the price change dummy variables separately: 
∆ 𝑟𝑡
𝐵𝑇𝐶 =  𝛼 + 𝛽0∆ 𝑟𝑡−1
𝐵𝑇𝐶 + 𝛽1∆ 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑡−1 + 𝛽2∆ 𝐵𝑖𝑑𝐴𝑠𝑘𝑡−1 + 𝛽3∆ 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑡−1 +




𝑛 + 𝛽9𝑆𝑜𝑎𝑟_10%𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡  Model (10-1) 
∆ 𝑟𝑡
𝐵𝑇𝐶 =  𝛼 + 𝛽0∆ 𝑟𝑡−1
𝐵𝑇𝐶 + 𝛽1∆ 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑡−1 + 𝛽2∆ 𝐵𝑖𝑑𝐴𝑠𝑘𝑡−1 + 𝛽3∆ 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑡−1 +




𝑛 + 𝛽10𝑆𝑜𝑎𝑟_20%𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡  Model (10-2) 
∆ 𝑟𝑡
𝐵𝑇𝐶 =  𝛼 + 𝛽0∆ 𝑟𝑡−1
𝐵𝑇𝐶 + 𝛽1∆ 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑡−1 + 𝛽2∆ 𝐵𝑖𝑑𝐴𝑠𝑘𝑡−1 + 𝛽3∆ 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑡−1 +




𝑛 + 𝛽11𝐶𝑟𝑎𝑠ℎ_10%𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡  Model (10-3) 
∆ 𝑟𝑡
𝐵𝑇𝐶 =  𝛼 + 𝛽0∆ 𝑟𝑡−1
𝐵𝑇𝐶 + 𝛽1∆ 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑡−1 + 𝛽2∆ 𝐵𝑖𝑑𝐴𝑠𝑘𝑡−1 + 𝛽3∆ 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑡−1 +




𝑛 + 𝛽12𝐶𝑟𝑎𝑠ℎ_10%𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡  Model (10-4) 
In addition to these, models (11) - (14) are suggested in order to see the impacts of the 
equity market index returns and exchange rate changes, minimizing possible collinearity of 
variables: 
∆ 𝑟𝑡
𝐵𝑇𝐶 =  𝛼 + 𝛽0∆ 𝑟𝑡−1
𝐵𝑇𝐶 + 𝛽1∆ 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑡−1 + 𝛽2∆ 𝐵𝑖𝑑𝐴𝑠𝑘𝑡−1 + 𝛽3∆ 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑡−1 +
𝛽4 𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝛽5
𝑛∆ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑡−1




𝐵𝑇𝐶 =  𝛼 + 𝛽0∆ 𝑟𝑡−1
𝐵𝑇𝐶 + 𝛽1∆ 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑡−1 + 𝛽2∆ 𝐵𝑖𝑑𝐴𝑠𝑘𝑡−1 + 𝛽3∆ 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑡−1 +
𝛽4 𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝛽5
𝑛∆ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑡−1
𝑛 + 𝛽9𝑆𝑜𝑎𝑟_10%𝑡−1 + 𝛽10𝑆𝑜𝑎𝑟_20%𝑡−1 +
𝛽11𝐶𝑟𝑎𝑠ℎ_10%𝑡−1 + 𝛽12𝐶𝑟𝑎𝑠ℎ_20%𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡              Model (12) 
∆ 𝑟𝑡
𝐵𝑇𝐶 =  𝛼 + 𝛽0∆ 𝑟𝑡−1
𝐵𝑇𝐶 + 𝛽1∆ 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑡−1 + 𝛽2∆ 𝐵𝑖𝑑𝐴𝑠𝑘𝑡−1 + 𝛽3∆ 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑡−1 +
𝛽4 𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝛽6
𝑛∆ 𝑋𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑡−1
𝑛 + 𝛽7𝑆𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑡−1 + 𝛽8𝐶𝑟𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡           Model (13) 
∆ 𝑟𝑡
𝐵𝑇𝐶 =  𝛼 + 𝛽0∆ 𝑟𝑡−1
𝐵𝑇𝐶 + 𝛽1∆ 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑡−1 + 𝛽2∆ 𝐵𝑖𝑑𝐴𝑠𝑘𝑡−1 + 𝛽3∆ 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑡−1 +
𝛽4 𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝛽6
𝑛∆ 𝑋𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑡−1
𝑛 + 𝛽9𝑆𝑜𝑎𝑟_10%𝑡−1 + 𝛽10𝑆𝑜𝑎𝑟_20%𝑡−1 +
𝛽11𝐶𝑟𝑎𝑠ℎ_10%𝑡−1 + 𝛽12𝐶𝑟𝑎𝑠ℎ_20%𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡              Model (14) 
Similar to the previous models, we regress the price soar and crash dummy variables 
separately for models (12) and (14), generating additional four subordinates for each model. 
Another issue to be addressed in this study is efficiency of Bitcoin market. 
 
 4.4. Results 
The results of this study are categorized by three parts. First, we generate graphs that show 
abnormality of Bitcoin price volatility. More specifically, the cryptocurrency’s trend values and 
actual prices in the market are compared by using the detrended ratio and single exponential 
residuals. Similar comparisons are also made with the five countries’ equity index prices. 
Secondly, we attempt to identify drivers of Bitcoin price changes by testing the relevant 
explanatory variables with both monthly and daily data. Lastly, several evidences of inefficiency 
of Bitcoin market are presented. 
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4.4.1. Bitcoin Overpricing 
As the first step to find evidence of Bitcoin overpricing, its trend value and detrended ratio 
are computed and analyzed. For the trend value analyses, the results are shown in Figures 3 to 5. 
[Please insert Figure 3 about here] 
Figure 1 presents the notable increases and decreases of the price of Bitcoin over the time, 
in comparison to the five countries’ equity index prices. As the figure shows, the recent 
fluctuations of the cryptocurrency are most remarkable among those of six different assets. 
[Please insert Figures 4 and 5 about here] 
Figures 4 and 5 provide another viewpoint of Bitcoin’s price volatility. The y-axis of the 
graph is index returns, while its x-axis refers those of the cryptocurrency. By matching the two 
dataset, volatility level of the five analysed indexes and Bitcoin returns are compared in Figure 2. 
Figure 3 presents comparisons of Bitcoin and each individual equity market index returns. As the 
shape of scattered plots are horizontally wide, those outcomes can be deemed as an evidence of 
relatively high volatility level of Bitcoin returns.  
[Please insert Figures 4-1 and 5-1 about here] 
Figures 4-1 and 5-1 compare volatility levels of Bitcoin during 2017-18 period with that 
of the period before the year of 2017. As observed in these figures, scattered plots form more 
flattened shapes before 2017 than the subsequent period. 
[Please insert Figures 6 and 7 about here] 
Figures 6 and 7 show single exponential residuals of Bitcoin and the five indexes from 
March 2010 to June 2018. Referring Figure 6, although the trend values of Bitcoin are similar to 
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those of the indexes until the end of 2016, its residuals fluctuate thereafter. Figure 7 presents the 
by-country comparisons. The single exponent residuals in the graphs support that Bitcoin’s price 
changes over the year of 2017 are beyond the relevant or traditional volatility level. 
Such excessive volatility of recent Bitcoin prices can be shown also by degree of detrend. 
Following Baek and Elback (2015), we define the detrended ratio as follows, in order to quantitate 
abnormality of the cryptocurrency and index prices. 
Detrended Ratio = Actual Value / Trend Value 
By calculating the detrended ratio, Bitcoin’s distinguished detrend ratio can be displayed 
quantitatively, by comparing its standard deviation with those of the suggested index price 
changes. 
[Please insert Table 31 about here] 
Table 31 compares summary statistics of the Bitcoin’s detrended ratios and the five 
indexes. As the table presents, the standard deviation of Bitcoin’s detrended ratio is about seven 
times of S&P500 over the period. The detrended ratios of other indexes shows about one fifth of 
the cryptocurrency’s detrended ratio. Therefore, it is fair to consider that recent price appreciation 
of the electronic coin is an abnormal phenomenon compare to the equity markets. 
4.4.2. Bitcoin Price Determinants 
The other issue of this paper addresses is the determinants of Bitcoin price changes. As 
previously explained, we suggest number of models which contain the possible explanatory 
variables. In order to see the effects of the relevant variables, number of regression models are 
implemented with both monthly and daily data. The models (1) to (8) are the analyses with 
monthly data and their results are shown in Table 32. 
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[Please insert Table 32 about here] 
The outcomes above provide clues to infer factors affecting on the price of Bitcoin. Model 
(1) shows no significant coefficient for any variables. However, for model (2), Bitcoin(USD) (t-
1), IP (China), SHSZ300 (t-1), NIKKEI (t-1), XRate CNY-USD (t-1), and XRate JPY-USD (t-1) 
have significant effect on Bitcoin price change. Additionally, 10% Crash (t-1), 20% Crash (t-1), 
and 30% Crash (t-1) are also significant in the model. If the soar and crash dummy variables are 
regressed separately, it generates somewhat different results. Except for Bitcoin(USD) (t-1) and 
XRate CNY-USD (t-1) in model (2-4), all the other external explanatory variables are not 
significant. 
If the analyses are focused on macro-economic factors corresponding models (3) and (4), 
China’s CPI shows significant effects on the cryptocurrency’s price change, except model (4-1). 
All the other explanatory variables do not explain the dependent variable. This result is consistent 
with Yermack (2015), showing that most real economy variables, especially macroeconomic 
factors are not correlated with Bitcoin price. 
Models (5) and (6) provide analyses focusing on index prices of suggested equity markets. 
Interestingly, the European stock price and trading volume index have significant coefficients in 
common, while NIKKEI (t-1) is significant in models (6), (6-1), (6-4), (6-5), and (6-6). Bitcoin’s 
price change and 10% Crash at t-1 are significant in model (6), while S&P500 (t-1) is shown as a 
decisive variable in model (6-6). 
Models (7) and (8) contain exchange rate variables while macroeconomic factors and 
index prices are excluded. According to the results, trading volume at t-1 is significant in all the 
models except for model (8). It is noteworthy to observe that trading volume is commonly 
significant in most of models (5)-(8) and its subordinate models. 
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Additional analyses are implemented with the daily data excluding the macro economic 
variables as previously introduced in models (9) to (14). The results are tabulated in Table 33. 
[Please insert Table 33 about here] 
The regression analyses with daily data show that daily high-low price spread plays a 
significant role in Bitcoin price change. Also, Chinese and Japanese stock market indexes are also 
significant explanatory variables, according to models (9) to (12). Additionally, models (9), (11), 
and (13) show crashes in the previous period have negative impact on the dependent variable. 
These results of daily data analyses are consistent of Baek and Elback (2015) showing that the 
high-low price spread may be the pivotal driver of Bitcoin price change. 
In summary, the regression analyses of Bitcoin volatility levels and its detrended ratio 
provide evidence that its price volatility is out of appropriate and traditional range. More 
importantly, according to the regression analyses results, the variables related to speculative 
investment behavior such as trading volume, high-low price spread and price crash in the previous 
period are significantly related to the price of Bitcoin. Furthermore, most of the suggested 
macroeconomic factor variables are insignificant in the regression models. These results imply 
that Bitcoin has limited linkage to the real economy. 
4.4.3. Market Efficiency of Bitcoin Market 
One of the key discussions in this chapter is whether or not Bitcoin is overpriced. One of 
the reasons for this perception is the unprecedented speed of its value appreciation. However, if 
Bitcoin market is efficient, even with such fast value changes, the market price of the 
cryptocurrency reflects its essential fair value and therefore no remarkable mispricing exists. The 
issue, then is whether or not market participants regard the cryptocurrency market as an efficient 
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market. Our results so far are not supportive of the efficient market hypothesis, however.  
Reviewing the regression results, several past price change variables are correlated with the price 
of Bitcoin. These coefficients imply that the Bitcoin traders may take signals from the historical 
data as information which influences on the market price of Bitcoin. In other words, Bitcoin 
market may not be deemed as an efficient market in a weak-form sense, since traders can take 
advantage from the historical price data of the cryptocurrency.  
Other arguments can be used to support the view that the price of Bitcoin does not fairly 
reflect its intrinsic value. Under the assumption that cryptocurrency markets are examples of the 
perfect competition market, analyzing the marginal mining cost of Bitcoin may provide the 
outline to find its appropriate intrinsic value. According to Loery and Chang (2018), the lowest 
mining cost of 1 BTC is measured as about $3,200. Also, J.P. Morgan analyzes that the worldwide 
weighted averaged cash cost to mine 1 BTC is about $4,060, and this can be dropped to $1,260 
or less in near future.9 Supposing that the price determination mechanism is same as that of the 
perfect competition market, the marginal cost of mining 1 BTC can be a rational price of the 
cryptocurrency. However, significant gap between the marginal mining cost and the actual price 
is observed in late 2017 to early 2018, as 1 BTC is about $18,000 in December 2017. 
Reviewing the considerable gap between the market price and mining cost of Bitcoin, one 
can argue that there are some other factors which constitute intrinsic value of the cryptocurrency, 
and the gap can be explained by the factor. However, the results of the study raise serious 
questions regarding the appropriateness or viability of Bitcoin as a medium of exchange. Bitcoin’s 
extreme volatility shown in the previous sections renders it as problematic in this regard, to say 
                                                     
9 Eric Lam, Bitcoin is worth less than the cost to mine it, JPMorgan Says, Bloomberg, Jan 25, 2019,  
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-01-25/bitcoin-is-worth-less-than-the-cost-to-mine-it-jpmorgan-
says, Accessed on Feb 4, 2019 
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the least. As the value of Bitcoin changes continuously and dramatically in the market without 
any discrete time segmentation, it is difficult to relate it to a basket of real goods or services in a 
certain period of time. Pricing of goods and services in Bitcoin may at some point be viable, to 
the extent that exchange rates between Bitcoin and fiat currencies become stable. Since its 
issuance and trading is largely outside the jurisdiction of monetary authorities, this is most 
unlikely. Fundamentally, one cannot expect Bitcoin to serve as a liquid store of value and have 
extra intrinsic value other than its marginal mining cost. Of course, the mining cost vary over the 
world, and the time-series data of marginal cost of Bitcoin mining is not available. However, 
considering the estimated worldwide weighted average marginal mining cost and absence of 
factors which give intrinsic value for Bitcoin, it is possible to infer that the rational value of the 
cryptocurrency was not fairly and efficiently reflected in the market price. 
Evidence of inefficiency of Bitcoin market can be inferred from derivatives markets. A 
number of recent studies provide explanations about Bitcoin’s mispricing by explaining the lack 
of synchronization between spot markets and futures markets. For example, Baur and Dimpfl 
(2018) show evidence that the futures price of Bitcoin is led by its spot price. This outcome is in 
contrast with most studies for financial and commodity futures whereby futures lead the spot. 
Problems in identifying the trading activity reflected in the spot markets are severe, however; this 
does not undercut the potential importance of futures in pricing or in arbitrage.10  The futures 
markets for Bitcoin have shown some resilience, since its introduction, especially the CME 
                                                     
10 As Young (2010) notes: “According to Bitwise, more than 95 percent of the reported bitcoin volume is inflated or 
faked, which leaves the futures market responsible for around 35 percent of global bitcoin volume.” See 
https://www.ccn.com/cme-sees-meteroic-bitcoin-demand-546m-in-1-day, accessed on April 13, 2019 
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contract. One of the leading cryptocurrency exchanges, Bakkt plans to launch the world’s first 
physically delivered Bitcoin futures contracts.11 
Can futures prices serve as valid predictors of spot prices?  To address this question, we 
implement Fama’s (1984) regression approach. The two equations to be estimated are following: 
𝑃𝑡+1 − 𝑃𝑡 = 𝛼1 + 𝛽1(𝐹𝑡 − 𝑃𝑡) + 𝜀1,𝑡+1             (1) 
and 
𝐹𝑡 − 𝑃𝑡+1 = 𝛼2 + 𝛽2(𝐹𝑡 − 𝑃𝑡) + 𝜀2,𝑡+1             (2) 
where 𝑃𝑡 and 𝐹𝑡 are the spot and future price of Bitcoin at time t, respectively. 𝐹𝑡 − 𝑃𝑡+1 defines 
the risk premium and (𝐹𝑡 − 𝑃𝑡) refers the basis at time t. Estimations of these two equations may 
provide evidence that the differentials between spot ands future prices contain information about 
future spot prices or risk premium at the expiration of the future contract. The prerequisite 
condition of relevant estimation of these two equations is stationarity of the data series. In order 
to test for stationarity of the dataset, we conducted three different unit root tests including: Dickey 
and Fuller (1979, 1981), augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF), and Phillips-Perron (PP) tests.  
[Please insert Table 34 about here] 
The results reported in the table show the basis, the risk premium, and the change in the 
future spot prices data series are stationary, rejecting existence of unit root process. Therefore, 
we can infer that the regression models are not subject to the spurious inference issues associated 
with time series.  
[Please insert Table 35 about here] 
                                                     
11 Jeremy Wall, Bakkt raises $182.5 million and its launch may be delayed again, January 1, 2019, 
https://www.investinblockchain.com/bakkt-raises-182-5-million-launch-delayed-again, accessed on April 13, 2019 
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Table 35 presents the results of the estimation of the equations. Given the significance of 
the coefficients  𝛽1 for both CBOE and CME contracts in the equation (1), we can infer that the 
basis, (𝐹𝑡 − 𝑃𝑡) contains some information about the spot price change of Bitcoin in the future. 
The results of estimation of the equation (2) are consistent with those of the equation (1). From 
the estimated coefficients  𝛽2, we can also conclude that the basis at time t can be a predictor of 
the risk premium. However, the Wald tests do not support unbiasedness of the predictors, since 
the joint tests for α1=0, β1=1 and α2=0, β2=1 are significant for all the contracts examined, as 
shown in Table 36. 
[Please insert Table 36 about here] 
Do the futures markets facilitate efficient pricing through arbitrage? We address this issue 
using the cost-of-carry model as in MacKinlay and Ramaswamy (1988), Bhatt and Cakici (1990), 
and Switzer, Varson, and Zghidi (2000). Mispricing is based on the deviation of the futures price 
prevailing in the market at time t for a contract with a maturity of T: F(t,T) and the arbitrage free 
expected Futures price Fe(t,T): 
𝑥𝑡 = (𝐹(𝑡,𝑇) − 𝐹(𝑡,𝑇)
𝑒 )/𝑃𝑡 
where 𝐹(𝑡,𝑇) is Bitcoin future price at time t with the maturity date of T, and 𝐹(𝑡,𝑇)
𝑒  = 𝑃𝑡𝑒
𝑟𝑓∗(𝑡−𝑇), 
where rf is risk free rate. Deviations from no-arbitrage are identified using panel unit root tests 
on xt. Since both Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) and CBOE introduced the futures in 
December 2017, data consisting of all contracts from January 2018 contracts to March 2019 
contracts are used in the tests. The CBOE data are obtained from the exchange’s website and the 
CME contracts are obtained from Bloomberg. Descriptive statistics of the mispricing term and 
absolute value of the mispricing term are presented in Table 37. 
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[Please insert Table 37 about here] 
In order to investigate existence of arbitrage opportunity in the Bitcoin market, we 
conducted two different unit root tests for the mispricing term data series. Evidence of unit root 
processes in the mispricing term data can support chance persistence of arbitrage opportunities 
through time, which would be indicative of inefficiency. 
[Please insert Table 38 about here] 
As shown in Panel A of Table 38, using the CBOE’s futures contracts data of both monthly 
nearby-contracts and rolled over 7 days before expiration, the test statistics indicate the presence 
of unit root processes of the mispricing term. The test results with CME’s futures contracts data 
are similar. According to Panel B of Table 38, we cannot reject the unit roots hypothesis at the 5% 
level, which indicates that the hypothesis of no-arbitrage is not supported. Furthermore, the signs 
of the t-statistics provide clues for direction of price change of Bitcoin. As we see the signs are 
negative for all the cases, we can see the mispricing terms are significantly negative, which 
indicates that futures prices exceed efficient prices based on the cost of carry. Why do these 
arbitrage opportunities persist? 
4.4.4. Further Discussion on Bitcoin Market Efficiency 
Several factors might serve as sources of inefficiency in the markets. Such factors would 
include trading frictions due to the extreme volatility of the markets, and failures of significant 
spot exchanges would adversely affect both long and short trading of spot Bitcoins. Regarding 
the latter, given the lack of physical delivery of the physical product at expiration combined with 
an illiquid spot market may inhibit short selling.12 Although Bitcoin has been touted for the 
                                                     
12 A number of exchanges do market contracts for short selling.  See: https://99bitcoins.com/short-sell-bitcoin/  
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integrity of its security system, a number of cases highlight its actual vulnerabilities: indeed, a 
number of hacking and fraud events have taken place since its initial release to the latest case of 
Quadriga.13 The chronology of major Bitcoin exchange security issues is shown in Table 39 and 
Figure 8.  
[Please insert Table 39 and Figure 8 about here] 
Theoretically and practically, Bitcoin itself is secure from hacking attacks due to the 
blockchain technology. However, exchanges and wallet service providers are not. Especially, 
centralized cryptocurrency exchanges are vulnerable to such hacks and frauds, and the security 
of the coin owners are not guaranteed by the service provider. As long as the concerns about hacks 
and frauds remain, the virtual currency’s stability and function as a store of value is remained to 
be jeopardized. 
While Bitcoin is the leading cryptocurrency market, it does not have a monopoly on the 
market, as numerous virtual currencies have been released in the last several years. Table 40 
shows the list of major alternative cryptocurrencies and their release dates.  
[Please insert Table 40 about here] 
As those cryptocurrencies may serve as alternatives or substitutes of Bitcoin, releases of 
competitive virtual monies are reviewed to capture the possible impacts on the price of Bitcoin. 
Figure 9 provides a snapshot of such alternative coin releases and corresponding changes of the 
price of Bitcoin since April 2010. 
                                                     
13 Doug Alexander, Quadriga Crypto Mystery Deepens With ‘Cold Wallets’ Found Empty, Bloomberg, March 1, 
2019, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-03-01/quadriga-has-6-cold-wallets-but-they-don-t-hold-any-
crypto, accessed on April 13, 2019 
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[Please insert Figure 9 about here] 
While the alternative coins have been released over the time, their impacts on Bitcoin 
prices is not clear-cut. For example, Litecoin, Stellar, Ripple, Tether, and Ethereum were 
launched before 2017: a casual glance at notable Bitcoin price appreciation or depreciation during 
the time. Subsequently, EOS, Bitcoin Cash, and TRON were launched during bullish period of 
Bitcoin market, and Bitcoin SV was introduced in the bearish period. However, those releases do 
not show any uniformed impact on Bitcoin’s price. One explanation is that Bitcoin is still the 
dominant player among the cryptocurrencies. In fact, the market capitalization of Bitcoin is five 
times larger than Ripple, which is the second biggest cryptocurrency market as of January 30, 
2019. This distinguishable market capitalization of Bitcoin imply that the alternatives may not 
have sufficient market shares to influence Bitcoin’s price.  
A casual glance at Figures 9 and 10 and Tables 39 and 40 in the period up to 2017 suggests 
that the impacts of Bitcoin security concerns and new coin releases on the price of Bitcoin were 
muted. One could argue that up until 2017, the legitimacy of the market was still in question.  
This changed with the launching of futures contracts on Bitcoin in December 2017, on both the 
CBOE and the CME.  Figures 9 and 10 provide graphs of the mispricing term and absolute value 
of mispricing term since the inception of futures trading on these major exchanges. 
[Please insert Figures 9 and 10 about here] 
As can be seen, mispricing and absolute mispricing the price crash exhibit a significant 
spike in the first week of November 2018.  This month was particularly bearish, with bitcoin 
exhibiting a monthly decline of about 37%. Was the jump in Bitcoin mispricing attributable to 
security concerns related to hacking and other forms of fraud? Notable events, for example were 
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the thefts of Bithumb and Zaif which resulted in losses of There might be several reasons for such 
bearish market, and one possible cause is concern about Bitcoin security, which might be 
triggered by a number of Bitcoin hacks and frauds continuously occurred in 2018. Especially, 
amount of Bitcoin stolen in the cases of Bithumb and Zaif are several thousands BTCs, reflecting 
losses of 31 million and 60 million U.S. dollar, respectively. 
To formally capture impacts of these issues on Bitcoin price, we regress the mispricing 
term,  𝑥𝑡 on dummy variables that represent events of identified Bitcoin hacks/frauds issue as 
well as alternative coin releases. The model as follows: 
𝑥𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝐻𝑎𝑐𝑘_𝐶𝑢𝑚t + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝑁𝑒𝑤𝐶𝑜𝑖𝑛t + 𝜀 𝑡 
where 𝐻𝑎𝑐𝑘_𝐶𝑢𝑚t is cumulative amount of stolen Bitcoin by the time t, and 𝑁𝑒𝑤𝐶𝑜𝑖𝑛t is dummy 
variable indicating on D-1 to D+5 of new cryptocurrency releases. For 𝑁𝑒𝑤𝐶𝑜𝑖𝑛t, only top 50 
cryptocurrencies in market capitalization are considered, as of April 11, 2019.14 The results are 
shown in Table 41. 
[Please insert Table 41 about here] 
Reviewing the results, we can conclude that hacks and frauds of Bitcoin are pivotal issues 
which may amplify the mispricing term. Alternative coin release variable also shows significant 
coefficients except for CBOE’s futures contract with nearby rollover data series. Overall, both 
Bitcoin security concerns and new cryptocurrency releases may lead considerable gap between 
the futures price and spot price in the future. 
                                                     
14 Data Source: https://coinmarketcap.com/ 
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Additionally, in order to verify persistency of effects captured above, we conducted 
GARCH test for the model. Considering asymmetric characteristic of the data series, EGARCH 
model is implemented. Table 42 shows the results of EGARCH estimation.  
[Please insert Table 42 about here] 
According to the table, all the EGARCH coefficient C(7) are less than one, implying that 
the effect of the independent dummy variables are not persistent. Thus, we can infer that the 
volatility structure of Bitcoin mispricing term is not affected by the two dummy variables: Bitcoin 





Chapter 5: Conclusions 
In this thesis, I study three aspects of recent international financial markets and explore 
their implications for policy making and investment decisions. These three aspects include a) 
cultural factor’s impact on investment behavior; b) effects of negative interest rate policies on 
financial markets; and c) pricing of the leading cryptocurrency, Bitcoin. The first essay addresses 
the issue of culture and risk behavior focuses on nine small European countries over a long-time 
frame and show that two different risk measures, i.e. the traditional risk measure and the extreme 
risk measure, capture different responses from investors in those countries. More importantly, we 
find that a country culture factor plays a critical role in explaining small stockholders’ behavior, 
and in particular the trading responses of such investors to changes in the risk environment. In 
country specific regressions, with the exception of Austria, small investors domiciled in 
collectivist countries do not show much responsiveness to changes in the risk environment, which 
implies that collectivism constrains the initiative for investors to actively trade in response to 
market signals. In a pooled panel regression where we can control for the highly persistent and 
time invariant country variable, we find that the culture-risk interaction variable has a 
significantly positive impact on fund flows. In addition, small investors from individualistic 
societies exhibit “flight to risk” behavior, consistent with high risk tolerance. 
I investigate the effects of negative interest rate policies (NIRP) on the financial markets 
of the eight European countries and Japan in my second essay. The results from Chapter 3 explain 
that the consequences of NIRP might not correspond to its policy objective. By implementing the 
event study analyses, I find the evidences of transitory effects of the policy announcements on 
the currency returns, while insufficient impacts are found in the equity markets. In extended term 
analyses with regression models, the effects on currency market returns are not in the direction of 
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the traditional expansionary monetary policy mechanism. The analyses provide evidences for 
NIRP’s limited reverse-effects on the currency returns, and the effects are more observable in the 
countries with steeper yield curves of sovereign bonds. Furthermore, for the equity markets, the 
S&P500 index variable plays significant role in most cases of developed economies, rather than 
interest regime switching variable. More specifically, the Euro Area, Japan, Norway, and 
Switzerland show notable cointegrations between the U.S. and those equity markets during the 
event window. Throughout the analyses, Switzerland presents notable differences from the other 
economies due to the SNB’s pegged exchange rate abolishment along with NIRP execution. 
Overall, findings of this study suggest that lowering policy rate under the zero bound as a 
stimulative monetary policy may cause unfavorable consequences, unlike conventional interest 
rate cuts during periods in which interest rates remain bounded from above by zero. I believe this 
research contributes to the literature of interest rate risk by delivering significant new evidence 
on the impact of NIRP. 
The last essay attempts to show the abnormality of recent severe Bitcoin price instability 
and to investigate possible drivers of recent price changes of the cryptocurrency by analyzing its 
historical price data and relevant explanatory variables. We visualize that the cryptocurrency’s 
recent price ascents and descents are anomalous and not consistent with efficient markets. The 
outcomes of the analyses portray that the realized prices of Bitcoin have notable gaps with its 
exponential trend values, having unprecedented volatility level and abnormal detrended ratios. 
One could support the assertion that Bitcoin is overpriced. Its instability certainly renders it as 
unviable as a medium of exchange. The analyses show that the price of Bitcoin is significantly 
related to its daily trading volume, monthly high-low price spread, and value crash in the previous 
trading day, while most of the other explanatory variables are significant. These results of 
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regression analyses are in favor of the argument that the price of Bitcoin has mainly moved with 
internal speculative investing activities. This study also provides evidence of inefficiency of 
Bitcoin market and presence of external risks which may influence the cryptocurrency’s essential 
value. Finally, the results also show significant and persistent mispricing of the Bitcoin spot prices 
in relation to futures prices, that represent deviations from no-arbitrage bounds. Moreover, we 
show that such mispricing may be amplified by hackings and alternative cryptocurrency releases. 
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Figure 1. Extreme Risk Measure (in %) for Belgium, Greece, Ireland, and Portugal during 1983-
2016 
 
Figure 1.1. Extreme Risk Measure (in %) for Belgium, 1988-2016 
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Figure 1.3. Extreme Risk Measure (in %) for Ireland, 1987-2016 
 
 






































































































































































































































































Figure 2.1. Net Flows (annual) into Equity Mutual Funds for Belgium (in USD $100 Million) vs. 
Extreme Risk Measure (in %) in Belgium, 1995-2013  
 
 
Figure 2.2. Net Flows (annual) into Equity Mutual Funds for Belgium (in USD $100 Million) vs. 
Extreme Risk Measure (in %) in Greece, 1995-2013 
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Figure 2.4.  
Net Flows (annual) into Equity Mutual Funds for Belgium (in USD $100 Million) vs. Extreme 
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Figure 5-1. Scatter Plot Chart of Bitcoin and Indexes Returns Before and After 2017 
 































Figure 7. Comparison of Single Exponential Residuals of Bitcoin and Index Price by Country 





Figure 8. BitCoin Price Changes and Major Exchange Hacks (March 2010 – January 2019) 
 
 
Figure 9. BitCoin Price Changes and Release of Alternative Coins (March 2010 – January 2019) 
  
  
Figure 9. Bitcoin Futures Mispricing Terms (CBOE: December 2017 – March 2019, CME: January 2018 – March 2019) 
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For our study  
Dummy =  
individualism (1)  
vs. Collectivism (0)  
 
1 United States 91 N/A 
2 United Kingdom 89 N/A 
3 Canada 80 N/A 
3 Netherland 80 N/A 
5 Italy 76 N/A 
6 Belgium 75 Individualism 
7 Denmark 74 Individualism 
8 France 71 N/A 
8 Sweden 71 Individualism 
10 Ireland 70 Individualism 
11 Norway 69 Individualism 
12 Switzerland 68 N/A 
13 Germany 67 N/A 
14 Finland 63 Collectivism 
15 Austria 55 Collectivism 
16 Spain 51 N/A 
17 Japan 46 N/A 
18 Greece 35 Collectivism 
19 Portugal 27 Collectivism 
 




Table 2. Statistics of Indices 
 
We focus on nine relatively small Eurozone countries in this study: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Norway, Portugal, and Sweden 
that were epicenters of European banking crisis, and the European sovereign debt crisis. For each country, we choose the equity index with the longest 
history as the major stock index to use in this study. The historical prices for those indices are collected from Bloomberg and Thomson Reuters DataStream. 
This table presents the details of _the nine indices, including time period and the number of observations for each country when we use daily, weekly, and 
monthly data to calculate risk variables. 
No. Country Index 
Daily Data  Weekly Data  Monthly Data 
Time Period Obs.  Time Period Obs.  Time Period  Obs. 
1 Austria Austrian Traded Index (ATX) 
June 5, 1992 - March 
24, 2017 
6150  
June 5, 1992 - March 
24, 2017 
1295  
June 30, 1992 - 
February 28, 2017 
297 
2 Belgium Belgium All Share Index (BELAS) 
October 3, 1988 - 
March 24, 2017 
7162  
October 7, 1988 - 
March 24, 2017 
1486  
October 7, 1988 - 
February 28, 2017 
341 
3 Denmark OMX Copenhagen 20 Index (KFX) 
December 4, 1989 - 
March 24, 2017 
6837  
December 8, 1989 - 
March 24, 2017 
1425  
December 29, 1989 - 
February 28, 2017 
327 
4 Finland OMS Helsinki Index (HEX) 
January 30, 1987 - 
February 28, 2017 
7549  
January 30, 1987 - 
February 24, 2017 
1570  
January 30, 1987 - 
January 31, 2017 
361 
5 Greece Athens Stock Exchange (ASE) Index 
Jun 30, 1992 - 
February 28, 2017 
6140  
July 3, 1992 - February 
24, 2017 
1282  
July 31, 1992 - January 
31, 2017 
294 
6 Ireland Irish Overall Index (ISEQ) 
January 2, 1987 - 
March 24, 2017 
7609  
February 4, 1983 - 
February 24, 2017 
1786  
January 31, 1983 - 
February 28, 2017 
410 
7 Norway OMX Oslo All Share Index (OSEAX) 
December 29, 1995 - 
March 24, 2017 
5331  
December 29, 1995 - 
March 24, 2017 
1109  
December 29, 1995 - 
February 28, 2017 
255 
8 Portugal Portugal All Share Index (PSI) 
January 5, 1988 - 
March 24, 2017 
7154  
January 9, 1988 - 
March 24, 2017 
1520  
January 29, 1988 - 
February 28, 2017 
350 
 9 Sweden Stockholm All-Share Index (SAX) 
January 2, 1987 - 
February 28, 2017 
7573  
January 2, 1987 - 
February 28, 2017 
1574  
January 31, 1980 - 





Table 3. Summary Statistics of Daily/Weekly/Monthly Logarithmatic Percent Changes (i.e. returns) of Indices 
             




1% 5% 10% 90% 95% 99% 
Panel A. Daily Data 
Austria 0.0168 0.0600 1.3605 -0.3699 7.0939 13033.5632 -4.1698 -2.1652 -1.4002 1.4208 1.9056 3.4388 
Belgium 0.0296 0.0599 1.0437 -0.1100 7.6207 17342.4548 -2.9831 -1.6847 -1.0868 1.0716 1.5673 2.7324 
Denmark 0.0312 0.0596 1.1896 -0.2878 5.4294 8490.7097 -3.3404 -1.8812 -1.2997 1.3315 1.8244 3.0799 
Finland 0.0283 0.0560 1.6216 -0.2981 7.6116 18332.9331 -4.6496 -2.5136 -1.6873 1.6915 2.4616 4.5382 
Greece -0.0047 0.0115 1.8742 -0.2601 5.6020 8096.5801 -5.4298 -2.9842 -2.0064 2.0397 2.8572 5.1334 
Ireland 0.0238 0.0495 1.2607 -0.8218 10.5498 36138.0111 -3.8700 -1.8522 -1.2400 1.3019 1.7842 3.3301 
Norway 0.0381 0.1043 1.3554 -0.5958 6.0898 8551.5429 -4.1378 -2.1205 -1.4159 1.4479 2.0026 3.3202 
Portugal 0.0131 0.0140 1.0759 -0.3667 9.7827 28683.4787 -3.1829 -1.6620 -1.0920 1.1272 1.6241 2.8246 
Sweden 0.0342 0.0801 1.3225 -0.1239 5.3008 8884.3645 -3.8125 -2.0677 -1.4092 1.4066 1.9700 3.5672 





         
Panel B. Weekly Data 
Austria 0.0801 0.2580 3.0910 -1.4792 14.4433 11719.3723 -8.2113 -4.5514 -3.4394 3.2815 4.3767 6.7723 
Belgium 0.1420 0.3113 2.3731 -1.4583 14.9052 14272.7576 -6.7343 -3.9823 -2.4188 2.6087 3.4002 5.7797 
Denmark 0.1512 0.3175 2.6330 -0.9537 6.6591 2846.9231 -7.0802 -4.1158 -2.8720 3.0625 3.8407 5.8779 
Finland 0.1362 0.2652 3.5620 -0.5548 3.6421 947.6775 -10.1309 -5.5977 -4.0108 4.0295 5.6184 8.7303 
Greece -0.0185 0.0574 4.2358 -0.1996 3.3167 595.6637 -12.0981 -6.9053 -4.8627 4.6592 6.1885 10.9949 
Ireland 0.1702 0.3937 2.8646 -1.5298 12.7169 12724.0204 -8.5059 -4.1356 -2.8895 3.2471 4.2346 6.6763 
Norway 0.1834 0.5046 2.9096 -1.1327 7.3826 2753.1451 -8.3526 -4.8245 -2.9110 3.0252 3.8062 6.8770 
Portugal 0.0528 0.1028 2.5132 -0.7780 6.2558 2630.1025 -8.2099 -3.7179 -2.7498 2.7429 3.9139 6.5868 
Sweden 0.1646 0.4128 2.8486 -0.6693 5.4360 2054.1876 -7.6722 -4.5096 -3.1517 3.1939 4.2327 7.1231 





Panel D. Whole sample period vs. crisis period.    




1% 5% 10% 90% 95% 99% 
Austria 
Jun 1992 - 
Feb 2017 296 0.3615 1.0892 6.1555 -1.1407 3.7602 238.5806 -18.5845 -10.1973 -6.9855 7.5428 8.8351 12.4084 
2009 12 2.9535 3.3022 8.5102 -0.8379 0.7025 1.6508 -14.7698 -10.4303 -5.4879 12.0763 12.8230 13.4021 
2008 12 -7.8906 -5.1448 12.6039 -0.6202 0.3061 0.8161 -31.9413 -29.3298 -25.6027 2.7774 7.2486 11.4020 
Belgium 
Oct 1988 - 
Feb 2017 340 0.6137 1.0386 4.6288 -1.0080 2.4974 145.9397 -14.5691 -8.1971 -4.6983 5.3307 6.7679 9.5863 
2009 12 2.0548 3.2581 6.0660 -0.4587 -0.3349 0.4768 -9.1809 -6.9306 -4.5274 9.2403 10.0677 10.5426 
2008 12 -5.3790 -3.6539 9.0788 -0.2209 -1.2006 0.8183 -20.1941 -17.5311 -14.7823 5.2510 6.3431 7.1137 
Denmark 
Dec 1989 - 
Feb 2017 326 0.6637 0.9758 5.3089 -0.5545 1.3498 41.4537 -14.8811 -8.1400 -6.0569 6.9451 8.2421 11.6878 
2009 12 2.5572 1.8970 7.0328 0.7288 1.3946 2.0348 -7.8010 -6.7073 -5.3600 7.3126 12.3817 17.2850 
2008 12 -5.2324 -3.8184 8.9896 -0.4373 -0.6429 0.5892 -20.5937 -19.7455 -18.2835 5.1821 6.4481 7.2954 
               
Panel C. Monthly Data 
Austria 0.3615 1.0892 6.1555 -1.1407 3.7602 238.5806 -18.5845 -10.1973 -6.9855 7.5428 8.8351 12.4084 
Belgium 0.6137 1.0386 4.6288 -1.0080 2.4974 145.9397 -14.5691 -8.1971 -4.6983 5.3307 6.7679 9.5863 
Denmark 0.6637 0.9758 5.3089 -0.5545 1.3498 41.4537 -14.8811 -8.1400 -6.0569 6.9451 8.2421 11.6878 
Finland 0.5861 0.6732 7.4341 -0.2154 1.6876 45.5041 -19.1259 -11.3699 -8.3427 8.8410 11.4745 20.3757 
Greece -0.0887 0.4265 9.0829 -0.2345 1.3781 25.8701 -25.3191 -15.4895 -11.8359 10.4745 14.0990 20.0462 
Ireland 0.7458 1.3983 6.0320 -1.0131 3.2589 250.9545 -17.6699 -9.1039 -6.3349 7.1754 9.5612 12.6107 
Norway 0.8019 1.3902 5.9166 -1.3484 4.4471 286.2679 -22.8869 -8.3305 -5.5780 7.3036 8.8279 11.1287 
Portugal 0.2573 0.3602 5.4960 -0.4136 2.3449 89.9131 -16.1342 -8.3648 -5.9919 6.6518 8.8381 14.5988 




Jan 1987 - 
Jan 2017 360 0.5861 0.6732 7.4341 -0.2154 1.6876 45.5041 -19.1259 -11.3699 -8.3427 8.8410 11.4745 20.3757 
2009 12 1.4832 2.5201 8.6403 0.1700 1.4814 1.1552 -14.0734 -10.4541 -6.6444 7.7624 13.2955 18.4713 
2008 12 -6.3652 -6.1905 6.8957 -0.6141 -0.4420 0.8520 -19.5638 -16.3998 -13.0412 0.5285 0.8950 1.2246 
Greece 
Jul 1992 - 
Jan 2017 293 -0.0887 0.4265 9.0829 -0.2345 1.3781 25.8701 -25.3191 -15.4895 -11.8359 10.4745 14.0990 20.0462 
2009 12 1.7204 2.6189 10.7347 -0.3204 -0.1370 0.2147 -16.8673 -15.8082 -13.7705 12.1840 15.8038 19.0224 
2008 12 -8.8693 -6.1391 10.3716 -1.0793 1.3006 3.1757 -31.2140 -25.3777 -19.1827 -0.9396 2.0115 4.8559 
Ireland 
Jan 1983 - 
Feb 2017 409 0.7458 1.3983 6.0320 -1.0131 3.2589 250.9545 -17.6699 -9.1039 -6.3349 7.1754 9.5612 12.6107 
2009 12 1.9889 3.4268 9.0016 -0.4051 0.5340 0.4708 -14.9858 -12.9271 -9.9477 10.1154 13.7264 17.0055 
2008 12 -9.0412 -5.9859 8.7199 -0.1941 -1.2916 0.9095 -22.9332 -20.3369 -17.6670 1.9485 2.6709 2.7593 
Norway 
Dec 1995 
- Feb 2017 254 0.8019 1.3902 5.9166 -1.3484 4.4471 286.2679 -22.8869 -8.3305 -5.5780 7.3036 8.8279 11.1287 
2009 12 3.6776 4.0228 5.2600 0.1802 0.6893 0.3025 -5.3866 -4.1903 -2.5998 9.6991 11.8826 13.5900 
2008 12 -6.2202 -5.2617 12.8421 -0.4010 -0.9388 0.7624 -27.0131 -25.6363 -23.9752 7.6412 9.4098 11.0751 
Portugal 
Jan 1988 - 
Feb 2017 349 0.2573 0.3602 5.4960 -0.4136 2.3449 89.9131 -16.1342 -8.3648 -5.9919 6.6518 8.8381 14.5988 
2009 12 2.8017 2.6839 4.9600 -0.0534 -0.6464 0.2146 -5.5719 -3.9126 -2.1452 8.1656 9.3783 10.5464 
2008 12 -5.7293 -2.5220 8.6310 -0.8762 0.0096 1.5356 -22.6329 -19.3963 -16.0307 2.2100 3.8644 5.2217 
Sweden 
Jan 1980 - 
Jan 2017 444 1.0082 1.2433 5.9358 -0.4064 2.0092 86.9052 -15.3517 -9.3336 -6.1547 7.7278 10.2612 14.0407 
2009 12 3.1910 1.9663 5.6680 1.2865 3.1955 8.4160 -5.3646 -2.7040 0.0672 9.1543 13.0364 16.3422 
2008 12 -4.5332 -1.3914 8.3117 -0.7971 -1.0682 1.8412 -19.2165 -17.2613 -15.0661 3.0916 3.3752 3.5383 
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Table 4. The Top 15-year Rankings of Volatility as Measured by Standard Deviation and by the 
Percentage of Extreme Days for Each of the Nine European Countries 




 Percentage of 
Extreme Days 
 Geometric Standard 
Deviation 
 Percentage of 
Extreme Days 
Rank Year GeoStdDev(%) 
 Year L(%)  Year GeoStdDev(%)  Year L(%) 






2008 35.7265 1 






2002 25.6784 2 






2009 22.5379 3 






2011 21.2453 4 






2015 20.5910 5 






2003 19.8203 6 






2010 19.5069 7 






2016 18.9441 8 






1998 18.6076 9 






1999 16.0590 10 






2014 15.8120 11 






2000 15.6013 12 






2007 15.2289 13 






2001 14.7436 14 






2013 14.5637 15 




 Percentage of 
Extreme Days 
 Geometric Standard 
Deviation 
 Percentage of 
Extreme Days 
Rank Year GeoStdDev(%) 
 Year L(%)  Year GeoStdDev(%)  Year L(%) 






2000 35.4582 1 






2001 33.3333 2 






2002 24.8996 3 






2008 15.4150 4 






1999 13.5458 5 






1998 12.8000 6 






2011 12.6482 7 






2009 12.3506 8 






2003 9.2000 9 






1992 4.3825 10 






1997 4.0161 11 






2007 3.2000 12 






2006 3.1873 13 






2012 2.8000 14 










Table 4. Cont'd 




 Percentage of 
Extreme Days 
 Geometric Standard 
Deviation 
 Percentage of 
Extreme Days 
Rank Year GeoStdDev(%) 
 Year L(%)  Year GeoStdDev(%)  Year L(%) 






2008 35.8268 1 






2009 23.7154 2 






2007 11.4173 3 






2010 11.0236 4 






2011 10.6719 5 






1987 10.3586 6 






2002 10.2767 7 






1998 10.0000 8 






2001 7.1146 9 






2016 6.2992 10 






2000 5.2209 11 






2015 5.1181 12 






1990 4.3825 13 






1988 3.9841 14 






2014 3.9370 15 




 Percentage of 
Extreme Days 
 Geometric Standard 
Deviation 
 Percentage of 
Extreme Days 
Rank Year GeoStdDev(%) 
 Year L(%)  Year GeoStdDev(%)  Year L(%) 






2008 25.3906% 1 






1998 21.8623% 2 






2011 18.2879% 3 






2015 16.7969% 4 






2014 14.9020% 5 






2010 13.9535% 6 






2000 13.9344% 7 






2016 12.4514% 8 






1988 12.1827% 9 






2009 9.7656% 10 






2012 8.9844% 11 






2013 8.6275% 12 






2001 8.0972% 13 






1999 7.6613% 14 















 Percentage of 
Extreme Days 
Year GeoStdDev(%)  Year L(%) 
1 2008 37.9923 
 
2008 21.0317% 
2 2001 29.9827 
 
2000 15.9363% 
3 2002 29.2078 
 
2002 14.0000% 
4 2000 28.5168 
 
2001 12.8000% 
5 1987 28.2888 
 
2009 11.5538% 
6 2009 27.2778 
 
2011 10.6719% 
7 2011 26.9015 
 
1998 10.0000% 
8 1998 26.7977 
 
1987 8.0000% 
9 1992 23.7326 
 
1992 7.1713% 
10 2007 19.4590 
 
2007 5.2000% 
11 1990 19.3971 
 
1990 4.8000% 
12 2003 19.2338 
 
2003 4.4177% 
13 2016 19.2001 
 
2006 4.3825% 
14 1997 19.1660 
 
1997 4.0161% 






Table 5. The Top 15-year Rankings of Volatility as Measured by Standard Deviation and by the 
Percentage of Extreme Weeks for Each of the Nine European Countries 




 Percentage of 
Extreme Weeks 
 Geometric Standard 
Deviation 
 Percentage of 
Extreme Weeks 
Rank Year GeoStdDev(%) 
 Year L(%)  Year GeoStdDev(%)  Year L(%) 






2008 63.4615 1 






2011 53.8462 2 






2009 51.9231 3 






1997 50.0000 4 






2002 46.1538 5 






1999 45.2830 6 






1998 44.2308 7 






2015 42.3077 8 






2010 41.5094 9 






2014 36.5385 10 






2013 36.5385 11 






2003 36.5385 12 






1990 36.5385 13 






2016 35.8491 14 






2007 34.6154 15 




 Percentage of 
Extreme Weeks 
 Geometric Standard 
Deviation 
 Percentage of 
Extreme Weeks 
Rank Year GeoStdDev(%) 
 Year L(%)  Year GeoStdDev(%)  Year L(%) 






2000 67.3077 1 






2002 61.5385 2 






2001 61.5385 3 






2008 50.0000 4 






1999 49.0566 5 






2009 48.0769 6 






1998 44.2308 7 






2011 42.3077 8 






2003 42.3077 9 






1992 40.3846 10 






1993 37.7358 11 






1995 36.5385 12 






1991 34.6154 13 






1997 32.6923 14 










Table 5. Cont'd 




 Percentage of 
Extreme Weeks 
 Geometric Standard 
Deviation 
 Percentage of 
Extreme Weeks 
Rank Year GeoStdDev(%) 
 Year L(%)  Year GeoStdDev(%)  Year L(%) 






2008 69.2308 1 






2009 67.3077 2 






2007 51.9231 3 






1987 50.0000 4 






1998 42.3077 5 






2001 40.3846 6 






2010 39.6226 7 






1986 38.4615 8 






2014 36.5385 9 






2011 36.5385 10 






1994 36.5385 11 






2015 34.6154 12 






2002 34.6154 13 






1990 32.6923 14 






2000 30.7692 15 




 Percentage of 
Extreme Weeks 
 Geometric Standard 
Deviation 
 Percentage of 
Extreme Weeks 
Rank Year GeoStdDev(%) 
 Year L(%)  Year GeoStdDev(%)  Year L(%) 






1998 76.9231 1 
2 2009 29.1440  2009 50.0000 
 
1998 31.7820  2014 59.6154 2 
3 1998 28.1193  1998 40.3846 
 
2014 24.7682  2008 55.7692 3 






2010 52.8302 4 
5 2011 22.9092  2007 30.7692 
 
2010 22.1164  2016 50.9434 5 
6 2006 21.1417  2006 30.7692 
 
2011 21.2006  2015 50.0000 6 






1997 50.0000 7 
8 1999 18.6570  2011 28.8462 
 
2016 19.3491  2009 48.0769 8 






2011 46.1538 9 






1988 43.1373 10 
11 2007 17.8288  2016 24.5283 
 
2000 18.7302  2007 42.3077 11 
12 2005 17.3425  2005 23.0769 
 
1989 18.6647  2000 42.3077 12 






1999 41.5094 13 
14 2000 16.7580  2014 21.1538 
 
2009 17.9053  2002 40.3846 14 
15 2003 15.8350  1997 21.1538 
 









 Percentage of 
Extreme Weeks 
Year GeoStdDev(%)  Year L(%) 
1 2008 38.0421 
 
2001 57.6923 
2 1998 28.6410 
 
2000 55.7692 
3 2000 27.3161 
 
2002 53.8462 
4 2001 27.0393 
 
2008 48.0769 
5 2002 26.8213 
 
2009 44.2308 
6 2011 26.7513 
 
1998 44.2308 
7 1990 26.5180 
 
2011 36.5385 
8 1987 25.8891 
 
1990 34.6154 
9 1992 25.7377 
 
1992 32.6923 
10 2009 25.5469 
 
1991 32.6923 
11 1991 18.6649 
 
1987 31.3725 
12 2010 18.6029 
 
1999 30.1887 
13 2007 18.5062 
 
2003 26.9231 
14 1994 18.0107 
 
1994 26.9231 







Table 6. The Top 15-year Rankings of Volatility as Measured by Standard Deviation and by the 
Percentage of Extreme Months for Each of the Nine European Countries 




 Percentage of 
Extreme Months 
 Geometric Standard 
Deviation 
 Percentage of 
Extreme Months 
Rank Year GeoStdDev(%) 
 Year L(%)  Year GeoStdDev(%)  Year L(%) 






1998 91.6667 1 






1997 91.6667 2 






2009 83.3333 3 






2005 83.3333 4 






2004 83.3333 5 






2015 75.0000 6 






2008 75.0000 7 






1989 75.0000 8 






2014 66.6667 9 






2012 66.6667 10 






2010 66.6667 11 






1993 66.6667 12 






1990 66.6667 13 






2011 58.3333 14 






2007 58.3333 15 




 Percentage of 
Extreme Months 
 Geometric Standard 
Deviation 
 Percentage of 
Extreme Months 
Rank Year GeoStdDev(%) 
 Year L(%)  Year GeoStdDev(%)  Year L(%) 






2001 100.0000 1 






2004 91.6667 2 






2002 91.6667 3 






1998 91.6667 4 






1997 83.3333 5 






1994 83.3333 6 






1993 83.3333 7 






1987 81.8182 8 






2015 75.0000 9 






2011 75.0000 10 






2009 75.0000 11 






2000 75.0000 12 






1999 75.0000 13 






1992 75.0000 14 










Table 6. Cont'd 




 Percentage of 
Extreme Months 
 Geometric Standard 
Deviation 
 Percentage of 
Extreme Months 
Rank Year GeoStdDev(%) 
 Year L(%)  Year GeoStdDev(%)  Year L(%) 






2008 100.0000 1 






2001 91.6667 2 






1992 91.6667 3 






2005 83.3333 4 






2002 83.3333 5 






1997 83.3333 6 






1990 83.3333 7 






1987 83.3333 8 






1985 83.3333 9 






1983 81.8182 10 






2009 75.0000 11 






1994 75.0000 12 






1986 75.0000 13 






1984 75.0000 14 






2016 66.6667 15 




 Percentage of 
Extreme Months 
 Geometric Standard 
Deviation 
 Percentage of 
Extreme Months 
Rank Year GeoStdDev(%) 
 Year L(%)  Year GeoStdDev(%)  Year L(%) 






1988 100.0000 1 






1998 91.6667 2 






1997 91.6667 3 






1994 91.6667 4 






2002 83.3333 5 






1999 83.3333 6 






1993 83.3333 7 






2015 75.0000 8 






2014 75.0000 9 






2012 75.0000 10 






2010 75.0000 11 






2009 75.0000 12 






2003 75.0000 13 






1989 75.0000 14 
















 Percentage of 
Extreme Months 
Year GeoStdDev(%)  Year L(%) 
1 1987 37.0711 
 
1997 91.6667 
2 1992 32.3222 
 
2002 83.3333 
3 2002 31.7092 
 
1987 83.3333 
4 2001 30.5038 
 
2015 75.0000 
5 1990 29.5851 
 
2001 75.0000 
6 1983 28.8175 
 
1989 75.0000 
7 2008 28.7925 
 
1988 75.0000 
8 1998 25.9940 
 
1983 75.0000 
9 1994 21.7047 
 
1981 75.0000 
10 1993 21.0375 
 
2005 66.6667 
11 2000 20.9825 
 
2003 66.6667 
12 1981 20.2546 
 
1998 66.6667 
13 1997 19.9931 
 
1994 66.6667 
14 1991 19.8585 
 
1993 66.6667 







Table 7. Regression Results of Equity Mutual Fund Net Flows on Risk Measures for Small 
Eurozone Countries 
  Austria (1996-2012)  Belgium (1995-2013) 
  Model (1) Model (2) Model (3)  Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) 
Panel A: Annual Observation with Financial Crisis Dummy Variable (Austria: n=17; Belgium: n=19) 
Constant 
 2.4426 7.7979 6.9923  2.4233 2.8781 0.3985 
 0.77 3.98 3.88  0.63 0.65 0.10 
GeoMean(t-1)  
 9.5968 8.1307 26.7668  0.0000 -6.0533 -1.5173 
 0.81 0.82 2.08  - -0.20 -0.06 
GeoStdDev(t-1) 
 0.4081    -1.7749   
 2.20    -0.08   
TotalExtr(t-1) 
  0.1976    -0.0345  
  2.85    -0.23  
NegExtr(t-1) 
   0.7464    1.1290 
   2.65    2.22 
PosExtr(t-1) 
   -0.4502    -1.7044 
   -1.36    -2.38 
Time 
 -0.5968 -0.6136 -0.7059  0.3782 0.4107 0.5843 
 -2.15 -2.52 -3.17  1.13 1.09 1.75 
Dummy Variable 
 -9.7441 -9.3226 -10.7261  -23.4073 -23.4763 -28.1261 
 -2.43 -2.55 0.00  -3.24 -3.14 -4.16 
Adjusted R Square  0.3863 0.4860 0.0596  0.3307 0.3567 0.5162 
  Austria (1996-2012)  Belgium (1995-2013) 
  Model (4) Model (5) Model (6)  Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) 
Panel B: Annual Observation without Financial Crisis Variable (Austria: n=17; Belgium: n=19) 
Constant 
 3.1549 7.9911 7.4769  1.2937 1.4899 0.1372 
 0.85 3.42 3.13  0.27 0.27 0.02 
GeoMean(t-1)  
 20.5567 19.7462 33.2442  0.0000 38.4154 44.9684 
 1.60 1.87 1.96  - 1.13 1.27 
GeoStdDev(t-1) 
 0.3679    40.2214   
 1.69    1.65   
TotalExtr(t-1) 
  0.1914    -0.0150  
  2.31    -0.08  
NegExtr(t-1) 
   0.5542    0.5583 
   1.51    0.78 
PosExtr(t-1) 
   -0.2382    -0.8332 
   -0.55    -0.83 
Time 
 -0.7288 -0.7640 -0.8402  0.1343 0.1481 0.2078 
 -2.28 -2.71 -2.89  0.32 0.32 0.44 






Table 7. Cont’d   Denmark (2003-2013)   Finland (1995-2012) 
    Model (1) Model (2) Model (3)   Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) 
Panel A: Annual Observation with Financial Crisis Dummy Variable (Denmark: n=11; Finland: n=19) 
Constant 
-1.9165 -1.3322 -1.9737  3.8327 2.4267 3.5382 
-1.03 -1.32 -1.58  0.75 0.69 0.90 
GeoMean(t-1)  
-2.0470 -0.7117 5.0563  -9.5690 -9.3994 -17.6914 
-0.34 -0.12 0.56  -0.89 -0.88 -1.09 
GeoStdDev(t-1) 
0.0597    -1.2308   
0.64    -0.61   
TotalExtr(t-1) 
 0.0407    -0.0322  
 0.91    -0.58  
NegExtr(t-1) 
  0.2428    -0.3713 
  1.05    -0.75 
PosExtr(t-1) 
  -0.1350    0.2691 
  -0.67    0.61 
Time 
0.5586 0.5399 0.5130  0.4734 0.4853 0.4990 
3.98 3.88 3.54  1.69 1.74 1.75 
Dummy Variable 
-1.0069 -1.0615 -0.9845  -7.3596 -7.5456 -8.2332 
-0.77 -0.84 -0.76  -1.61 -1.63 -1.70 
Adjusted R Square  0.6288 0.6509 0.6385  0.0880 0.0857 0.0474 
  Denmark (2003-2013)   Finland (1995-2012) 
  Model (4) Model (5) Model (6)  Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) 
Panel B: Annual Observation without Financial Crisis Variable (Denmark: n=11, Finland: n=18) 
Constant 
 -1.8887 -1.4059 -2.0784  3.3158 2.0470 2.5779 
 -1.04 -1.43 -1.73  0.62 0.55 0.62 
GeoMean(t-1)  
 -0.5161 0.8002 6.7826  -5.1050 -4.3124 -8.1711 
 -0.09 0.14 0.81  -0.47 -0.40 -0.50 
GeoStdDev(t-1) 
 0.0510    -0.8899   
 0.57    -0.42   
TotalExtr(t-1) 
  0.0355    -0.0161  
  0.82    -0.28  
NegExtr(t-1) 
   0.2496    -0.1825 
   1.12    -0.35 
PosExtr(t-1) 
   -0.1499    0.1332 
   -0.77    0.29 
Time 
 0.5475 0.5297 0.5020  0.3662 0.3778 0.3797 
 4.04 3.91 3.61  1.27 1.32 1.28 




Table 7. Cont’d   Greece (2003-2013)   Ireland (1995-2012) 
    Model (1) Model (2) Model (3)   Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) 
Panel A: Annual Observation with Financial Crisis Dummy Variable (Greece: n=19, Ireland: n=11) 
Constant 
0.2781 0.0801 0.0839  7.1932 5.6588 10.3754 
0.51 0.21 0.21  0.97 1.24 0.84 
GeoMean(t-1)  
-0.4488 -0.3883 -0.3515  22.5714 27.4193 -11.3329 
-0.42 -0.37 -0.29  0.69 0.93 -0.12 
GeoStdDev(t-1) 
-0.0110    -1.8291   
-0.59    -0.27   
TotalExtr(t-1) 
 -0.0057    -0.0120  
 -0.42    -0.08  
NegExtr(t-1) 
  -0.0006    -0.7822 
  -0.01    -0.42 
PosExtr(t-1) 
  -0.0113    0.6076 
  -0.14    0.41 
Time 
0.0110 0.0097 0.0096  0.0117 -0.0972 -0.0750 
0.31 0.27 0.26  0.01 -0.12 -0.09 
Dummy Variable 
-0.4872 -0.4651 -0.4999  25.1384 25.4558 24.9086 
-0.79 -0.75 -0.61  2.82 2.87 2.58 
Adjusted R Square  -0.2057 -0.2200 -0.3134  0.4184 0.4120 0.3181 
  Greece (2003-2013)   Ireland (1995-2012) 
  Model (4) Model (5) Model (6)  Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) 
Panel B: Annual Observation without Financial Crisis Variable (Greece: n=19, Ireland: n=11) 
Constant 
 0.2541 0.0804 0.0633  10.8503 6.9073 15.5529 
 0.47 0.21 0.16  1.05 1.07 0.92 
GeoMean(t-1)  
 -0.2048 -0.1601 -0.4038  -36.2552 -26.9905 -96.2743 
 -0.20 -0.16 -0.34  -1.03 -0.84 -0.75 
GeoStdDev(t-1) 
 -0.0098    -4.8519   
 -0.53    -0.51   
TotalExtr(t-1) 
  -0.0054    -0.0479  
  -0.40    -0.23  
NegExtr(t-1) 
   -0.0289    -1.4663 
   -0.49    -0.57 
PosExtr(t-1) 
   0.0195    1.0958 
   0.31    0.53 
Time 
 0.0050 0.0044 0.0068  0.6344 0.4075 0.4284 
 0.15 0.12 0.19  0.54 0.36 0.36 





 Table 7. Cont’d   Norway (1997-2013)   Portugal (1995-2013) 
    Model (1) Model (2) Model (3)   Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) 
Panel A: Annual Observation with Financial Crisis Dummy Variable (Norway: n=17; Portugal: n=19) 
Constant 
0.6241 0.2738 0.4143  4.2220 4.3452 4.1639 
0.76 0.59 0.63  1.28 1.79 1.64 
GeoMean(t-1)  
-0.5150 -0.1188 -0.9350  -19.0232 -19.4260 -13.6505 
-0.22 -0.05 -0.27  -1.58 -1.58 -0.74 
GeoStdDev(t-1) 
-0.3677    0.0066   
-0.57    0.04   
TotalExtr(t-1) 
 -0.0065    -0.0025  
 -0.33    -0.04  
NegExtr(t-1) 
  -0.0335    0.1693 
  -0.37    0.42 
PosExtr(t-1) 
  0.0274    -0.1721 
  0.25    -0.43 
Time 
0.0244 0.0190 0.0173  -0.2368 -0.2334 -0.2657 
0.49 0.38 0.33  -1.18 -1.16 -1.21 
Dummy Variable 
-1.3454 -1.4294 -1.4458  -9.5473 -9.5090 -10.5338 
-1.70 -1.84 -1.78  -2.56 -2.57 -2.35 
Adjusted R Square  0.0908 0.0751 -0.0002  0.2496 0.2496 0.2033 
  Norway (1997-2013)   Portugal (1995-2013) 
  Model (4) Model (5) Model (6)  Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) 
Panel B: Annual Observation without Financial Crisis Variable (Norway: n=17, Portugal: n=19)  
Constant  0.9339 0.2795 0.3672  5.1340 4.3824 4.7160 
  1.09 0.55 0.51  1.33 1.54 1.63 
GeoMean(t-1)   0.2369 1.1121 0.6116  -11.6650 -11.0451 -23.6160 
  0.10 0.49 0.17  -0.85 -0.79 -1.14 
GeoStdDev(t-1)  -0.6878    -0.0786   
  -1.03    -0.37   
TotalExtr(t-1)   -0.0128    -0.0207  
   -0.62    -0.26  
NegExtr(t-1)    -0.0297    -0.3403 
    -0.31    -0.87 
PosExtr(t-1)    0.0083    0.3022 
    0.07    0.76 
Time  0.0167 0.0051 0.0040  -0.3115 -0.3185 -0.2403 
  0.32 0.10 0.07  -1.34 -1.37 -0.95 




Table 7. Cont’d  Sweden (1995-2013) 
  Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) 
Panel A: Annual Observation (Sweden: n=19) 
Constant 
 -5.6016 -1.3133 0.2287 
 -0.60 -0.25 0.04 
GeoMean(t-1)  
 -17.1531 -16.9401 -25.2051 
 -0.62 -0.59 -0.83 
GeoStdDev(t-1) 
 0.3240   
 0.81   
TotalExtr(t-1) 
  0.1506  
  0.76  
NegExtr(t-1) 
   -0.5469 
   -0.71 
PosExtr(t-1) 
   0.8997 
   1.10 
Time 
 0.6340 0.6420 0.6337 
 1.70 1.72 1.69 
Dummy Variable 
 -11.8822 -11.9234 -9.4073 
 -1.63 -1.63 -1.20 
Adjusted R^2  0.1623 0.1586 0.1518 
  Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) 
Panel B: Annual Observation without Financial Crisis Variable (Sweden: n=19) 
Constant  -6.4102 -1.8243 0.5465 
  -0.65 -0.33 0.10 
GeoMean(t-1)   -1.0663 -0.9150 -17.6518 
  -0.04 -0.03 -0.59 
GeoStdDev(t-1)  0.3450   
  0.81   
TotalExtr(t-1)   0.1591  
   0.77  
NegExtr(t-1)    -0.8457 
    -1.15 
PosExtr(t-1)    1.2330 
    1.57 
Time  0.4964 0.5049 0.5346 
  1.30 1.32 1.44 





Table 8. Pooled regression results of equity mutual fund net flows on risk measures 
Panel A: Pooled regression results of equity mutual fund net flows on risk measures, with no country fixed effect controlled. 
The countries examined are separated into two groups, individualism and collectivism, based on Hofstede’s culture dimension score of 
individualism vs. collectivism. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES Model 1’ Model 2’ Model 3’ Model 4’ Model 5’ Model 6’ Model 7’ Model 8’ Model 9’ 
          
Geometric Mean (t-1) -9.045** -9.740** -9.053** -8.035 -8.224* -1.432 -6.569 -7.738 -5.112 
 (4.157) (4.025) (3.909) (5.072) (4.859) (4.079) (5.242) (4.963) (4.874) 
Geo. Std. Deviation (t-1) 0.00983 0.00239 -0.0907       
 (0.0561) (0.0573) (0.0697)       
Individualism  4.196***   4.647***   4.082***  
  (1.456)   (1.414)   (1.503)  
Individualism*Geo StdDev (t-1)   0.163***       
   (0.0553)       
Total Extreme Value (t-1)    -0.0632 -0.0780* -0.112**    
    (0.0435) (0.0418) (0.0511)    
Individualism*Total Extr (t-1)      0.112***    
      (0.0399)    
Negative Extreme Value (t-1)       0.0608 0.0580 0.105 
       (0.127) (0.123) (0.163) 
Positive Extreme Value (t-1)       0.00169 -0.0250 -0.220 
       (0.134) (0.133) (0.205) 
Individualism*Neg Extr (t-1)         0.0157 
         (0.217) 
Individualism*Pos Extr (t-1)         0.221 
         (0.255) 
GDP (t-1) 2.60e-05 -4.34e-05 -3.10e-05 1.99e-05 -5.86e-05** -1.60e-05 2.52e-05 -4.33e-05 -7.64e-06 
 (2.18e-05) (2.85e-05) (2.61e-05) (2.20e-05) (2.87e-05) (2.40e-05) (2.31e-05) (3.09e-05) (2.69e-05) 
Crisis -5.446* -5.240 -5.334* -3.034 -2.269 -1.459 -5.691* -5.460* -5.765* 
 (3.145) (3.186) (3.146) (2.726) (2.797) (2.689) (3.119) (3.180) (3.182) 
Constant 2.888* 3.486** 5.336*** 4.296*** 5.065*** 5.078*** 2.417** 3.142*** 3.860*** 
 (1.608) (1.600) (1.850) (1.274) (1.193) (1.344) (1.139) (1.112) (1.296) 
Fixed Effect No No No No No No No No No 
          
Observations 141 141 141 141 141 141 141 141 141 
R-squared 0.058 0.111 0.108 0.080 0.143 0.144 0.065 0.113 0.095 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Panel B: Pooled regression results of equity mutual fund net flows on risk measures, with country fixed effect controlled.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES Model 1’ Model 2’ Model 3’ Model 4’ Model 5’ Model 6’ Model 7’ Model 8’ Model 9’ 
          
Geometric Mean (t-1) -8.278 -9.594 -10.10* -8.839 -9.429 -7.362 -9.733 -10.79 -8.674 
 (6.087) (5.644) (5.793) (6.681) (6.512) (6.883) (7.284) (7.062) (6.795) 
Geo. Std. Deviation (t-1) 0.0165 -0.00314 -0.105       
 (0.0581) (0.0604) (0.0782)       
Individualism  4.396***   4.446***   4.258***  
  (1.278)   (1.333)   (1.385)  
Individualism*Geo StdDev (t-1)   0.182***       
   (0.0450)       
Total Extreme Value (t-1)    0.0197 -0.00766 -0.0411    
    (0.0366) (0.0395) (0.0432)    
Individualism*Extreme Measure (t-1)      0.103***    
      (0.0207)    
Negative Extreme Value (t-1)       -0.0477 -0.0631 -0.0514 
       (0.151) (0.114) (0.0873) 
Positive Extreme Value (t-1)       0.142 0.0952 -0.0620 
       (0.174) (0.136) (0.191) 
Individualism*Neg Extr (t-1)         0.106 
         (0.129) 
Individualism*Pos Extr (t-1)         0.134 
         (0.218) 
GDP (t-1) 1.66e-05 -5.95e-05* -5.02e-05* 1.86e-05 -6.11e-05 -1.41e-05 2.45e-05 -5.22e-05 -1.77e-05 
 (1.93e-05) (3.20e-05) (2.61e-05) (2.11e-05) (3.67e-05) (2.40e-05) (2.18e-05) (3.66e-05) (2.49e-05) 
Crisis = o, - - - - - - - - - 
          
Constant 2.455 3.524* 5.595** 2.342 3.646** 3.630** 1.858 3.177** 3.902** 
 (1.763) (1.962) (2.204) (1.369) (1.617) (1.618) (1.159) (1.416) (1.539) 
Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
          
Observations 141 141 141 141 141 141 141 141 141 
R-squared 0.011 0.084 0.088 0.012 0.085 0.065 0.021 0.087 0.066 
Number of year 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 9. Simultaneous Regression Results (2 Groups: Individualism vs Collectivism), 2SLS Estimates 
 Model (2’) Model (3’) Model (4’) Model (5’) Model (6’) 
VARIABLES Net Flow Geo.StDev Net Flow Geo.StDev Net Flow Total Extr. Net Flow Total Extr. Net Flow Total Extr. 
           
Geometric Mean (t-1) -2.872 8.552 -2.405 8.599 -2.158 15.76 -3.657 16.06 -2.196 16.05 
(5.514) (5.950) (5.513) (5.946) (5.419) (11.63) (5.299) (11.52) (5.335) (11.60) 
Geo. StdDev (t-1) 0.212**  0.125        
(0.0851)  (0.0951)        
Individualism 4.012*** -0.571     3.555** 4.321   
(1.505) (1.881)     (1.497) (3.642)   
Net Flow(t-1)  0.230**  0.219*  0.539**  0.461**  0.509** 
  (0.115)  (0.114)  (0.224)  (0.223)  (0.219) 
Individualism*Geo StdDev (t-1)   0.143**        
   (0.0559)        
Total Extr. (t-1)     0.106***  0.0896**  0.0313  
     (0.0372)  (0.0365)  (0.0495)  
Individualism*Total Extr. (t-1)         0.101**  
         (0.0451)  
GDP (t-1) -4.46e-05 -1.97e-05 -2.82e-05 -2.89e-05 2.78e-05 -0.000109 -3.13e-05 -0.000180* -1.48e-06 -0.000109 
(3.96e-05) (4.87e-05) (3.63e-05) (3.78e-05) (3.10e-05) (7.39e-05) (3.91e-05) (9.44e-05) (3.32e-05) (7.37e-05) 
Crisis -5.773*** 17.60*** -5.857*** 17.59*** -6.036*** 39.42*** -5.782*** 39.37*** -5.849*** 39.33*** 
 (1.949) (2.404) (1.948) (2.403) (1.962) (4.699) (1.913) (4.655) (1.936) (4.689) 
Constant -0.944 19.88*** 0.758 0.219* 0.887 17.71*** 1.603 18.35*** 0.0313 17.79*** 
 (2.331) (1.854) (2.529) (0.114) (1.679) (3.590) (1.657) (3.589) (0.0495) (3.582) 
Var(e.netflow) 44.53*** 44.51*** 45.20*** 42.82*** 43.92*** 
 (5.851) (5.836) (5.607) (5.304) (5.450) 
Var(e.risk) 67.22*** 67.11*** 256.6*** 252.0*** 255.8*** 
 (8.188) (8.162) (31.250) (30.590) (31.02) 
Covariance -21.94*** -21.35*** -39.22*** -37.81*** -38.99*** 
 (6.760) (6.778) (11.910) (11.340) (11.53) 
           
Observations 141 141 141 141 141 141 141 141 141 141 
Standard errors in parentheses 




Table 10. Overview of Central Banks with Negative Policy Rates 
Year Country Date Rate Announcement Measures 




January 19, 2015 
January 22, 2015 
January 29, 2015 
February 5, 2015 








-0.75 %  
-0.65 % 
July 5, 2012 Certificates of deposit 
(CD) 
2014 Euro Area 
 
June 11, 2014 
September 10, 2014 
December 9, 2015 





June 5, 2014 Deposit rate  
2015 Switzerland January 15, 2015 -0.75%  
 
December 18, 2014 Sight deposits at SNB 
(with an exemption 
threshold) 
Sweden February 12, 2015 
March 18, 2015 
July 2, 2015 





February 12, 2015 Reverse repo rate 
Norway September 24, 2015 
March 17, 2016 
-0.25% 
-0.50% 
September 24, 2015 Reserve rate 
2016 Bulgaria January 4, 2016 
March 16, 2016 
-0.30% 
-0.40%  
November 26, 2015 Deposit rate 
Japan February 16, 2016 -0.10% January 29, 2016 Deposit rate 
Hungary March 23, 2016 -0.05% March 22, 2016 Deposit rate  
Bosnia and Herzegovina July 1, 2016 -0.20% April 18, 2016 Deposit rate  
 









Bosnia and Herzegovina 
Convertible Mark 
BAM MSCI Bosnia and Herzegovina MXBAH 
Bulgaria Bulgarian Lev BGN SOFIX Index SOFIX 
Denmark Danish Krone DKK OMX Copenhagen Index KAX 
Euro Area EURO EUR Deutsche Boerse AG German Stock Index  DAX 
Hungary Hungarian Forint HUF Budapest Stock Exchange Budapest Stock Index BUX 
Japan Japanese Yen JPY Nikkei 225 NKY 
Norway Norwegian Krone NOK Oslo Stock Exchange All Share Index OSEAX 
Switzerland Swiss Franc CHF Swiss Market Index SMI 
Sweden Swedish Krona SEK OMX Stockholm 30 Index OMX 
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Table 12. Summary Statistics of Daily Currency Return Logarithmatic Percent Changes 
Country Mean Median StdDev Skewness Kurtosis Jarque-Bera 
Percentile 
1% 5% 10% 90% 95% 99% 
Panel A. Overall Period 
Bosnia & Herzegovina -0.0001 0.0000 0.0055 -0.3255 3.0781 215.71 -0.0153 -0.0089 -0.0067 0.0065 0.0084 0.0130 
Bulgaria 0.0003 0.0002 0.0064 -0.1889 1.9942 89.77 -0.0167 -0.0101 -0.0073 0.0078 0.0105 0.0167 
Denmark 0.0002 0.0000 0.0059 0.0481 0.9560 20.12 -0.0147 -0.0093 -0.0064 0.0074 0.0102 0.0159 
Euro Area 0.0003 0.0000 0.0053 -0.0515 2.6968 158.72 -0.0143 -0.0083 -0.0048 0.0064 0.0084 0.0144 
Hungary 0.0000 0.0000 0.0067 0.1515 1.9815 87.56 -0.0182 -0.0106 -0.0080 0.0081 0.0110 0.0165 
Japan -0.0001 0.0002 0.0067 -0.7692 4.3611 466.03 -0.0173 -0.0108 -0.0076 0.0070 0.0101 0.0176 
Norway 0.0004 0.0006 0.0081 0.1310 0.2790 3.19 -0.0181 -0.0132 -0.0098 0.0103 0.0144 0.0212 
Sweden 0.0005 0.0005 0.0063 -0.2999 1.0602 32.33 -0.0164 -0.0112 -0.0064 0.0082 0.0113 0.0148 
Switzerland 0.0002 0.0008 0.0105 -12.2975 227.9075 1145080.63 -0.0173 -0.0091 -0.0063 0.0070 0.0107 0.0162 
             
Panel B. Regime 0 – Ex-Event 
Bosnia & Herzegovina 0.0000 0.0000 0.0063 -0.3526 3.1160 111.00 -0.0179 -0.0094 -0.0073 0.0073 0.0091 0.0136 
Bulgaria 0.0004 0.0003 0.0076 -0.2615 1.2049 18.76 -0.0202 -0.0121 -0.0085 0.0094 0.0133 0.0183 
Denmark 0.0005 0.0001 0.0068 0.0735 0.5891 4.01 -0.0158 -0.0098 -0.0081 0.0085 0.0115 0.0165 
Euro Area -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0037 -0.2337 1.3714 22.83 -0.0107 -0.0057 -0.0040 0.0047 0.0066 0.0074 
Hungary -0.0001 0.0004 0.0074 -0.1510 0.8669 9.16 -0.0196 -0.0118 -0.0091 0.0085 0.0126 0.0170 
Japan -0.0001 0.0002 0.0053 -0.9397 4.8040 289.40 -0.0154 -0.0092 -0.0061 0.0054 0.0065 0.0118 
Norway 0.0010 0.0010 0.0086 0.0515 -0.0895 0.20 -0.0179 -0.0136 -0.0104 0.0124 0.0150 0.0212 
Sweden 0.0010 0.0008 0.0054 0.0001 1.8121 35.71 -0.0150 -0.0066 -0.0046 0.0080 0.0097 0.0168 
Switzerland 0.0005 0.0004 0.0042 0.0134 1.9020 39.35 -0.0096 -0.0062 -0.0042 0.0051 0.0070 0.0125 
             
Panel C. Regime 1 – Post-Event 
Bosnia & Herzegovina -0.0001 0.0000 0.0046 -0.2511 0.6219 6.95 -0.0105 -0.0083 -0.0062 0.0052 0.0070 0.0104 
Bulgaria 0.0001 0.0000 0.0051 0.0111 2.3926 62.26 -0.0149 -0.0081 -0.0053 0.0067 0.0078 0.0112 
Denmark -0.0001 -0.0002 0.0048 -0.2513 0.5164 5.65 -0.0127 -0.0075 -0.0056 0.0062 0.0079 0.0102 
Euro Area 0.0007 0.0004 0.0065 -0.1327 1.5924 28.34 -0.0154 -0.0110 -0.0062 0.0083 0.0125 0.0162 
Hungary 0.0001 -0.0003 0.0060 0.7214 3.9048 188.45 -0.0123 -0.0084 -0.0068 0.0075 0.0095 0.0143 
Japan 0.0000 -0.0001 0.0079 -0.6871 3.2291 133.93 -0.0253 -0.0116 -0.0082 0.0088 0.0121 0.0183 
Norway -0.0002 0.0001 0.0074 0.1290 0.7860 7.44 -0.0182 -0.0121 -0.0094 0.0080 0.0134 0.0170 
Sweden 0.0000 -0.0001 0.0070 -0.3416 0.4060 6.87 -0.0177 -0.0129 -0.0089 0.0084 0.0118 0.0145 





Table 13. Summary Statistics of Daily Index Return Logarithmatic Percent Changes 
Country Mean Median StdDev Skewness Kurtosis Jarque-Bera 
Percentile 
1% 5% 10% 90% 95% 99% 
Panel A. Overall Period 
Bosnia & Herzegovina -0.0004 0.0000 0.0077 -0.4662 7.5782 1270.43 -0.0246 -0.0120 -0.0073 0.0064 0.0106 0.0248 
Bulgaria 0.0002 0.0000 0.0067 -0.1501 8.2602 1488.84 -0.0147 -0.0087 -0.0066 0.0073 0.0103 0.0168 
Denmark 0.0003 0.0007 0.0109 -0.4441 2.3843 141.07 -0.0300 -0.0182 -0.0129 0.0120 0.0168 0.0275 
Euro Area 0.0006 0.0006 0.0104 -0.2281 0.9295 23.37 -0.0275 -0.0177 -0.0122 0.0136 0.0182 0.0255 
Hungary 0.0010 0.0004 0.0105 -0.3667 3.9674 354.73 -0.0260 -0.0159 -0.0110 0.0140 0.0167 0.0265 
Japan 0.0001 0.0002 0.0148 -0.1713 5.4977 661.20 -0.0411 -0.0246 -0.0155 0.0142 0.0208 0.0384 
Norway 0.0000 0.0000 0.0124 -0.0432 1.7438 66.43 -0.0302 -0.0181 -0.0146 0.0141 0.0208 0.0328 
Sweden 0.0001 0.0002 0.0108 -0.3022 1.5954 63.43 -0.0277 -0.0198 -0.0124 0.0128 0.0180 0.0262 
Switzerland -0.0001 0.0001 0.0106 -1.5978 12.7995 3792.63 -0.0256 -0.0154 -0.0112 0.0108 0.0148 0.0264 
             
Panel B. Regime 0 – Ex-Event 
Bosnia & Herzegovina -0.0001 0.0000 0.0076 0.0817 10.4053 1177.73 -0.0216 -0.0106 -0.0057 0.0064 0.0093 0.0271 
Bulgaria 0.0010 0.0007 0.0069 -0.0900 12.4257 1679.44 -0.0115 -0.0075 -0.0060 0.0085 0.0111 0.0173 
Denmark 0.0005 0.0009 0.0081 -1.1168 6.2101 473.66 -0.0209 -0.0138 -0.0082 0.0094 0.0124 0.0192 
Euro Area 0.0005 0.0009 0.0116 -0.0846 0.3168 1.40 -0.0282 -0.0194 -0.0151 0.0155 0.0192 0.0268 
Hungary 0.0008 0.0002 0.0096 -0.1421 2.9906 98.14 -0.0235 -0.0129 -0.0098 0.0122 0.0164 0.0239 
Japan 0.0008 0.0002 0.0139 -0.6829 7.2384 590.08 -0.0364 -0.0174 -0.0132 0.0142 0.0228 0.0373 
Norway 0.0004 0.0000 0.0132 -0.0054 1.1255 13.78 -0.0308 -0.0177 -0.0150 0.0160 0.0241 0.0313 
Sweden -0.0006 0.0000 0.0127 -0.2842 0.9645 13.63 -0.0312 -0.0232 -0.0176 0.0142 0.0197 0.0285 
Switzerland -0.0001 0.0000 0.0118 -0.5503 3.0551 114.68 -0.0347 -0.0184 -0.0141 0.0142 0.0172 0.0285 
             
Panel C. Regime 1 – Post-Event 
Bosnia & Herzegovina -0.0008 0.0000 0.0078 -0.9906 5.2735 345.11 -0.0271 -0.0164 -0.0085 0.0060 0.0106 0.0169 
Bulgaria -0.0005 0.0000 0.0065 -0.2859 3.0858 107.11 -0.0188 -0.0121 -0.0076 0.0064 0.0091 0.0146 
Denmark 0.0000 0.0005 0.0131 -0.2083 0.8247 9.28 -0.0306 -0.0247 -0.0168 0.0152 0.0210 0.0340 
Euro Area 0.0007 0.0004 0.0089 -0.4992 1.7962 45.93 -0.0244 -0.0155 -0.0092 0.0111 0.0162 0.0205 
Hungary 0.0011 0.0005 0.0115 -0.5044 4.1965 202.58 -0.0279 -0.0170 -0.0121 0.0152 0.0170 0.0275 
Japan -0.0004 0.0002 0.0156 0.2114 4.4776 219.98 -0.0437 -0.0274 -0.0198 0.0139 0.0190 0.0418 
Norway -0.0004 0.0000 0.0115 -0.1411 2.6746 78.66 -0.0282 -0.0181 -0.0139 0.0120 0.0161 0.0335 
Sweden 0.0007 0.0003 0.0085 -0.0271 1.2934 18.23 -0.0218 -0.0128 -0.0093 0.0105 0.0150 0.0239 
Switzerland 0.0003 0.0003 0.0072 -0.1022 2.3620 61.13 -0.0217 -0.0116 -0.0076 0.0085 0.0114 0.0212 
127 
 
Table 14. Abnormal Return Analysis for Currency Exchange Markets 
Panel A: Abnormal Returns (AR) (Event Date: NIRP Announcement Day) 
Day USD / BAM USD / BGN USD / DKK USD / EUR USD / HUF USD / JPY USD / NOK USD / SEK USD / CHF 
D-10 -0.050%   -0.568%   1.311% ** 0.187%  1.282%   -0.921%   -0.490%   -0.293%   -0.655%   
 -0.085  -0.879  2.232  0.349  1.204  -1.389  -0.605  -0.470  -0.617  
D-9 0.060%  0.225%  -0.275%  0.173%  0.267%  0.288%  -0.421%  0.062%  0.751%  
 0.102  0.349  -0.469  0.323  0.251  0.435  -0.520  0.099  0.707  
D-8 -0.114%  0.783%  0.519%  -0.181%  -0.450%  0.271%  0.290%  0.329%  -0.295%  
 -0.193  1.212  0.884  -0.338  -0.423  0.408  0.358  0.527  -0.278  
D-7 0.247%  0.370%  0.074%  0.091%  1.302%  -0.599%  0.134%  -1.260% ** -0.501%  
 0.417  0.572  0.126  0.170  1.223  -0.903  0.166  -2.021  -0.472  
D-6 -0.260%  -0.192%  0.181%  0.268%  -0.090%  0.646%  -0.694%  0.775%  -0.535%  
 -0.439  -0.297  0.308  0.500  -0.085  0.974  -0.857  1.243  -0.504  
D-5 -0.045%  -0.734%  0.159%  -0.099%  -0.090%  0.912%  -0.959%  -0.514%  0.137%  
 -0.075  -1.136  0.271  -0.185  -0.085  1.375  -1.184  -0.824  0.129  
D-4 0.119%  0.791%  -1.767% *** -0.277%  -0.070%  -0.407%  1.111%  1.747% *** -0.443%  
 0.201  1.225  -3.008  -0.516  -0.066  -0.614  1.371  2.802  -0.417  
D-3 0.982% * 0.059%  0.708%  0.241%  0.520%  0.100%  0.692%  -0.489%  0.168%  
 1.660  0.091  1.205  0.449  0.489  0.150  0.854  -0.784  0.158  
D-2 0.192%  -0.105%  -0.268%  -0.263%  0.559%  0.217%  0.722%  -0.447%  -0.611%  
 0.325  -0.162  -0.456  -0.490  0.526  0.328  0.890  -0.717  -0.575  
D-1 -0.228%  0.146%  0.644%  0.187%  -0.501%  0.116%  -0.253%  0.516%  1.347%  
 -0.386  0.225  1.096  0.348  -0.471  0.175  -0.312  0.827  1.269  
D-0 -0.229%  0.096%  1.140% * -0.481%  0.089%  1.932% *** 2.112% *** 0.763%  0.678%  
 -0.387  0.149  1.940  -0.897  0.083  2.914  2.606  1.223  0.639  
D+1 -0.491%  0.129%  0.775%  0.064%  -0.792%  -0.126%  0.799%  -0.279%  0.430%  
 -0.830  0.199  1.320  0.120  -0.744  -0.190  0.986  -0.447  0.405  
D+2 0.622%  0.231%  -0.211%  0.350%  -1.074%  -0.849%  0.071%  -0.113%  -0.069%  
 1.052  0.358  -0.360  0.653  -1.009  -1.280  0.088  -0.181  -0.065  
D+3 0.025%  -0.668%  0.476%  0.322%  -0.090%  -1.742% *** -0.729%  -1.170% * 0.387%  
 0.043  -1.034  0.811  0.600  -0.085  -2.629  -0.900  -1.877  0.365  
D+4 0.589%  0.156%  0.075%  0.091%  -0.090%  -0.956%  0.411%  0.415%  -0.201%  
 0.996  0.242  0.127  0.169  -0.085  -1.443  0.507  0.666  -0.189  
D+5 -0.331%  -3.080% *** 0.277%  -0.207%  1.048%  0.075%  -1.096%  0.664%  -0.242%  
 -0.560  -4.767  0.471  -0.387  0.985  0.113  -1.352  1.065  -0.228  
D+6 -0.252%  0.580%  -0.371%  0.064%  2.127% ** -0.879%  -0.698%  -0.511%  0.357%  
 -0.425  0.897  -0.632  0.118  1.998  -1.325  -0.862  -0.820  0.336  
D+7 -0.229%  0.305%  -0.192%  -0.275%  0.428%  -0.643%  0.337%  0.300%  0.214%  
 -0.387  0.471  -0.328  -0.514  0.402  -0.970  0.415  0.482  0.202  
D+8 -0.398%  -0.545%  -0.188%  0.172%  -0.622%  -1.543% ** -1.611% ** -0.045%  -0.110%  
 -0.673  -0.843  -0.320  0.321  -0.584  -2.327  -1.988  -0.072  -0.103  
D+9 -0.814%  -1.244% * 0.045%  -0.398%  0.294%  -0.826%  -0.803%  -1.408% ** 0.526%  
 -1.377  -1.925  0.077  -0.742  0.276  -1.246  -0.991  -2.257  0.496  
D+10 -0.614%  0.730%  -0.003%  -0.113%  -0.857%  0.734%  -0.892%  1.187% * -0.059%  
 -1.039   1.129   -0.005   -0.211   -0.805   1.107   -1.101   1.904   -0.055  
                     
Panel B: Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) (Event Date: NIRP Announcement Day) 
(-10,10) -1.220%  -2.536%  3.108%  -0.085%  3.188%  -4.200%  -1.969%  0.230%  1.274%  
(-10,0) 0.902%  0.775%  1.286%  0.328%  2.728%  0.623%  0.131%  0.426%  -0.637%  
(0,10) -2.122%  -3.311%  1.822%  -0.413%  0.460%  -4.822%  -2.100%  -0.195%  1.911%  












Table 14. Cont’d                 
Panel C: Abnormal Returns (AR) (Event Date: NIRP Implementation Day) 
Day USD / BAM USD / BGN USD / DKK USD / EUR USD / HUF USD / JPY USD / NOK USD / SEK USD / CHF 
D-10 -0.347%   -0.460%   1.312% ** 0.267%   -0.185%   -0.851%   -0.490%   -0.293%   -0.075%   
 -0.637  -0.703  2.238  0.495  -0.275  -1.289  -0.605  -0.470  -0.130  
D-9 -0.221%  -0.411%  -0.275%  -0.101%  -0.948%  -1.745% *** -0.421%  0.062%  0.747%  
 -0.406  -0.629  -0.468  -0.186  -1.407  -2.644  -0.520  0.099  1.303  
D-8 0.494%  0.377%  0.520%  -0.278%  -0.137%  -0.959%  0.290%  0.329%  0.484%  
 0.905  0.577  0.887  -0.515  -0.203  -1.453  0.358  0.527  0.843  
D-7 -0.434%  -0.490%  0.075%  0.240%  0.351%  0.073%  0.134%  -1.260% ** 0.293%  
 -0.796  -0.749  0.127  0.445  0.521  0.111  0.166  -2.021  0.511  
D-6 -0.698%  -0.171%  0.182%  -0.264%  0.207%  -0.881%  -0.694%  0.775%  0.371%  
 -1.279  -0.262  0.311  -0.490  0.307  -1.335  -0.857  1.243  0.646  
D-5 2.566% *** 0.087%  0.160%  0.185%  -0.883%  -0.645%  -0.959%  -0.514%  0.369%  
 4.704  0.133  0.273  0.344  -1.311  -0.977  -1.184  -0.824  0.644  
D-4 0.722%  0.321%  -1.766% *** -0.482%  -1.171% * -1.545% ** 1.111%  1.747% *** -0.438%  
 1.323  0.492  -3.012  -0.895  -1.739  -2.341  1.371  2.802  -0.763  
D-3 -0.567%  0.030%  0.709%  0.063%  0.320%  -0.828%  0.692%  -0.489%  0.015%  
 -1.039  0.046  1.209  0.117  0.475  -1.255  0.854  -0.784  0.026  
D-2 -0.206%  0.476%  -0.267%  0.349%  0.438%  0.732%  0.722%  -0.447%  0.487%  
 -0.378  0.727  -0.455  0.647  0.651  1.109  0.890  -0.717  0.848  
D-1 0.061%  -0.076%  0.645%  0.320%  0.519%  1.181% * -0.253%  0.516%  -0.172%  
 0.111  -0.116  1.100  0.594  0.771  1.790  -0.312  0.827  -0.299  
D-0 -0.332%  0.312%  1.141% * 0.089%  0.773%  -0.468%  2.112% *** 0.763%  -19.418% *** 
 -0.609  0.477  1.946  0.166  1.148  -0.709  2.606  1.223  -33.856  
D+1 -0.185%  0.746%  0.776%  -0.209%  0.277%  0.022%  0.799%  -0.279%  2.263% *** 
 -0.339  1.141  1.324  -0.387  0.411  0.033  0.986  -0.447  3.945  
D+2 0.804%  -0.335%  -0.210%  0.062%  0.070%  -0.761%  0.071%  -0.113%  2.371% *** 
 1.475  -0.512  -0.359  0.116  0.104  -1.153  0.088  -0.181  4.133  
D+3 -0.286%  -1.431% ** 0.477%  -0.277%  -0.443%  -0.545%  -0.729%  -1.170% * -0.479%  
 -0.524  -2.188  0.814  -0.513  -0.658  -0.825  -0.900  -1.877  -0.835  
D+4 0.355%  0.030%  0.075%  0.171%  -0.775%  0.253%  0.411%  0.415%  -1.820% *** 
 0.650  0.045  0.129  0.317  -1.151  0.383  0.507  0.666  -3.174  
D+5 0.105%  0.570%  0.277%  -0.399%  -0.062%  -0.733%  -1.096%  0.664%  1.248% ** 
 0.193  0.871  0.473  -0.740  -0.092  -1.111  -1.352  1.065  2.176  
D+6 -0.036%  -0.004%  -0.370%  -0.114%  -0.658%  0.067%  -0.698%  -0.511%  0.971% * 
 -0.066  -0.006  -0.631  -0.212  -0.977  0.102  -0.862  -0.820  1.692  
D+7 -0.042%  -0.210%  -0.192%  0.036%  -0.229%  0.724%  0.337%  0.300%  2.523% *** 
 -0.077  -0.321  -0.327  0.066  -0.340  1.097  0.415  0.482  4.400  
D+8 -0.263%  0.063%  -0.187%  -0.073%  -0.459%  0.877%  -1.611% ** -0.045%  -0.034%  
 -0.482  0.096  -0.319  -0.136  -0.682  1.329  -1.988  -0.072  -0.060  
D+9 -0.190%  -0.500%  0.046%  -0.060%  0.367%  -1.160% * -0.803%  -1.408% ** 0.198%  
 -0.348  -0.764  0.078  -0.111  0.545  -1.758  -0.991  -2.257  0.345  
D+10 0.429%  0.197%  -0.002%  -0.182%  -0.449%  1.160% * -0.892%  1.187% * 2.022% *** 
  0.786   0.301   -0.003   -0.338   -0.666   1.758   -1.101   1.904   3.525   
                   
Panel D: Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) (Event Date: NIRP Implementation Day) 
(-10,10) 1.728%   -0.880%   3.127%   -0.656%   -3.078%   -6.031%   -1.969%   0.230%   -8.075%   
(-10,0) 1.369%  -0.317%  1.295%  0.300%  -1.489%  -5.467%  0.131%  0.426%  2.081%  
(0,10) 0.360%   -0.563%   1.832%   -0.956%   -1.589%   -0.564%   -2.100%   -0.195%   -10.156%   





Table 15. Abnormal Return Analysis for Equity Markets 
Panel A: Abnormal Returns (AR) (Event Date: NIRP Announcement Day) 
Day MXBAH SOFIX KAX DAX BUX NKY OSEAX OMX SMI 
D-10 -1.715% ** -0.139%   -0.336%   0.184%   0.034%   0.325%   -1.968%   0.505%   -0.023%   
 -2.248  -0.195  -0.308  0.173  0.050  0.016  -1.603  0.462  -0.022  
D-9 0.203%  -0.567%  -0.289%  0.430%  -0.179%  -0.253%  -1.099%  0.327%  -0.023%  
 0.267  -0.793  -0.264  0.405  -0.264  -0.012  -0.895  0.299  -0.022  
D-8 -0.365%  -0.490%  -1.462%  1.216%  -0.941%  1.417%  -0.692%  0.240%  -0.591%  
 -0.479  -0.686  -1.337  1.145  -1.388  0.069  -0.564  0.220  -0.569  
D-7 0.347%  0.922%  -0.862%  0.431%  -0.131%  -2.908%  0.625%  0.964%  0.120%  
 0.455  1.291  -0.788  0.405  -0.193  -0.141  0.509  0.882  0.115  
D-6 0.547%  -0.296%  1.017%  -0.070%  0.358%  -1.589%  1.594%  -0.603%  -0.023%  
 0.717  -0.414  0.930  -0.066  0.527  -0.077  1.298  -0.552  -0.022  
D-5 -0.810%  0.025%  0.037%  -0.056%  0.213%  6.581%  0.694%  0.656%  -0.023%  
 -1.061  0.035  0.034  -0.053  0.315  0.320  0.565  0.600  -0.022  
D-4 0.204%  -0.587%  2.506% ** -0.010%  -0.877%  1.765%  -1.306%  0.833%  -0.023%  
 0.267  -0.821  2.291  -0.009  -1.294  0.086  -1.064  0.762  -0.022  
D-3 -0.145%  0.788%  1.114%  0.015%  -1.165% * -1.507%  0.386%  -0.416%  -0.153%  
 -0.190  1.103  1.019  0.014  -1.719  -0.073  0.314  -0.380  -0.148  
D-2 -2.331% *** -0.808%  1.427%  -0.359%  0.326%  3.558%  -1.201%  0.828%  0.612%  
 -3.056  -1.130  1.305  -0.338  0.482  0.173  -0.978  0.757  0.590  
D-1 -0.086%  -1.328% * 0.219%  0.016%  0.445%  0.155%  -0.615%  -0.433%  -0.433%  
 -0.113  -1.859  0.201  0.015  0.656  0.008  -0.501  -0.396  -0.417  
D-0 -1.273% * 0.194%  0.459%  0.159%  0.526%  3.631%  -1.407%  2.067% * 2.644% ** 
 -1.669  0.271  0.419  0.150  0.775  0.177  -1.146  1.891  2.548  
D+1 -0.781%  0.553%  -0.663%  0.341%  0.780%  2.832%  2.314% * 0.945%  -0.242%  
 -1.024  0.773  -0.606  0.321  1.151  0.138  1.885  0.865  -0.233  
D+2 0.394%  -0.529%  -0.453%  0.161%  0.284%  0.228%  -1.634%  0.176%  0.917%  
 0.517  -0.740  -0.414  0.152  0.419  0.011  -1.330  0.161  0.884  
D+3 0.413%  0.283%  1.187%  0.148%  0.077%  -2.332%  0.161%  -0.883%  -2.096% ** 
 0.542  0.395  1.085  0.139  0.113  -0.113  0.131  -0.807  -2.020  
D+4 -0.333%  -0.164%  -0.671%  -0.844%  -0.436%  0.016%  1.804%  1.370%  -1.844% * 
 -0.436  -0.230  -0.614  -0.795  -0.644  0.001  1.469  1.254  -1.777  
D+5 0.019%  -0.204%  -0.379%  -0.165%  -0.769%  -0.460%  0.875%  0.498%  0.397%  
 0.025  -0.285  -0.346  -0.156  -1.134  -0.022  0.713  0.456  0.383  
D+6 -0.063%  -0.032%  0.536%  -0.314%  -0.055%  1.963%  -0.630%  0.019%  -0.361%  
 -0.082  -0.044  0.490  -0.295  -0.082  0.095  -0.513  0.017  -0.348  
D+7 0.029%  -0.041%  1.052%  -0.345%  -0.652%  -4.684%  3.319% *** 0.874%  -1.447%  
 0.038  -0.057  0.962  -0.325  -0.961  -0.228  2.703  0.800  -1.395  
D+8 1.573% ** -0.153%  0.284%  0.313%  -0.223%  -1.469%  2.063% * 0.276%  -0.367%  
 2.063  -0.215  0.259  0.295  -0.328  -0.071  1.680  0.252  -0.353  
D+9 0.029%  -0.294%  0.626%  0.047%  -0.453%  0.871%  1.851%  -0.179%  1.010%  
 0.038  -0.412  0.573  0.045  -0.668  0.042  1.508  -0.164  0.973  
D+10 0.029%  -0.212%  1.410%  0.686%  0.374%  -4.092%  -1.471%  0.356%  -0.572%  
  0.038   -0.296   1.289   0.646   0.552   -0.199   -1.198   0.325   -0.551   
                   
Panel B: Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) (Event Date: NIRP Announcement Day) 
(-10,10) -4.111%  -3.079%  6.758%  1.983%  -2.463%  4.046%  3.662%  8.420%  -2.520%  
(-10,0) -4.150%  -2.479%  3.370%  1.796%  -1.917%  7.544%  -3.583%  2.901%  -0.560%  
(0,10) 0.039%  -0.600%  3.387%  0.187%  -0.547%  -3.498%  7.245%  5.520%  -1.960%  
             *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  
 




Table 15. Cont’d 
Panel C: Abnormal Returns (AR) (Event Date: NIRP Implementation Day) 
Day MXBAH SOFIX KAX DAX BUX NKY OSEAX OMX SMI 
D-10 -0.152%   0.163%   -0.336%   0.184%   1.282%   -3.228% ** -1.968%   0.505%   -0.004%   
 -0.206  0.243  -0.308  0.174  1.204  -2.298  -1.603  0.462  -0.004  
D-9 -0.385%  1.107% * -0.289%  0.431%  0.267%  -0.880%  -1.099%  0.327%  -0.004%  
 -0.522  1.650  -0.264  0.406  0.251  -0.627  -0.895  0.299  -0.004  
D-8 -0.363%  -0.022%  -1.462%  1.217%  -0.450%  -1.357%  -0.692%  0.240%  -0.501%  
 -0.492  -0.033  -1.337  1.147  -0.423  -0.966  -0.564  0.220  -0.543  
D-7 0.113%  -0.022%  -0.862%  0.431%  1.302%  1.066%  0.625%  0.964%  -0.727%  
 0.153  -0.033  -0.788  0.407  1.223  0.759  0.509  0.882  -0.788  
D-6 -0.883%  0.503%  1.017%  -0.070%  -0.090%  -5.581% *** 1.594%  -0.603%  0.293%  
 -1.197  0.750  0.930  -0.066  -0.085  -3.974  1.298  -0.552  0.318  
D-5 -2.094% *** 2.249% *** 0.037%  -0.056%  -0.090%  -2.366% * 0.694%  0.656%  2.644% *** 
 -2.839  3.354  0.034  -0.052  -0.085  -1.685  0.565  0.600  2.868  
D-4 -0.170%  0.002%  2.506% ** -0.009%  -0.070%  -0.026%  -1.306%  0.833%  -0.376%  
 -0.230  0.002  2.291  -0.008  -0.066  -0.018  -1.064  0.762  -0.408  
D-3 0.026%  -0.022%  1.114%  0.016%  0.520%  -4.989% *** 0.386%  -0.416%  0.514%  
 0.035  -0.033  1.019  0.015  0.489  -3.552  0.314  -0.380  0.558  
D-2 0.221%  -0.022%  1.427%  -0.359%  0.559%  6.885% *** -1.200%  0.828%  1.435%  
 0.300  -0.033  1.305  -0.338  0.526  4.902  -0.978  0.757  1.557  
D-1 1.765% ** -0.826%  0.219%  0.017%  -0.501%  0.173%  -0.615%  -0.433%  -0.950%  
 2.392  -1.232  0.201  0.016  -0.471  0.123  -0.501  -0.396  -1.030  
D-0 1.597% ** 0.010%  0.459%  0.160%  0.089%  -1.394%  -1.407%  2.067% * -9.074% *** 
 2.165  0.015  0.419  0.151  0.083  -0.992  -1.146  1.891  -9.843  
D+1 -0.068%  0.052%  -0.663%  0.342%  -0.792%  2.225%  2.315% * 0.945%  -6.153% *** 
 -0.092  0.077  -0.606  0.322  -0.744  1.584  1.885  0.865  -6.674  
D+2 -4.636% *** -1.187% * -0.453%  0.162%  -1.074%  -1.454%  -1.633%  0.176%  3.151% *** 
 -6.285  -1.770  -0.414  0.152  -1.009  -1.035  -1.330  0.161  3.418  
D+3 0.026%  0.989%  1.187%  0.148%  -0.090%  0.871%  0.161%  -0.883%  0.316%  
 0.035  1.475  1.085  0.140  -0.085  0.620  0.131  -0.807  0.343  
D+4 -1.568% ** -0.622%  -0.671%  -0.844%  -0.090%  -0.393%  1.804%  1.370%  -2.109% ** 
 -2.126  -0.927  -0.614  -0.795  -0.085  -0.280  1.469  1.254  -2.287  
D+5 0.026%  -0.009%  -0.379%  -0.165%  1.048%  -0.878%  0.875%  0.498%  -0.117%  
 0.035  -0.014  -0.346  -0.155  0.985  -0.625  0.713  0.456  -0.127  
D+6 0.826%  -0.727%  0.536%  -0.313%  2.127% ** 1.375%  -0.630%  0.019%  1.997% ** 
 1.120  -1.084  0.490  -0.295  1.998  0.979  -0.513  0.017  2.166  
D+7 -0.069%  0.044%  1.052%  -0.345%  0.428%  0.272%  3.319% *** 0.874%  1.640% * 
 -0.094  0.066  0.962  -0.325  0.402  0.193  2.703  0.800  1.779  
D+8 0.026%  -0.284%  0.284%  0.314%  -0.622%  -1.030%  2.063% * 0.276%  1.270%  
 0.035  -0.424  0.259  0.296  -0.584  -0.733  1.680  0.252  1.378  
D+9 -0.951%  -0.948%  0.626%  0.048%  0.294%  0.340%  1.852%  -0.179%  -1.096%  
 -1.289  -1.414  0.573  0.045  0.276  0.242  1.508  -0.164  -1.189  
D+10 -1.033%  -0.092%  1.410%  0.686%  -0.857%  4.001% *** -1.471%  0.356%  1.475%  
  -1.400   -0.137   1.289   0.647   -0.805   2.849   -1.198   0.325   1.600   
                   
Panel D: Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) (Event Date: NIRP Implementation Day) 
 
(-10,10) -7.744%  0.334%  6.758%  1.997%  3.188%  -6.368%  3.667%  8.420%  -6.374%  
(-10,0) -1.921%  3.107%  3.370%  1.803%  2.728%  -10.303%  -3.580%  2.901%  2.325%  
(0,10) -5.824%  -2.774%  3.387%  0.194%  0.460%  3.936%  7.247%  5.520%  -8.699%  




Table 16. Portfolio Average Abnormal Return Analysis for Currency Exchange Markets 
Panel A: Average Abnormal Returns (AAR) (Event Date: NIRP Announcement Day) 
Day AAR z   Std Error Minimum Maximum CAAR 
D-10 -0.022% -0.8067   0.0082 -0.921% 1.311% -0.0220% 
D-9 0.126% 0.4257  0.0034 -0.421% 0.751% 0.1036% 
D-8 0.128% 0.7193  0.0041 -0.450% 0.783% 0.2315% 
D-7 -0.016% -0.2407  0.0072 -1.260% 1.302% 0.2157% 
D-6 0.011% 0.2813  0.0050 -0.694% 0.775% 0.2267% 
D-5 -0.137% -0.5717  0.0055 -0.959% 0.912% 0.0896% 
D-4 0.089% 0.3257  0.0103 -1.767% 1.747% 0.1789% 
D-3 0.331% 1.4244  0.0044 -0.489% 0.982% 0.5101% 
D-2 0.000% -0.1104  0.0045 -0.611% 0.722% 0.5098% 
D-1 0.219% 0.9238  0.0056 -0.501% 1.347% 0.7290% 
D-Day 0.678% 2.7568 *** 0.0092 -0.481% 2.112% 1.4066% 
D+1 0.057% 0.2729  0.0055 -0.792% 0.799% 1.4632% 
D+2 -0.116% -0.2482  0.0055 -1.074% 0.622% 1.3475% 
D+3 -0.354% -1.5687  0.0077 -1.742% 0.476% 0.9930% 
D+4 0.054% 0.3299  0.0046 -0.956% 0.589% 1.0473% 
D+5 -0.321% -1.5535  0.0120 -3.080% 1.048% 0.7259% 
D+6 0.046% -0.2383  0.0091 -0.879% 2.127% 0.7721% 
D+7 0.027% -0.0752  0.0037 -0.643% 0.428% 0.7992% 
D+8 -0.543% -2.1965 ** 0.0064 -1.611% 0.172% 0.2561% 
D+9 -0.514% -2.5634 ** 0.0068 -1.408% 0.526% -0.2581% 
D+10 0.013% 0.3079   0.0074 -0.892% 1.187% -0.2456% 
        
Panel B: Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns (CAAR) (Event Date: NIRP Announcement Day) 
Window CAAR z           
[-10,10] -0.246% 0.367814           
[-10,0] 0.014066 1.763108 *     
[0,10] -0.009746 -1.440100      
[-5,5] 0.004992 0.597290      
[-5,0] 0.011799 1.938641 *     
[0,5] -0.000031 -0.004433      
[-3,3] 0.008141 1.304215      
[-3,0] 0.012277 2.497336 **     
[0,3] 0.00264 0.606396      
[-2,2] 0.008374 1.607700      
[-2,0] 0.008966 2.061282 **     
[0,2] 0.006185 1.605909      
[-1,1] 0.009534 2.825540 ***     
[-1,0] 0.008968 2.602609 ***     
[0,1] 0.007342 2.142314 **         





Table 16. Cont’d 
Panel C: Average Abnormal Returns (AAR) (Event Date: NIRP Implementation Day)  
Day AAR z   Std Error Minimum Maximum CAAR 
D-10 -0.125% -0.4590  0.0062 -0.851% 1.312% -0.1247% 
D-9 -0.368% -1.6192  0.0069 -1.745% 0.747% -0.4927% 
D-8 0.125% 0.6424  0.0049 -0.959% 0.520% -0.3682% 
D-7 -0.113% -0.5619  0.0052 -1.260% 0.351% -0.4813% 
D-6 -0.130% -0.5718  0.0056 -0.881% 0.775% -0.6117% 
D-5 0.041% 0.5999  0.0107 -0.959% 2.566% -0.5711% 
D-4 -0.167% -0.9209  0.0122 -1.766% 1.747% -0.7379% 
D-3 -0.006% -0.1164  0.0054 -0.828% 0.709% -0.7439% 
D-2 0.254% 1.1076  0.0044 -0.447% 0.732% -0.4903% 
D-1 0.305% 1.4885  0.0046 -0.253% 1.181% -0.1857% 
D-Day -1.670% -9.2027 *** 0.0670 -19.418% 2.112% -1.8555% 
D+1 0.468% 2.2227 ** 0.0080 -0.279% 2.263% -1.3877% 
D+2 0.218% 1.2370  0.0091 -0.761% 2.371% -1.1699% 
D+3 -0.542% -2.5018 ** 0.0055 -1.431% 0.477% -1.7123% 
D+4 -0.098% -0.5426  0.0074 -1.820% 0.415% -1.8108% 
D+5 0.064% 0.4940  0.0073 -1.096% 1.248% -1.7470% 
D+6 -0.151% -0.5938  0.0051 -0.698% 0.971% -1.8976% 
D+7 0.361% 1.7983 * 0.0087 -0.229% 2.523% -1.5368% 
D+8 -0.193% -0.7714  0.0065 -1.611% 0.877% -1.7293% 
D+9 -0.390% -1.7536 * 0.0062 -1.408% 0.367% -2.1192% 
D+10 0.386% 2.0550 ** 0.0092 -0.892% 2.022% -1.7337% 
        
Panel D: Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns (CAAR) (Event Date: NIRP Implementation Day) 
Window CAAR z           
[-10,10] -1.734% -1.739111 *         
[-10,0] -1.856% -2.898560 ***     
[0,10] -1.548% -2.279071 **     
[-5,5] -1.135% -1.849640 *     
[-5,0] -1.244% -2.875653 ***     
[0,5] -1.561% -3.385738 ***     
[-3,3] -0.974% -2.178954 **     
[-3,0] -1.118% -3.361446 ***     
[0,3] -1.527% -4.122365 ***     
[-2,2] -0.426% -1.407307      
[-2,0] -1.112% -3.814271 ***     
[0,2] -0.984% -3.315709 ***     
[-1,1] -0.897% -3.170491 ***     
[-1,0] -1.365% -5.454711 ***     
[0,1] -1.202% -4.935589 ***         
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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Table 17. Descriptive Statistics of Currency Mispricing Terms 
 Denmark Euro Japan Norway Sweden Switzerland 
 Mean 1.60E-05 -1.82E-05 1.45E-06 -2.64E-05 7.02E-06 2.48E-05 
 Median 0.00015 9.91E-06 -0.000135 -0.000112 3.59E-05 5.96E-05 
 Maximum 0.00146 0.00162 0.00157 0.00120 0.00098 0.00101 
 Minimum -0.00110 -0.00120 -0.00178 -0.00046 -0.00060 -0.00053 
 Std. Dev. 0.00066 0.00075 0.00095 0.00036 0.00035 0.00033 
 Skewness 0.00857 0.37056 -0.13364 1.76422 0.64728 0.62192 
 Kurtosis 2.42268 2.64539 1.92494 6.49143 3.78373 4.67819 
 Jarque-Bera 0.34749 0.70313 1.27832 25.66657 2.38554 4.54529 
 Observations 25 25 25 25 25 25 
 
Table 18. Panel Error Term Unit Root Test Results (July 2011 – July 2017) 
Considering the data availability, currencies of six economies are considered: Denmark, the Euro Area, Japan, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland. Here, the 
sample of countries are divided into two groups: EU (Denmark, the Euro Area, Sweden), and non-EU (Japan, Norway, and Switzerland). 
Method Levin, Lin, and Chu Im, Pesaran, and Shin 
Fisher-Choi ADF Fisher-Choi PP 
Fisher Chi-sq Choi Z-stat Fisher Chi-sq Choi Z-stat 
 
 Stat. Prob. Stat. Prob. Stat. Prob. Stat. Prob. Stat. Prob. Stat. Prob. 
Overall 
Level  0.74430  0.7717 -1.3735  0.0848*  27.3460  0.0069*** -1.5500  0.0606*  44.4956  0.0000*** -2.7164  0.0033*** 
1st Diff. -7.2319 0.0000*** - - - - - - - - - - 
EU Countries 
Level -2.2430 0.0124** -3.0292 0.0012*** 15.0670 0.0198** -2.2067 0.0137** 35.8004 0.0000*** -4.6902 0.0000*** 
1st Diff. - - - - - - - - - - - - 
non-EU Countries 
Level 1.3884 0.9175 1.0868 0.8614 7.0898 0.3126 0.8775 0.8099 8.6952 0.1915 0.8487 0.8020 
1st Diff. -2.9725 0.0015*** -6.3024 0.0000*** 45.9695 0.0000*** -5.5717 0.0000*** 45.9695 0.0000*** -5.5717 0.0000*** 




Table 19. By-country Error Term Unit Root Test Results (Before and After NIRP) 
Considering the data availability, six economies are considered: Denmark, the Euro Area, Japan, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland. The unit root tests are implemented by 
country, with periodic breakpoint of NIRP. For each country, pre- and post-year of NIRP implementation are compared. 
 
Method 
Denmark (DKK)   Euro Area (EUR)   Japan (JPY) 
ADF PP   ADF PP   ADF PP 
Stat. Prob. Stat. Prob.  Stat. Prob. Stat. Prob.  Stat. Prob. Stat. Prob. 
Overall 
Level -2.3897 0.3750 -2.3277 0.4046  -5.9491 0.0003*** -5.9450 0.0003***  -2.0571 0.5422 -2.1166 0.5113 
1st Diff. -5.4625 0.0011*** -5.4625 0.0011***  - - - -  -4.8311 0.0042*** -4.8314 0.0041*** 
Pre-NIRP 
Level -3.7964 0.0562* -3.8528 0.0517*  -3.4927 0.0865* -3.4936 0.0864*  -1.7926 0.6454 -1.8234 0.6312 
1st Diff. - - - -  - - - -  -2.7467 0.2450 -5.0712 0.0107** 
Post-NIRP 
Level -2.9801 0.1850 -2.6389 0.2742  -3.8637 0.0552* -6.0330 0.0033***  -1.1749 0.8622 -0.6970 0.9432 
1st Diff. -3.9609 0.0600** -5.0982 0.0128**  - - - -  -3.1109 0.1639 -4.7663 0.0191** 
                
Method 
Norway (NOK)  Sweden (SEK)  Switzerland (CHF) 
ADF PP  ADF PP  ADF PP 
Stat. Prob. Stat. Prob.  Stat. Prob. Stat. Prob.  Stat. Prob. Stat. Prob. 
Overall 
Level -3.3270 0.0859* -3.3129 0.0881*  -2.7962 0.2118 -2.7962 0.2118  -2.6513 0.2636 -2.6449 0.2656 
1st Diff. - - - -  -6.5860 0.0001*** -6.8250 0.0001***  -3.2842 0.0974* -6.7760 0.0001*** 
Pre-NIRP 
Level -1.7926 0.6454 -1.8234 0.6312  -3.7805 0.0575* -5.5847 0.0045***  -1.2350 0.8529 -0.9333 0.9148 
1st Diff. -2.7467 0.2450 -5.0712 0.0107**  - - - -  -2.6885 0.2609 -2.6937 0.2571 
Post-NIRP 
Level -2.7214 0.2516 -3.6560 0.0732*  -3.4580 0.0950* -3.4587 0.0949*  -4.0240 0.0444** -4.4943 0.0233** 
1st Diff. -4.7781 0.0232** - -  - - - -  - - - - 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 20. Portfolio Average Abnormal Return Analysis for Equity Markets 
Panel A: Average Abnormal Returns (AAR) (Event Date: NIRP Announcement Day) 
Day AAR z   Std Error Minimum Maximum CAAR 
D-10 -0.3482% -1.2248   0.0088 -1.9682% 0.5049% -0.3482% 
D-9 -0.1610% -0.4267  0.0048 -1.0988% 0.4298% -0.5092% 
D-8 -0.1854% -1.1963  0.0097 -1.4622% 1.4166% -0.6946% 
D-7 -0.0547% 0.8449  0.0121 -2.9079% 0.9639% -0.7493% 
D-6 0.1038% 0.7806  0.0093 -1.5893% 1.5938% -0.6455% 
D-5 0.8131% 0.2442  0.0221 -0.8095% 6.5812% 0.1676% 
D-4 0.2784% 0.0656  0.0124 -1.3060% 2.5058% 0.4460% 
D-3 -0.1203% -0.0201  0.0085 -1.5067% 1.1142% 0.3258% 
D-2 0.2281% -0.7321  0.0170 -2.3311% 3.5576% 0.5538% 
D-1 -0.2290% -0.8023  0.0054 -1.3283% 0.4448% 0.3249% 
D-Day 0.7777% 1.1390  0.0170 -1.4073% 3.6305% 1.1026% 
D+1 0.6755% 1.0900  0.0124 -0.7809% 2.8318% 1.7781% 
D+2 -0.0505% -0.1135  0.0073 -1.6335% 0.9173% 1.7276% 
D+3 -0.3380% -0.1782  0.0119 -2.3315% 1.1867% 1.3896% 
D+4 -0.1225% -0.5906  0.0111 -1.8439% 1.8038% 1.2671% 
D+5 -0.0208% -0.1224  0.0052 -0.7686% 0.8751% 1.2462% 
D+6 0.1181% -0.2539  0.0076 -0.6303% 1.9630% 1.3644% 
D+7 -0.2105% 0.5125  0.0215 -4.6844% 3.3191% 1.1539% 
D+8 0.2552% 1.1938  0.0105 -1.4693% 2.0625% 1.4090% 
D+9 0.3899% 0.6452  0.0075 -0.4526% 1.8513% 1.7989% 
D+10 -0.3881% 0.2018   0.0161 -4.0920% 1.4096% 1.4109% 
        
Panel B: Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns (CAAR) (Event Date: NIRP Announcement Day) 
Window CAAR z           
[-10,10] 1.4109% 0.2306           
[-10,0] 1.1026% -0.4004      
[0,10] 1.0860% 1.0624      
[-5,5] 1.8917% -0.0062      
[-5,0] 1.7481% -0.0431      
[0,5] 0.9214% 0.4998      
[-3,3] 0.9435% 0.1447      
[-3,0] 0.6565% -0.2077      
[0,3] 1.0647% 0.9686      
[-2,2] 1.4018% 0.2599      
[-2,0] 0.7768% -0.2283      
[0,2] 1.4027% 1.2214      
[-1,1] 1.2243% 0.8237      
[-1,0] 0.5488% 0.2381      
[0,1] 1.4533% 1.5761           





Table 20. Cont’d  
Panel C: Average Abnormal Returns (AAR) (Event Date: NIRP Implementation Day)  
Day AAR z   Std Error Minimum Maximum CAAR 
D-10 -0.3950% -0.7786   0.0137 -3.2283% 1.2815% -0.3950% 
D-9 -0.0584% 0.0981  0.0069 -1.0986% 1.1065% -0.4534% 
D-8 -0.3767% -0.9971  0.0081 -1.4622% 1.2167% -0.8301% 
D-7 0.3211% 0.7744  0.0077 -0.8624% 1.3019% -0.5090% 
D-6 -0.4244% -0.8589  0.0208 -5.5811% 1.5940% -0.9334% 
D-5 0.1861% 0.9205  0.0168 -2.3661% 2.6444% -0.7473% 
D-4 0.1537% 0.4203  0.0104 -1.3058% 2.5058% -0.5936% 
D-3 -0.3167% -0.5118  0.0181 -4.9887% 1.1142% -0.9103% 
D-2 1.0861% 2.6658 *** 0.0233 -1.2002% 6.8854% 0.1758% 
D-1 -0.1280% -0.2995  0.0083 -0.9498% 1.7647% 0.0478% 
D-Day -0.8325% -2.4185 ** 0.0330 -9.0741% 2.0671% -0.7847% 
D+1 -0.1997% -1.1277  0.0250 -6.1531% 2.3145% -0.9844% 
D+2 -0.7721% -2.7042 *** 0.0205 -4.6362% 3.1510% -1.7565% 
D+3 0.3029% 0.9791  0.0064 -0.8825% 1.1867% -1.4536% 
D+4 -0.3469% -1.4636  0.0126 -2.1086% 1.8040% -1.8005% 
D+5 0.0999% 0.3069  0.0061 -0.8784% 1.0481% -1.7006% 
D+6 0.5789% 1.6261  0.0108 -0.7270% 2.1265% -1.1217% 
D+7 0.8017% 2.1622 ** 0.0113 -0.3448% 3.3193% -0.3201% 
D+8 0.2552% 0.7199  0.0094 -1.0295% 2.0627% -0.0648% 
D+9 -0.0017% -0.4709  0.0094 -1.0959% 1.8515% -0.0665% 
D+10 0.4973% 1.0566   0.0168 -1.4706% 4.0014% 0.4308% 
        
Panel D: Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns (CAAR) (Event Date: NIRP Implementation Day) 
Window CAAR z           
[-10,10] 0.4308% 0.0217           
[-10,0] -0.7847% -0.2971      
[0,10] 0.3830% -0.4022      
[-5,5] -0.7672% -0.9747      
[-5,0] 0.1487% 0.3171      
[0,5] -1.7484% -2.6242 ***     
[-3,3] -0.8600% -1.2915      
[-3,0] -0.1911% -0.2820      
[0,3] -1.5015% -2.6357 ***     
[-2,2] -0.8462% -1.7370 *     
[-2,0] 0.1256% -0.0302      
[0,2] -1.8043% -3.6087 ***     
[-1,1] -1.1602% -2.2203 **     
[-1,0] -0.9605% -1.9220 *     
[0,1] -1.0323% -2.5076 **         
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Index Return (t-1) -0.055  -0.019  0.071 ** 0.244 *** -0.032  0.010  -0.082  -0.032  -0.169 ** 
 0.15  0.68  0.03  0.00  0.37  0.69  0.16  0.51  0.02  
Currency Return (t-1) 0.272 ** 0.052  -0.055  -0.239 ** 0.146 ** -0.077  -0.093  -0.134 ** -0.108 * 
 0.01  0.59  0.56  0.01  0.03  0.28  0.30  0.03  0.07  
O/N Deposit Rate (t-1)   0.014 * -0.016 *** 0.004  0.000  -0.001  -0.008  -0.001  -0.002  
   0.09  0.00  0.38  0.57  0.30  0.30  0.54  0.49  
2-Yr Bond Yield (t-1)   0.008 *** 0.006 ** 0.007  0.004 ** 0.020 * 0.004  0.007 ** -0.028 *** 
   0.00  0.02  0.30  0.01  0.07  0.77  0.02  0.00  
10-Yr Bond Yield (t-1)   -0.014 ** 0.020 *** -0.001  0.000  0.000  0.024 ** 0.004  -0.003  
   0.02  0.00  0.86  0.86  0.97  0.03  0.12  0.41  
Abs Yield Curve Slope   0.012 * -0.025 *** 0.000  0.000  -0.001  -0.011  -0.003  0.002  
   0.06  0.00  1.00  0.87  0.30  0.15  0.20  0.48  
5-Yr CDS Spread (t-1)   0.001  0.016 ** 0.005  0.007  -0.005  -0.005  -0.001  0.001  
   0.95  0.04  0.57  0.64  0.66  0.63  0.91  0.84  
BBDXY (t-1) -0.286 * -0.104  0.017  -0.042  -0.053  0.113  0.313 * 0.136  0.278 ** 
 0.06  0.45  0.90  0.73  0.64  0.25  0.06  0.19  0.05  
S&P500 Return (t-1) -0.030  0.060  0.103 *** 0.022  -0.005  0.057  0.001  0.023  0.047  
 0.53  0.18  0.00  0.59  0.91  0.22  0.99  0.55  0.46  
EURSTX 50 Return (t-
1) 
0.038  0.004  -0.041 * -0.233 *** 0.066 * 0.031  0.070  0.021  0.147 ** 
 0.21  0.88  0.09  0.00  0.06  0.35  0.21  0.63  0.01  
STATE -0.004 *** -0.002  -0.003 *** 0.000  -0.002 ** 0.001  -0.002  -0.002  -0.035 *** 
 0.00  0.22  0.00  0.65  0.04  0.76  0.33  0.13  0.00  
Constant -0.002 *** -0.001  0.005  -0.003 ** -0.008  -0.003  -0.028 *** -0.002  -0.005 *** 
 0.00  0.74  0.23  0.05  0.10  0.15  0.01  0.20  0.01  
                   
Observations 324  459  485  489  486  472  225  488  487  
R-squared 0.192   0.207   0.505   0.058   0.182   0.073   0.133   0.321   0.195   
Robust pval in brackets 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Index Return (t-1) -0.052  -0.048  -0.076  0.127  -0.100 * -0.279 *** -0.200 ** -0.247 *** -0.246 *** 
 0.42  0.32  0.24  0.29  0.06  0.00  0.02  0.00  0.00  
Currency Return (t-1) -0.034  0.067  0.221  0.283  0.041  0.038  0.149  0.295 *** 0.366 *** 
 0.86  0.51  0.23  0.14  0.69  0.79  0.26  0.01  0.00  
O/N Deposit Rate (t-1)   -0.001  0.032 *** 0.010  0.000  -0.003  0.052 *** 0.006  -0.003  
   0.91  0.00  0.29  0.82  0.30  0.00  0.23  0.29  
2-Yr Bond Yield (t-1)   -0.002  -0.009 * 0.010  -0.001  0.013  0.003  0.005  -0.020 *** 
   0.56  0.09  0.44  0.57  0.54  0.86  0.24  0.00  
10-Yr Bond Yield (t-1)   -0.007  -0.030 *** -0.018 ** -0.004  0.005  -0.054 *** -0.016 *** -0.003  
   0.31  0.00  0.04  0.16  0.61  0.00  0.00  0.33  
Abs Yield Curve Slope   0.004  0.037 *** 0.015 * 0.000  -0.005  0.052 *** 0.011 ** 0.003  
   0.53  0.00  0.07  1.00  0.13  0.00  0.01  0.20  
5-Yr CDS Spread (t-1)   -0.005  0.034 ** -0.002  0.022  0.011  -0.012  0.009  0.008  
   0.77  0.02  0.89  0.30  0.64  0.41  0.29  0.24  
BBDXY (t-1) 0.061  -0.111  -0.092  -0.500 ** -0.092  0.725 *** -0.249  -0.326 * -0.237 * 
 0.83  0.45  0.73  0.04  0.58  0.00  0.32  0.06  0.08  
S&P500 Return (t-1) 0.010  0.052  0.177 *** 0.358 *** 0.066  0.657 *** 0.549 *** 0.418 *** 0.400 *** 
 0.90  0.26  0.01  0.00  0.34  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  
EURSTX 50 Return (t-1) 0.030  -0.014  0.108 ** -0.318 *** 0.075  0.222 *** -0.010  -0.033  0.022  
 0.57  0.65  0.02  0.01  0.15  0.00  0.90  0.65  0.69  
STATE 0.000  -0.001  0.000  0.000  -0.003  0.003  0.001  -0.003  -0.018 *** 
 0.91  0.66  0.90  0.90  0.13  0.34  0.71  0.14  0.00  
Constant -0.002  0.008 ** -0.008  0.005  0.017 ** 0.000  0.001  0.008 *** -0.001  
 0.14  0.03  0.27  0.12  0.03  0.91  0.95  0.01  0.51  
                   
Observations 267  457  473  479  476  448  219  473  476  
R-squared 0.005   0.042   0.142   0.064   0.024   0.281   0.234   0.140   0.211   
Robust pval in brackets 




Table 23. Comparison of Average Term Structure of Interests 
The yield curve slopes are calculated by differentials of 10-year government bond yields and 2-year government bond yields. For 
Hungary, due to availability issue, 3-year government bond yields are used instead of 2-year yields. Each value is average of the 
differentials over the period from 1 year before to 1 year after the NIRP. 
 Bulgaria Hungary Denmark Euro Area Sweden Norway Switzerland Japan 
Avg. Term Structure 2.0276% 1.6212% 1.4116% 1.3212% 1.1629% 0.9263% 0.7865% 0.2606% 
Rank 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
 
 
Table 24. Indexes Cointegration with the U.S. Equity Market 
For those nine countries' indexes, Johansen cointegration tests are implemented, using the S&P500 as the benchmark index. Daily 
data of each equity index returns are used for the test, and Linear deterministic trends are assumed. The data covers three different 
period of time. 1) the primary event window is D-10 to D+10 of the event day. 2) Regime 0+1 is two years of data, before and 
after NIRP. 3) to see the longer-term cointegration, 6 years of longer-term period, which covers all the analyses data in this study 
is considered. 
  1) Primary Event Window 2) Regime 0+1 (2 years) 3) July 5, 2011 - July 1, 2017 
Country Index Trace Stat. Prob. Trace Stat. Prob. Trace Stat. Prob. 
Bos & Herz MXBAH 13.33255 0.1032   8.666291 0.3972   6.615036 0.6228   
Bulgaria SOFIX 12.87747 0.1194  18.86822 0.0149 ** 3.606961 0.9326  
Denmark KAX 12.87747 0.1194  12.2596 0.1449  8.059453 0.4591  
Euro Area DAX 25.02436 0.0014 *** 3.29829 0.9517  9.189588 0.3482  
Hungary BUX 7.152566 0.5600  7.378296 0.5341  11.49918 0.1826  
Japan NIKKEI 13.99046 0.0832 * 11.52513 0.1812  20.00238 0.0098 *** 
Norway OSEAX 22.58429 0.0036 *** 18.72791 0.0157 ** 7.091516 0.5670  
Sweden OMX 5.380235 0.7672  12.30256 0.1430  6.171222 0.6753  









Table 25. Results of VIX Volatility Index Regression Models 
   Euro Japanese Yen 
VARIABLES Model (E2) Model (E4) Model (J2) Model (J4) 
     
EUVIX (t-1) -0.084    
 [0.25]    
JYVIX (t-1)   -0.055  
   [0.38]  
Index Return (t-1) -0.085 -0.203 -0.228 -0.202 
 [0.87] [0.70] [0.22] [0.28] 
Currency Return (t-1) -0.561 -0.636 0.415 0.381 
 [0.46] [0.40] [0.55] [0.58] 
Overnight Deposit rate (t-1) -0.012 -0.011 -0.003 -0.002 
 [0.71] [0.74] [0.67] [0.68] 
2-Yr Bond Yield (t-1) 0.113 0.11 -0.129 -0.126 
 [0.14] [0.15] [0.50] [0.51] 
10-Yr Bond Yield (t-1) -0.113** -0.110** 0.071 0.069 
 [0.04] [0.05] [0.67] [0.68] 
Abs Yield Curve Slope 0.108** 0.105* -0.115 -0.113 
 [0.04] [0.05] [0.49] [0.50] 
5-Yr CDS Spread (t-1) -0.068 -0.073 -0.013 -0.009 
 [0.26] [0.23] [0.89] [0.93] 
BBDXY (t-1) 0.985 0.947 1.785** 1.825** 
 [0.34] [0.35] [0.04] [0.04] 
S&P500 Return (t-1) -0.41 -0.308 -1.045** -0.958* 
 [0.22] [0.33] [0.03] [0.05] 
EURSTX 50 Return (t-1) -0.288 -0.193 0.006 0.082 
 [0.60] [0.72] [0.98] [0.79] 
STATE 0.001 0.001 -0.022 -0.021 
 [0.86] [0.88] [0.28] [0.30] 
Constant 0.007 0.007 0.014 0.014 
 [0.68] [0.68] [0.33] [0.33] 
     
Observations 475 475 457 457 
R-squared 0.036 0.031 0.057 0.055 
Robust pval in brackets 




Table 26. Test Results for Equality of Variance and Mean 
Panel A: Equality of Variance and Mean of Currency Returns 
 
Variance Bos&Herz Bulgaria Denmark Euro Area Hungary Japan Norway Switzerland Sweden 
Regime 0               
(Est. Window) 4.24E-05 5.79E-05 6.30E-05 1.49E-05 6.54E-05 3.00E-05 7.93E-05 1.65E-04 3.63E-05 
Event Window 1.80E-05 7.45E-05 4.12E-05 6.10E-06 2.91E-05 7.61E-05 7.84E-05 2.67E-05 6.40E-05 
Regime 1 2.50E-05 2.64E-05 2.41E-05 4.00E-05 3.95E-05 6.31E-05 5.86E-05 7.26E-05 5.04E-05 
          
Standard Deviation Bos&Herz Bulgaria Denmark Euro Area Hungary Japan Norway Switzerland Sweden 
Regime 0               
(Est. Window) 0.0065 0.0076 0.0079 0.0039 0.0081 0.0055 0.0089 0.0128 0.0060 
Event Window 0.0042 0.0086 0.0064 0.0025 0.0054 0.0087 0.0089 0.0052 0.0080 
Regime 1 0.0050 0.0051 0.0049 0.0063 0.0063 0.0079 0.0077 0.0085 0.0071 
                    
F-Test Bos&Herz Bulgaria Denmark Euro Area Hungary Japan Norway Switzerland Sweden 
Test Statistic 0.0340 0.1350 1.7110 2.9710 0.0580 0.0470 2.6560 0.1220 3.4780 
df 511 516 519 505 512 520 521 509 521 
p-value 0.4554 0.0062 0.6209 0.9684 0.5490 0.7299 0.5060 0.5473 0.1666 
    ***               
          
Bartlett's Test Bos&Herz Bulgaria Denmark Euro Area Hungary Japan Norway Switzerland Sweden 
Test Statistic 0.584 1.665 0.840 0.425 0.005 0.165 0.089 0.145 0.766 
df 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
p-value 0.445 0.197 0.359 0.514 0.943 0.684 0.765 0.703 0.381 
                    
                   
Levene's Test Bos&Herz Bulgaria Denmark Euro Area Hungary Japan Norway Switzerland Sweden 
Test Statistic 10.864 14.211 20.428 26.131 8.497 25.024 6.033 51.374 15.179 
df1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
df2 510 515 518 504 511 519 520 508 520 
p-value 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.014 0.000 0.000 







Panel B: Equality of Variance and Mean of Equity Returns 
 
Variance Bos&Herz Bulgaria Denmark Euro Area Hungary Japan Norway Switzerland Sweden 
Regime 0 
(Est. Window) 0.00007664 0.00004335 0.00017783 0.00008612 0.00012216 0.00024400 0.00013348 0.00005473 0.00007402 
Event Window 0.00026284 0.00002830 0.00009371 0.00001865 0.00006669 0.00105758 0.00022367 0.00005050 0.00014793 
Regime 1 0.00007514 0.00005372 0.00006878 0.00013450 0.00020720 0.00009357 0.00017450 0.00014415 0.00016148 
          
Standard Deviation Bos&Herz Bulgaria Denmark Euro Area Hungary Japan Norway Switzerland Sweden 
Regime 0                
(Est. Window) 0.0088 0.0066 0.0133 0.0093 0.0111 0.0156 0.0116 0.0074 0.0086 
Event Window 0.0162 0.0053 0.0097 0.0043 0.0082 0.0325 0.0150 0.0071 0.0122 
Regime 1 0.0087 0.0073 0.0083 0.0116 0.0144 0.0097 0.0132 0.0120 0.0127 
                    
F-Test Bos&Herz Bulgaria Denmark Euro Area Hungary Japan Norway Switzerland Sweden 
Test Statistic 0.5584 7.5508 0.2450 0.0016 0.3596 0.1194 0.4430 0.3626 1.9193 
df 340 476 486 493 489 466 521 491 484 
p-value 0.4554 0.0062 0.6209 0.9684 0.5490 0.7299 0.5060 0.5473 0.1666 
   ***               
                    
Bartlett's Test Bos&Herz Bulgaria Denmark Euro Area Hungary Japan Norway Switzerland Sweden 
Test Statistic 0.023 8.248 1.278 0.636 0.005 2.218 2.157 2.830 0.968 
df 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
p-value 0.880 0.004 0.258 0.425 0.943 0.136 0.142 0.093 0.325 
    ***           **   
                   
Levene's Test Bos&Herz Bulgaria Denmark Euro Area Hungary Japan Norway Switzerland Sweden 
Test Statistic 0.479 0.358 35.438 9.409 5.717 0.712 3.645 32.342 24.426 
df1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
df2 339 475 485 492 488 465 520 490 483 
p-value 0.489 0.550 0.000 0.002 0.017 0.399 0.057 0.000 0.000 
      *** *** **   * *** *** 




Table 27. GARCH Results for the Currency and Equity Returns 
Panel A: Results for Currency Returns – GARCH (1,1) 
GARCH = C(2) + C(3)*RESID(-1)^2 + C(4)*GARCH(-1)      
1. Overall Period          
VARIABLES BAM / USD BGN / USD DKK / USD EUR / USD HUF / USD JPY / USD NOK / USD SEK / USD CHF / USD 
C 1.71E-07 1.44E-07 2.76E-07 1.79E-07 6.77E-07 7.63E-07 1.05E-05 2.00E-06 1.60E-06 
α: RESID(-1)^2 -0.013725 0.0156641 -0.012954 0.0571653 0.024806 0.0448262 0.051859 0.048223 -0.001119 
β: GARCH(-1) 1.0073425 0.9791945 1.00157 0.9387652 0.961045 0.9434469 0.821851 0.918212 0.988795 
α + β 0.9936179 0.9948585 0.9886158 0.9959305 0.985851 0.9882731 0.87371 0.966435 0.987676 
          
R-squared -0.008742 -0.035196 -0.077495 -0.001992 -0.021797 -0.017556 -0.00208 -0.003266 -0.004532 
          
2. Pre-NIRP Year          
VARIABLES BAM / USD BGN / USD DKK / USD EUR / USD HUF / USD JPY / USD NOK / USD SEK / USD CHF / USD 
C 4.28E-05 2.27E-05 6.27E-07 2.18E-07 6.55E-07 4.61E-06 1.71E-05 6.54E-06 3.77E-07 
α: RESID(-1)^2 0.103486 0.090867 0.040644 -0.034892 -0.027967 0.154794 0.059911 0.10649 0.048103 
β: GARCH(-1) -0.125225 0.513729 0.943554 1.011889 1.021612 0.698613 0.726931 0.717688 0.926772 
α + β -0.021739 0.604596 0.984198 0.976997 0.993645 0.853407 0.786842 0.824178 0.974875 
 
                  
R-squared -0.00011 -0.000001 -0.046789 -0.000223 -0.006985 -0.005906 -0.000122 -0.000355 -0.000024 
          
3. Post-NIRP Year          
VARIABLES BAM / USD BGN / USD DKK / USD EUR / USD HUF / USD JPY / USD NOK / USD SEK / USD CHF / USD 
C 4.19E-07 7.24E-06 4.98E-06 3.58E-08 4.00E-05 6.33E-05 3.37E-05 3.37E-05 7.03E-06 
α: RESID(-1)^2 0.033959 0.013898 -0.037763 -0.014563 0.132307 0.067455 0.152735 0.152735 0.024824 
β: GARCH(-1) 0.964802 0.702362 0.825747 1.02472 -0.165633 -0.06925 0.239623 0.239623 0.831818 
α + β 0.998761 0.71626 0.787984 1.010157 -0.033326 -0.001795 0.392358 0.392358 0.856642 
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Panel B: Results for Equity Returns - EGARCH 
LOG(GARCH) = C(2) + C(3)*ABS(RESID(-1)/@SQRT(GARCH(-1))) + C(4)*RESID(-1)/@SQRT(GARCH(-1)) + C(5)*LOG(GARCH(-1)) 




















C(2) -0.39815 -1.67294 -0.61323 -0.80373 -0.41791 -0.667310 -0.21709 -0.83335 -2.06753 
C(3) 0.113871 0.166386 0.147225 0.15294 0.11682 0.072953 0.01367 0.15067 0.458703 
C(4) 0.055591 0.105444 -0.042980 -0.14810 -0.11044 -0.282890 -0.15698 -0.19254 -0.30395 
C(5) 0.965552 0.846417 0.944802 0.925073 0.963868 0.930218 0.97638 0.921458 0.815726 
          
R-squared -0.00153 -1.60E-05 -0.00017 -0.0004 -0.00144 -2.20E-05 -0.00214 -0.00071 -0.00154 
          




















C(2) -6.570981 -13.7528 -1.15E+01 -0.520557 -13.13213 -0.751651 -1.090929 -1.240111 -1.240111 
C(3) 0.587399 0.138494 -0.132133 -0.155938 0.130958 0.085573 0.002378 0.17849 0.17849 
C(4) 0.224617 0.089592 -0.086002 -0.292603 0.044777 -0.28552 -0.238962 -0.172011 -0.172011 
C(5) 0.368005 -0.351723 -0.341272 0.932073 -0.457563 0.922213 0.879515 0.884593 0.884593 
 
         
R-squared -0.000207 -0.000341 -0.000152 -0.005839 -0.000183 -0.001382 -0.000158 -0.002724 -0.002724 
          




















C(2) -18.50785 -1.30E+00 -7.93699 -0.217151 -0.546783 -0.452892 -0.353236 -0.658590 -1.170406 
C(3) 0.062831 0.291976 -0.04483 -0.055505 0.107688 -0.014376 0.095905 -0.042432 0.010951 
C(4) 0.536980 0.196786 0.027519 -0.055804 -0.211022 -0.312554 -0.192732 -0.244562 -0.273735 
C(5) -0.822353 0.896221 0.172379 0.970096 0.950489 0.946172 0.968321 0.922189 0.874033 
 
         
R-squared -0.001269 -0.000836 -0.000022 -0.001157 -0.000936 -0.004528 -0.006824 -0.000017 0.000000 
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Table 28. Descriptive Statistics (May 2014 – December 2018, Monthly Data)  
Panel A: Monthly Data (March 2014 – December 2018) 
Variables BTC-USD Spread Bid-Ask CPI (US) CPI (CHN) CPI (JPN) CPI (EUR) CPI (KOR) IP (US) 
Mean 0.0376 0.0194 2.0831 0.1196 0.1518 0.0333 0.0696 0.0875 0.0804 
St. Dev. 0.2245 0.7691 2.8489 0.2075 0.4585 0.2612 0.5059 0.3237 0.5050 
Skewness 0.0497 0.6952 2.7017 -0.6900 0.6683 0.3433 -0.7861 0.2298 0.4506 
Kurtosis -0.0436 3.0267 9.6547 1.9963 1.8263 -0.0624 2.0908 0.6764 -0.0392 
 
         











Mean 0.5075 0.1271 0.1143 0.0196 -0.0429 -0.0027 -0.0179 -0.0661 0.0018 
St. Dev. 0.1349 1.4442 1.0289 1.7955 0.1248 0.0258 0.1081 0.0668 0.1940 
Skewness 0.3356 -0.5822 0.5360 -0.0423 -0.1104 1.1869 -1.0654 -0.1378 0.6403 
Kurtosis 1.9003 1.7863 0.9608 -0.7242 -0.4312 8.9882 2.2254 -0.2958 0.2095 
 
         
Variables CNY-USD JPY-USD EUR-USD KRW-USD S&P500 SHSZ300 NIKKEI EUROSTOX KOSPI 
Mean -0.0016 -0.0009 0.0010 -0.0011 0.0051 0.0043 0.0046 -0.0046 -0.0007 
St. Dev. 0.0114 0.0290 0.0233 0.0251 0.0319 0.0771 0.0385 0.0418 0.0481 
Skewness -0.3988 0.3357 0.3989 0.6343 -0.7234 -0.3141 -0.5273 0.0395 -0.4698 
Kurtosis 0.6597 1.6848 0.5090 0.7860 1.6489 2.2481 0.7849 -0.6738 2.0174 
 
Panel B: Daily Data (April 2014 – January 2019) 
Variables BTC-USD Spread Bid-Ask CNY-USD JPY-USD EUR-USD 
Mean 0.0024 0.0004 2.0075 -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0000 
St. Dev. 0.0432 0.6287 6.8885 0.0022 0.0056 0.0054 
Skewness 0.0900 0.5467 19.5408 -0.2907 0.5601 -0.1178 
Kurtosis 4.8345 1.3685 480.5404 6.7355 5.2741 2.3406 
       
Variables KRW-USD SP500 SHSZ300 NIKKEI EUROSTOXX KOSPI 
Mean 0.0000 0.0003 -0.0012 -0.0034 0.0002 0.0001 
St. Dev. 0.0053 0.0083 0.0560 0.1345 0.0127 0.0082 
Skewness -0.0893 -0.4191 -31.3190 -34.6839 3.0356 -0.4403 
Kurtosis 1.3451 4.0344 1058.5476 1213.2091 55.5101 2.3779 
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Table 29. The Chronology of Government Regulations about Bitcoin Transaction 
Date Country Description 
June 4, 2018 The United States The Securities and Exchange Commission announced that Valerie A. 
Szczepanik has been named Associate Director of the Division of 
Corporation Finance and Senior Advisor for Digital Assets and 
Innovation for Division Director Bill Hinman, the newly created 
branch to manage cryptocurrency. 
January 22, 2018 South Korea South Korea brought in a regulation that requires all the bitcoin 
traders to reveal their identity, thus putting a ban on anonymous 
trading of bitcoins 
January 19, 2018 The United States The Commodities Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) filed charges 
against two cryptocurrency fraud cases.  
December 27, 2017 South Korea Korea’s government announced that it will impose additional 
measures to regulate speculation in cryptocurrency trading within the 
country. 
December 6, 2017 South Korea Korea's Financial Services Commission issued a ban on the trading of 
bitcoin futures, prompting several securities firms to cancel seminars 
scheduled in December for bitcoin future investors 
November 11, 2017 The United States Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin mentioned he had established 
working-groups at treasury looking at bitcoin and that it is something 
they will be watching "very carefully." 
September 29, 2017 The United States The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (the SEC) filed a 
civil complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of 
New York against the sponsors of two “initial coin offerings” (ICOs) 
for alleged violations of U.S. securities laws 
September 4, 2017 China China banned all companies and individuals from raising funds 
through ICO activities, reiterating that ICOs are considered illegal 
activity in the country 
July 25, 2017 The United States The SEC issued an investor bulletin about initial coin offerings, 
saying they can be “fair and lawful investment opportunities” but can 
be used improperly. The SEC has issued three enforcement actions 
against ICO sponsors- one halt and exposure of two alleged frauds. 
SEC Chairman Clayton has also expressed concern about market 
participants who extend to customers credit in U.S. 
July 1, 2017 The United States The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 
voted to approve a model act providing for the regulation of digital 
currency business at state level 
[Source 1: www.marketwatch.com / Here’s how the U.S. and the world regulate bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies by Francine 
McKenna, accessed on February 9, 2018] 
[Source 2: https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2018-102 / [Press Release] SEC Names Valerie A. Szczepanik Senior 
Advisor for Digital Assets and Innovation, accessed on Jan 31, 2019]  
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Table 30. Correlation Matrix of Relevant Variables 

































































BTC-USD 1.00                             
BTC-USD (t-1) 0.06 1.00                            
Spread (t-1) 0.08 0.02 1.00                           
Bid-Ask (t-1) 0.04 0.00 -0.02 1.00                          
Volume -0.21 0.09 0.20 -0.05 1.00                         
CPI (US) 0.24 0.13 0.07 0.18 -0.15 1.00                        
CPI (CHN) -0.18 -0.01 -0.07 -0.03 -0.03 0.03 1.00                       
CPI (JPN) 0.11 0.05 0.11 0.26 0.14 0.27 0.12 1.00                      
CPI (EUR) 0.13 -0.01 0.07 -0.06 -0.19 0.10 -0.12 0.10 1.00                     
CPI (KOR) 0.06 -0.20 -0.09 -0.01 0.10 0.16 0.41* 0.09 -0.21 1.00                    
IP (US) 0.16 0.07 -0.05 0.42* -0.10 0.04 -0.10 0.09 -0.02 -0.18 1.00                   
IP (CHN) 0.01 -0.02 0.24 0.05 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.19 0.03 0.03 -0.02 1.00                  
IP (JPN) 0.12 -0.02 0.18 -0.13 0.00 -0.17 -0.02 -0.12 0.05 0.02 0.21 0.05 1.00                 
IP (EUR) 0.10 0.18 -0.01 -0.12 0.15 0.17 0.06 0.16 -0.11 -0.10 0.03 0.07 0.13 1.00                
IP (KOR) 0.07 -0.08 0.19 0.12 -0.07 0.15 0.07 0.03 0.01 0.00 -0.02 0.36* -0.35* 0.00 1.00               
Unemp (US) 0.04 -0.08 0.11 0.03 -0.08 0.05 0.06 0.13 -0.12 0.15 -0.06 -0.26 0.14 -0.08 -0.32 1.00              
Unemp (CHN) 0.07 -0.01 -0.02 -0.19 -0.02 -0.05 0.12 -0.33 0.09 0.01 0.12 -0.07 0.26 0.07 0.02 -0.23 1.00             
Unemp (JPN) 0.06 0.05 0.18 -0.07 -0.11 -0.19 -0.02 -0.21 0.03 -0.21 0.19 0.07 0.30 -0.18 0.04 -0.04 -0.01 1.00            
Unemp (EUR) -0.01 -0.04 0.10 -0.03 0.08 -0.01 0.02 -0.12 -0.05 0.11 -0.09 0.00 0.07 0.00 -0.18 0.41*  -0.11 0.06 1.00           
Unemp (KOR) -0.02 -0.06 -0.17 -0.13 -0.15 0.07 0.51* 0.10 0.18 0.19 -0.18 0.04 0.13 0.11 -0.06 -0.01 0.25 -0.20 -0.23 1.00          
S&P500 (t-1) 0.25 0.21 0.39* -0.07 -0.06 -0.05 -0.03 -0.04 0.02 -0.04 0.01 0.26 0.35* 0.10 0.10 0.19 -0.06 0.25 0.20 0.04 1.00         
SHSZ300 (t-1) 0.14 0.05 0.19 -0.11 -0.06 -0.14 -0.01 0.19 0.11 -0.20 0.11 -0.06 0.03 -0.03 0.01 0.11 -0.09 0.06 0.08 0.04 0.45* 1.00        
NIKKEI (t-1) 0.26 0.21 0.28 -0.12 -0.13 -0.08 0.02 0.06 0.23 -0.11 0.03 0.11 0.38* 0.08 0.00 0.14 0.04 0.15 0.00 0.17 0.72* 0.50* 1.00       
ESTX (t-1) 0.04 0.22 0.20 -0.13 -0.18 -0.20 0.10 -0.02 0.13 -0.06 -0.15 0.14 0.43* 0.12 -0.11 0.23 -0.13 0.19 0.14 0.23 0.66* 0.29 0.70* 1.00      
KOSPI (t-1) 
0.14 0.16 0.25 -0.12 
-
0.35* 
-0.05 0.13 0.05 0.14 -0.17 0.09 0.12 0.25 -0.05 0.13 0.18 -0.05 0.25 -0.09 0.26 0.55* 0.49* 0.63* 0.58* 1.00     
CNY-USD (t-1) 0.16 0.08 0.10 0.05 -0.19 -0.07 0.16 0.10 -0.04 -0.13 0.12 0.18 0.12 -0.05 -0.03 0.07 -0.16 0.20 0.04 0.14 0.27 0.41* 0.34*  0.31 0.55* 1.00    
JPY-USD (t-1) 0.10 -0.01 -0.24 -0.03 -0.17 0.01 -0.12 0.02 -0.01 -0.06 0.13 0.00 0.05 -0.10 -0.02 0.02 -0.07 0.09 -0.22 -0.03 -0.15 -0.11 0.03 -0.06 0.24 0.29 1.00   
EUR-USD (t-1) 





0.12 0.13 0.08 0.08 
-
0.41* 









































BTC-USD 1.00              
BTC-USD (t-1) 0.03 1.00            
 
Spread (t-1) -0.04 -0.07 1.00            
Bid-Ask (t-1) 0.04 0.00 0.29*   1.00           
Volume -0.01 -0.09* 0.12*   0.01 1.00          
S&P500 (t-1) 0.05 0.04 0.00 -0.01 -0.07 1.00         
SHSZ300 (t-1) 0.05 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.04 0.10*   1.00        
NIKKEI (t-1) -0.01 0.07 -0.08* -0.03 -0.05 0.05 0.02 1.00       
ESTX (t-1) 0.04 -0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.46*   0.07* -0.43* 1.00      
KOSPI (t-1) 0.03 0.00 -0.02 -0.04 0.01 0.24*   0.10* 0.51*   0.32* 1.00     
CNY-USD (t-1) 0.01 -0.04 0.01 0.00 0.07* 0.08*   0.11* 0.04 0.08* 0.18* 1.00   
 
JPY-USD (t-1) -0.03 0.02 -0.01 -0.02 0.00 -0.37* -0.03* -0.02  -0.34* -0.16* 0.17* 1.00   
EUR-USD (t-1) 0.05 0.01 -0.05 0.02 0.04 0.12*  0.01 0.02 0.23* 0.11* -0.07 -0.32* 1.00 
 




Table 31. Statistic Measures of Detrend Ratios of Bitcoin and Indexes 
Statistic Measure Bitcoin S&P500 SHSZ NIKKEI EUSTOXX KOSPI 
Standard Deviation 0.067925 0.009203 0.014968 0.013133 0.013951 0.01235 
Skewness 1.090718 -0.42525 -0.60099 -2.66675 -0.15835 -0.27621 
Kurtosis 14.87181 4.657465 4.638201 39.4934 4.442844 3.034228 
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Table 32. Regression Results with Monthly Data (April 2014 – December 2018) 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 2-1 Model 2-2 Model 2-3 Model 2-4 Model 2-5 Model 2-6 
         
Bitcoin (USD) (t-1) 0.038 1.641* 0.066 0.011 -0.081 0.443* 0.028 0.144 
 [0.848] [0.093] [0.830] [0.977] [0.828] [0.086] [0.921] [0.601] 
Spread (t-1) -0.008 -0.051 -0.011 -0.010 -0.004 -0.002 -0.012 -0.011 
 [0.928] [0.479] [0.895] [0.906] [0.962] [0.983] [0.881] [0.893] 
Bid-Ask Spread (t-1) -0.002 0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.006 -0.001 -0.001 -0.007 
 [0.929] [0.910] [0.933] [0.900] [0.784] [0.925] [0.942] [0.789] 
Trading Volume (t-1) -0.059 -0.013 -0.057 -0.059 -0.067 -0.069 -0.056 -0.057 
 [0.471] [0.880] [0.474] [0.490] [0.450] [0.402] [0.476] [0.474] 
Regulation -0.099 -0.167 -0.099 -0.116 -0.164 -0.216 -0.093 -0.158 
 [0.496] [0.445] [0.491] [0.541] [0.451] [0.219] [0.594] [0.441] 
CPI (US) 0.095 0.258 0.096 0.093 0.127 0.140 0.097 0.113 
 [0.707] [0.245] [0.706] [0.719] [0.616] [0.508] [0.699] [0.648] 
CPI (China) -0.169 -0.095 -0.169 -0.174 -0.187 -0.157 -0.169 -0.181 
 [0.189] [0.523] [0.190] [0.197] [0.164] [0.192] [0.191] [0.161] 
CPI (Japan) 0.015 0.120 0.007 0.013 -0.003 0.026 0.006 0.026 
 [0.953] [0.596] [0.976] [0.961] [0.992] [0.926] [0.980] [0.913] 
CPI (Euro Zone) 0.040 0.107 0.041 0.038 0.021 0.033 0.043 0.027 
 [0.713] [0.406] [0.697] [0.734] [0.850] [0.724] [0.688] [0.804] 
CPI (Korea) 0.167 0.057 0.167 0.168 0.188 0.187 0.167 0.152 
 [0.360] [0.747] [0.371] [0.355] [0.338] [0.270] [0.361] [0.421] 
IP (US) 0.017 -0.019 0.021 0.020 0.030 -0.003 0.021 0.030 
 [0.877] [0.865] [0.848] [0.850] [0.783] [0.973] [0.847] [0.787] 
IP (China) -0.264 -1.264** -0.262 -0.238 -0.220 -0.301 -0.272 -0.294 
 [0.436] [0.047] [0.444] [0.592] [0.544] [0.386] [0.443] [0.398] 
IP (Japan) -0.004 -0.058 -0.001 -0.005 -0.015 -0.030 -0.001 -0.016 
 [0.931] [0.425] [0.981] [0.930] [0.795] [0.541] [0.990] [0.800] 
IP (Euro Zone) 0.051 0.056 0.050 0.051 0.044 0.052 0.050 0.049 
 [0.287] [0.350] [0.302] [0.322] [0.384] [0.264] [0.309] [0.318] 
IP (Korea) 0.019 0.002 0.020 0.017 0.018 0.007 0.020 0.016 
 [0.570] [0.962] [0.552] [0.676] [0.571] [0.806] [0.551] [0.640] 
Unemp Rate (US) 0.189 -0.211 0.209 0.217 0.204 0.160 0.206 0.182 
 [0.679] [0.564] [0.637] [0.613] [0.642] [0.693] [0.643] [0.688] 
Unemp Rate (China) -0.235 3.921 -0.347 -0.429 -1.103 -0.831 -0.287 -0.374 
 [0.933] [0.243] [0.900] [0.872] [0.717] [0.758] [0.921] [0.890] 
Unemp Rate (Japan) 0.262 0.387 0.245 0.254 0.302 0.519 0.238 0.234 
 [0.618] [0.440] [0.630] [0.630] [0.575] [0.328] [0.651] [0.645] 
Unemp Rate (Euro) -0.058 -1.942 -0.084 -0.080 0.078 -0.038 -0.129 -0.069 
 [0.925] [0.133] [0.894] [0.896] [0.914] [0.950] [0.842] [0.909] 
Unemp Rate (Korea) 0.083 -0.312 0.092 0.096 0.139 0.070 0.082 0.119 
 [0.804] [0.413] [0.781] [0.769] [0.693] [0.815] [0.791] [0.707] 
S&P500 (t-1) 1.840 3.431 1.844 1.776 1.902 1.385 1.875 2.121 
 [0.364] [0.120] [0.380] [0.420] [0.353] [0.511] [0.351] [0.296] 
SHSZ300 (t-1) -0.220 -1.379* -0.215 -0.216 -0.127 -0.222 -0.228 -0.285 
 [0.761] [0.092] [0.777] [0.765] [0.861] [0.693] [0.751] [0.717] 
NIKKEI (t-1) 2.042 4.563** 1.995 2.106 1.938 3.102 1.994 2.025 
 [0.277] [0.047] [0.279] [0.280] [0.304] [0.109] [0.280] [0.280] 
EURO STOXX50 (t-1) -1.889 -2.231 -1.949 -1.994 -1.704 -2.167 -1.929 -1.889 
 [0.410] [0.386] [0.385] [0.374] [0.478] [0.292] [0.403] [0.395] 
KOSPI (t-1) -1.127 -4.119 -0.964 -1.027 -1.136 -1.521 -0.970 -1.424 
 [0.647] [0.103] [0.675] [0.656] [0.625] [0.485] [0.671] [0.567] 
XRate CNY-USD (t-1) 6.767 15.189** 6.773 7.007 5.866 8.158* 6.855 6.927 
 [0.140] [0.028] [0.175] [0.126] [0.283] [0.060] [0.136] [0.121] 
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XRate JPY-USD (t-1) -0.554 -5.345* -0.572 -0.662 -0.088 -0.695 -0.600 -0.991 
 [0.786] [0.093] [0.792] [0.745] [0.972] [0.694] [0.768] [0.662] 
XRate EUR-USD (t-1) -1.449 -4.023 -1.492 -1.638 -1.513 -1.800 -1.508 -1.921 
 [0.545] [0.152] [0.531] [0.573] [0.530] [0.423] [0.526] [0.492] 
XRate KRW-USD (t-1) 0.521 8.053 0.262 0.251 -0.184 0.987 0.261 0.935 
 [0.899] [0.108] [0.950] [0.951] [0.964] [0.783] [0.949] [0.833] 
10% Soar (t-1)  0.141 -0.008      
  [0.557] [0.958]      
20% Soar (t-1)  -0.298  0.034     
  [0.246]  [0.899]     
30% Soar (t-1)  -0.720   0.170    
  [0.153]   [0.648]    
10% Crash (t-1)  0.730**    0.258   
  [0.013]    [0.126]   
20% Crash (t-1)  -0.605*     -0.019  
  [0.097]     [0.923]  
30% Crash (t-1)  0.894**      0.146 
  [0.035]      [0.670] 
Soar (t-1) 0.061        
 [0.824]        
Crash (t-1) = o, -        
         
Constant 0.169 0.393 0.169 0.155 0.153 0.116 0.171 0.187 
 [0.390] [0.118] [0.400] [0.524] [0.450] [0.571] [0.406] [0.367] 
         
Observations 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 
R-squared 0.384 0.593 0.383 0.384 0.389 0.453 0.383 0.389 
p-value in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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Table 32. Cont’d 
VARIABLES Model 3 Model 4 Model 4-1 Model 4-2 Model 4-3 Model 4-4 Model 4-5 Model 4-6 
Bitcoin (USD) (t-1) 0.092 0.930 0.247 0.233 -0.056 0.297 0.062 0.132 
 [0.632] [0.251] [0.349] [0.376] [0.819] [0.268] [0.796] [0.546] 
Spread (t-1) 0.023 0.018 0.022 0.019 0.021 0.026 0.021 0.022 
 [0.655] [0.745] [0.658] [0.704] [0.684] [0.604] [0.667] [0.664] 
Bid-Ask Spread (t-1) -0.003 0.000 -0.003 -0.001 -0.007 -0.003 -0.002 -0.004 
 [0.879] [0.998] [0.871] [0.959] [0.673] [0.859] [0.893] [0.840] 
Trading Volume (t-1) -0.090 -0.083 -0.077 -0.085 -0.088 -0.098 -0.087 -0.089 
 [0.141] [0.158] [0.174] [0.154] [0.140] [0.113] [0.151] [0.134] 
Regulation -0.030 -0.060 -0.021 0.017 -0.106 -0.078 -0.016 -0.046 
 [0.853] [0.803] [0.897] [0.924] [0.617] [0.671] [0.925] [0.791] 
CPI (US) 0.123 0.198 0.114 0.137 0.151 0.142 0.125 0.131 
 [0.578] [0.377] [0.590] [0.534] [0.490] [0.502] [0.565] [0.550] 
CPI (China) -0.172* -0.158 -0.180** -0.159* -0.209** -0.164* -0.175* -0.176* 
 [0.051] [0.176] [0.044] [0.082] [0.045] [0.067] [0.052] [0.053] 
CPI (Japan) 0.155 0.112 0.132 0.124 0.123 0.175 0.145 0.155 
 [0.487] [0.655] [0.545] [0.573] [0.574] [0.468] [0.511] [0.475] 
CPI (Euro Zone) 0.022 0.026 0.019 0.031 0.005 0.023 0.026 0.020 
 [0.802] [0.793] [0.822] [0.721] [0.952] [0.788] [0.765] [0.818] 
CPI (Korea) 0.190 0.199 0.200 0.180 0.228 0.196 0.195 0.188 
 [0.255] [0.265] [0.242] [0.284] [0.195] [0.225] [0.239] [0.261] 
IP (US) 0.045 0.038 0.052 0.050 0.055 0.042 0.050 0.051 
 [0.594] [0.615] [0.495] [0.520] [0.438] [0.565] [0.513] [0.499] 
IP (China) -0.029 -0.289 -0.049 -0.115 -0.010 -0.028 -0.049 -0.032 
 [0.917] [0.498] [0.865] [0.714] [0.974] [0.924] [0.871] [0.908] 
IP (Japan) 0.004 0.004 0.012 0.017 -0.010 -0.006 0.008 0.002 
 [0.921] [0.938] [0.713] [0.692] [0.804] [0.877] [0.839] [0.960] 
IP (Euro Zone) 0.027 0.011 0.027 0.024 0.027 0.024 0.027 0.026 
 [0.521] [0.810] [0.505] [0.582] [0.520] [0.559] [0.523] [0.547] 
IP (Korea) 0.010 0.023 0.015 0.020 0.009 0.004 0.011 0.009 
 [0.636] [0.426] [0.512] [0.489] [0.691] [0.861] [0.623] [0.697] 
Unemp Rate (US) 0.049 0.025 0.093 0.042 0.055 0.036 0.050 0.049 
 [0.869] [0.941] [0.745] [0.883] [0.849] [0.910] [0.865] [0.869] 
Unemp Rate (China) 1.203 1.094 1.017 1.239 0.097 0.995 1.218 1.134 
 [0.628] [0.704] [0.675] [0.597] [0.971] [0.687] [0.621] [0.643] 
Unemp Rate (Japan) 0.236 0.315 0.223 0.214 0.324 0.332 0.219 0.222 
 [0.597] [0.528] [0.629] [0.631] [0.484] [0.495] [0.624] [0.622] 
Unemp Rate (Euro) 0.138 0.043 0.110 0.073 0.280 0.125 0.036 0.131 
 [0.798] [0.956] [0.826] [0.879] [0.621] [0.804] [0.947] [0.806] 
Unemp Rate (Korea) 0.047 0.045 0.076 0.053 0.106 0.042 0.047 0.062 
 [0.863] [0.865] [0.758] [0.835] [0.650] [0.866] [0.844] [0.797] 
10% Soar (t-1)  -0.076 -0.083      
  [0.665] [0.475]      
20% Soar (t-1)  -0.255  -0.108     
  [0.220]  [0.506]     
30% Soar (t-1)  0.050   0.195    
  [0.841]   [0.361]    
10% Crash (t-1)  0.233    0.122   
  [0.155]    [0.347]   
20% Crash (t-1)  -0.091     -0.037  
  [0.662]     [0.810]  
30% Crash (t-1)  0.224      0.035 
  [0.388]      [0.865] 
Soar (t-1) 0.062        
 [0.802]        
Crash (t-1) = o, -        
         
Constant 0.052 0.146 0.089 0.096 0.054 0.015 0.060 0.053 
 [0.735] [0.476] [0.588] [0.586] [0.730] [0.930] [0.715] [0.729] 
Observations 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 
R-squared 0.245 0.314 0.254 0.251 0.258 0.263 0.245 0.245 
p-value in parentheses 






Table 32. Cont’d 
VARIABLES Model 5 Model 6 Model 6-1 Model 6-2 Model 6-3 Model 6-4 Model 6-5 Model 6-6 
         
Bitcoin (USD) (t-1) 0.019 1.165* 0.112 0.121 0.038 0.296 0.072 0.112 
 [0.913] [0.084] [0.624] [0.542] [0.844] [0.178] [0.752] [0.586] 
Spread (t-1) 0.001 -0.011 -0.004 -0.008 -0.004 0.002 -0.004 -0.007 
 [0.987] [0.775] [0.903] [0.803] [0.899] [0.961] [0.899] [0.850] 
Bid-Ask Spread (t-1) 0.003 0.007 0.003 0.005 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.002 
 [0.796] [0.540] [0.773] [0.716] [0.818] [0.714] [0.791] [0.837] 
Trading Volume (t-1) -0.086** -0.084** -0.077** -0.079* -0.084** -0.096** -0.083** -0.086** 
 [0.023] [0.038] [0.033] [0.051] [0.038] [0.013] [0.027] [0.019] 
Regulation -0.018 -0.065 -0.029 -0.013 -0.033 -0.058 -0.032 -0.046 
 [0.900] [0.680] [0.839] [0.930] [0.824] [0.676] [0.823] [0.745] 
S&P500 (t-1) 2.316 2.185 2.232 2.372 2.267 1.891 2.249 2.391* 
 [0.102] [0.182] [0.117] [0.102] [0.110] [0.182] [0.110] [0.098] 
SHSZ300 (t-1) -0.065 -0.036 -0.106 -0.130 -0.075 0.018 -0.066 -0.043 
 [0.868] [0.927] [0.780] [0.730] [0.843] [0.962] [0.869] [0.915] 
NIKKEI (t-1) 1.982 2.388* 2.024* 1.941 1.937 2.245* 1.933* 1.834* 
 [0.100] [0.098] [0.100] [0.110] [0.118] [0.068] [0.092] [0.098] 
EURO STOXX50 (t-1) -2.083* -2.596** -2.072* -2.130* -2.073* -2.196** -2.082* -2.128* 
 [0.075] [0.032] [0.076] [0.072] [0.081] [0.042] [0.073] [0.081] 
KOSPI (t-1) -0.476 -0.104 -0.290 -0.141 -0.346 -0.425 -0.308 -0.414 
 [0.516] [0.907] [0.676] [0.841] [0.611] [0.537] [0.652] [0.551] 
10% Soar (t-1)  -0.108 -0.037      
  [0.425] [0.700]      
20% Soar (t-1)  -0.169  -0.061     
  [0.179]  [0.634]     
30% Soar (t-1)  -0.139   0.020    
  [0.517]   [0.912]    
10% Crash (t-1)  0.287*    0.148   
  [0.086]    [0.159]   
20% Crash (t-1)  -0.013     0.015  
  [0.938]     [0.901]  
30% Crash (t-1)  0.230      0.071 
  [0.329]      [0.683] 
Soar (t-1) 0.173        
 [0.179]        
Crash (t-1) = o, -        
         
Constant 0.000 -0.043 0.016 0.009 0.003 -0.042 0.002 0.000 
 [0.992] [0.351] [0.746] [0.811] [0.930] [0.302] [0.961] [1.000] 
         
Observations 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 
R-squared 0.203 0.289 0.196 0.198 0.195 0.230 0.194 0.197 
p-value in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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Table 32. Cont’d 
VARIABLES Model 7 Model 8 Model 8-1 Model 8-2 Model 8-3 Model 8-4 Model 8-5 Model 8-6 
         
Bitcoin (USD) (t-1) 0.056 0.912 0.103 0.048 0.018 0.318 0.140 0.094 
 [0.737] [0.252] [0.649] [0.843] [0.923] [0.130] [0.503] [0.653] 
Spread (t-1) 0.040 0.037 0.040 0.038 0.041 0.040 0.038 0.036 
 [0.387] [0.419] [0.402] [0.392] [0.376] [0.353] [0.397] [0.418] 
Bid-Ask Spread (t-1) 0.002 0.004 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.003 0.001 0.002 
 [0.884] [0.801] [0.888] [0.914] [0.938] [0.844] [0.938] [0.919] 
Trading Volume (t-1) -0.077* -0.076 -0.075* -0.077* -0.080* -0.087** -0.077* -0.076* 
 [0.056] [0.106] [0.067] [0.059] [0.065] [0.027] [0.055] [0.063] 
Regulation -0.040 -0.085 -0.045 -0.051 -0.057 -0.083 -0.062 -0.053 
 [0.771] [0.577] [0.736] [0.725] [0.679] [0.507] [0.644] [0.701] 
XRate CNY-USD (t-1) 2.723 3.247 2.721 2.959 2.562 3.634 3.102 2.750 
 [0.412] [0.383] [0.399] [0.363] [0.458] [0.248] [0.314] [0.412] 
XRate JPY-USD (t-1) 0.431 0.289 0.472 0.393 0.528 0.473 0.295 0.315 
 [0.735] [0.845] [0.735] [0.760] [0.667] [0.704] [0.819] [0.830] 
XRate EUR-USD (t-1) -1.275 -1.185 -1.299 -1.397 -1.357 -1.393 -1.343 -1.432 
 [0.432] [0.573] [0.423] [0.476] [0.417] [0.389] [0.406] [0.451] 
XRate KRW-USD (t-1) -1.022 -0.513 -1.017 -1.109 -1.215 -1.272 -0.961 -1.023 
 [0.442] [0.787] [0.440] [0.480] [0.396] [0.344] [0.477] [0.441] 
10% Soar (t-1)  -0.085 -0.020      
  [0.555] [0.866]      
20% Soar (t-1)  -0.098  0.019     
  [0.556]  [0.912]     
30% Soar (t-1)  -0.103   0.061    
  [0.666]   [0.759]    
10% Crash (t-1)  0.227    0.158   
  [0.156]    [0.142]   
20% Crash (t-1)  0.060     0.064  
  [0.724]     [0.603]  
30% Crash (t-1)  0.102      0.035 
  [0.622]      [0.852] 
Soar (t-1) 0.071        
 [0.578]        
Crash (t-1) = o, -        
         
Constant 0.038 -0.001 0.046 0.039 0.037 -0.007 0.033 0.038 
 [0.365] [0.992] [0.333] [0.340] [0.357] [0.890] [0.439] [0.331] 
         
Observations 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 
R-squared 0.106 0.166 0.105 0.105 0.108 0.146 0.109 0.105 
p-value in parentheses 




Table 33. Regression Result with Daily Data (11 April 2014 – 30 January 2019) 
VARIABLES Model 9 Model 10 Model 10-1 Model 10-2 Model 10-3 Model 10-4 
       
Bitcoin (USD) (t-1) -0.024 0.051 0.086* 0.035 0.025 0.030 
 [0.747] [0.367] [0.071] [0.457] [0.632] [0.518] 
Spread (t-1) 0.005** 0.005** 0.004** 0.004** 0.004** 0.004** 
 [0.013] [0.019] [0.027] [0.046] [0.032] [0.045] 
Bid-Ask Spread (t-1) 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 [0.804] [0.948] [0.976] [0.983] [0.956] [0.980] 
Trading Volume (t-1) 0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 
 [0.775] [0.982] [0.880] [0.689] [0.825] [0.853] 
Regulation -0.011 -0.023 -0.015 -0.022 -0.017 -0.017 
 [0.724] [0.390] [0.652] [0.409] [0.580] [0.576] 
S&P500 (t-1) 0.379 0.339 0.347 0.340 0.334 0.348 
 [0.101] [0.143] [0.134] [0.146] [0.150] [0.136] 
SHSZ300 (t-1) 0.033*** 0.035*** 0.035*** 0.035*** 0.034*** 0.035*** 
 [0.004] [0.002] [0.003] [0.002] [0.004] [0.003] 
NIKKEI (t-1) 0.350** 0.381** 0.400*** 0.372** 0.376** 0.373** 
 [0.022] [0.011] [0.008] [0.016] [0.015] [0.016] 
EURO STOXX50(t-1) -0.180 -0.188 -0.197 -0.171 -0.169 -0.180 
 [0.265] [0.257] [0.237] [0.298] [0.300] [0.273] 
KOSPI (t-1) -0.095 -0.127 -0.140 -0.110 -0.115 -0.105 
 [0.667] [0.559] [0.520] [0.620] [0.603] [0.635] 
XRate CNY-USD (t-1) 0.026 -0.062 -0.031 0.022 0.038 0.034 
 [0.972] [0.935] [0.967] [0.977] [0.960] [0.964] 
XRate JPY-USD (t-1) 0.142 0.117 0.076 0.078 0.081 0.078 
 [0.673] [0.718] [0.817] [0.815] [0.807] [0.813] 
XRate EUR-USD (t-1) 0.436 0.532* 0.504 0.469 0.460 0.458 
 [0.192] [0.098] [0.121] [0.163] [0.170] [0.173] 
XRate KRW-USD (t-1) -0.082 -0.020 -0.024 -0.064 -0.059 -0.077 
 [0.811] [0.954] [0.943] [0.851] [0.862] [0.823] 
10% Soar (t-1)  -0.036* -0.030    
  [0.060] [0.103]    
20% Soar (t-1)  0.059  0.027   
  [0.218]  [0.561]   
10% Crash (t-1)  -0.008   -0.015  
  [0.537]   [0.256]  
20% Crash (t-1)  -0.042    -0.052 
  [0.387]    [0.279] 
Soar (t-1) -0.007      
 [0.579]      
Crash (t-1) -0.024***      
 [0.007]      
Constant 0.004*** 0.003* 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 [0.009] [0.073] [0.101] [0.190] [0.126] [0.154] 
       
Observations 993 993 993 993 993 993 
R-squared 0.035 0.034 0.028 0.023 0.024 0.025 
p-value in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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Table 33. Cont’d 
VARIABLES Model 11 Model 12 Model 12-1 Model 12-2 Model 12-3 Model 12-4 
       
Bitcoin (USD) (t-1) -0.028 0.050 0.086* 0.037 0.026 0.031 
 [0.695] [0.371] [0.072] [0.442] [0.628] [0.509] 
Spread (t-1) 0.005** 0.005** 0.004** 0.004** 0.004** 0.004** 
 [0.012] [0.019] [0.027] [0.047] [0.032] [0.046] 
Bid-Ask Spread (t-1) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 [0.730] [0.967] [0.900] [0.940] [0.881] [0.945] 
Trading Volume (t-1) 0.001 0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 [0.730] [0.927] [0.933] [0.740] [0.880] [0.905] 
Regulation -0.011 -0.022 -0.015 -0.022 -0.017 -0.017 
 [0.727] [0.402] [0.650] [0.419] [0.581] [0.576] 
S&P500 (t-1) 0.340 0.310 0.325 0.313 0.307 0.319 
 [0.120] [0.159] [0.142] [0.160] [0.165] [0.151] 
SHSZ300 (t-1) 0.033*** 0.034*** 0.034*** 0.034*** 0.033*** 0.034*** 
 [0.003] [0.001] [0.002] [0.001] [0.002] [0.002] 
NIKKEI (t-1) 0.332** 0.362*** 0.386*** 0.361** 0.363** 0.362** 
 [0.018] [0.009] [0.006] [0.011] [0.010] [0.011] 
EURO STOXX50 (t-1) -0.147 -0.140 -0.148 -0.128 -0.127 -0.138 
 [0.344] [0.368] [0.344] [0.411] [0.411] [0.374] 
KOSPI (t-1) -0.082 -0.104 -0.120 -0.098 -0.101 -0.095 
 [0.685] [0.600] [0.548] [0.627] [0.616] [0.637] 
10% Soar (t-1)  -0.034* -0.029    
  [0.070] [0.114]    
20% Soar (t-1)  0.056  0.025   
  [0.252]  [0.590]   
10% Crash (t-1)  -0.008   -0.016  
  [0.508]   [0.244]  
20% Crash (t-1)  -0.042    -0.052 
  [0.390]    [0.283] 
Soar (t-1) -0.006      
 [0.633]      
Crash (t-1) -0.025***      
 [0.004]      
Constant 0.004** 0.002* 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 [0.010] [0.083] [0.115] [0.206] [0.138] [0.169] 
       
Observations 995 995 995 995 995 995 
R-squared 0.032 0.030 0.024 0.020 0.020 0.021 
p-value in parentheses 




Table 33. Cont’d 
VARIABLES Model 13 Model 14 Model 14-1 Model 14-2 Model 14-3 Model 14-4 
       
Bitcoin (USD) (t-1) -0.036 0.026 0.058 0.014 0.011 0.011 
 [0.605] [0.642] [0.216] [0.759] [0.828] [0.808] 
Spread (t-1) 0.005** 0.005** 0.004** 0.004** 0.004** 0.004** 
 [0.011] [0.018] [0.023] [0.036] [0.028] [0.037] 
Bid-Ask Spread (t-1) 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 [0.797] [0.950] [0.956] [0.997] [0.944] [0.999] 
Trading Volume (t-1) -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 
 [0.904] [0.702] [0.563] [0.435] [0.537] [0.585] 
Regulation -0.010 -0.022 -0.013 -0.021 -0.015 -0.015 
 [0.765] [0.411] [0.696] [0.428] [0.634] [0.633] 
XRate CNY-USD (t-1) 0.147 0.085 0.125 0.160 0.164 0.173 
 [0.836] [0.906] [0.861] [0.821] [0.818] [0.808] 
XRate JPY-USD (t-1) -0.144 -0.146 -0.195 -0.188 -0.194 -0.190 
 [0.602] [0.574] [0.463] [0.480] [0.470] [0.479] 
XRate EUR-USD (t-1) 0.442 0.519* 0.484 0.477 0.462 0.462 
 [0.150] [0.080] [0.109] [0.124] [0.136] [0.137] 
XRate KRW-USD (t-1) 0.123 0.138 0.132 0.117 0.120 0.105 
 [0.657] [0.615] [0.633] [0.674] [0.665] [0.705] 
10% Soar (t-1)  -0.032* -0.024    
  [0.091] [0.179]    
20% Soar (t-1)  0.064  0.035   
  [0.183]  [0.451]   
10% Crash (t-1)  -0.005   -0.011  
  [0.709]   [0.405]  
20% Crash (t-1)  -0.051    -0.057 
  [0.308]    [0.250] 
Soar (t-1) -0.007      
 [0.585]      
Crash (t-1) -0.022**      
 [0.010]      
Constant 0.004*** 0.003* 0.003* 0.002 0.002* 0.002* 
 [0.006] [0.051] [0.069] [0.125] [0.084] [0.096] 
       
Observations 1,039 1,039 1,039 1,039 1,039 1,039 
R-squared 0.019 0.019 0.012 0.010 0.009 0.011 
p-value in parentheses 








Table 34. Unit Root Test Statistics for Fama (1984) Model 
Panel A: CBOE BTC Futures Contracts 
Rollover Nearby 7 Days 
Unit Root Test ADF DF-GLS PP ADF DF-GLS PP 
Change in spot -9.8827*** -4.8564*** -16.6816*** -9.5041*** -9.2639*** -16.6831*** 
Basis -5.7320*** -0.3320 -5.9340*** -5.6850*** -0.3601 -5.8364*** 
Risk premium -5.2160*** -0.4326 -5.9993*** -5.7349*** -0.3320 -5.9359*** 
       
Panel B: CME BTC Futures Contracts 
Rollover Nearby 7 Days 
Unit Root Test ADF DF-GLS PP ADF DF-GLS PP 
Change in spot -9.2851*** -9.0732*** -16.3040*** -9.3170*** -9.1029*** -16.3587*** 
Basis -3.9440*** -0.7803 -4.0684 -3.9631*** -0.7873 -4.0850*** 
Risk premium -4.2704*** -0.8501 -4.4147 -4.2883*** -0.7139 -4.4295*** 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 35. Results of Fama (1984) Model 
Panel A: CBOE BTC Futures Contracts 
Rollover   Nearby 7 Days 
Equation (1): Pt-1-Pt=α1+β1*(Ft-Pt)+ε1,t+1       
    α1 β1 F-Stat α1 β1 F-Stat 
Coefficient   97.3997** 0.0606*** 13.7553*** 102.3019** 0.0625*** 15.4107*** 
Standard Error  42.8474 0.0163 - 42.3927 0.0159 - 
Probability   0.0237 0.0002 0.0002 0.0164 0.0001 0.0001 
Equation (2): Ft- Pt+1 =α2+β2*(Ft - Pt)+ε2,t+1       
    α2 β2 F-Stat α2 β2 F-Stat 
Coefficient   -97.3997** 0.9394*** 3308.2470*** -102.3019** 0.9375*** 3462.0300*** 
Standard Error  42.8474 0.0163 - 42.3927 0.0159 - 
Probability   0.0237 0.0000 0.0000 0.0164 0.0000 0.0000 
        
Panel B: CME BTC Futures Contracts 
Rollover   Nearby 7 Days 
Equation (1): Pt-1-Pt=α1+β1*(Ft-Pt)+ε1,t+1       
    α1 β1 F-Stat α1 β1 F-Stat 
Coefficient   132.2801*** 0.0663*** 15.8842*** 133.3589*** 0.0665*** 16.1867*** 
Standard Error  48.3904 0.0166 - 48.1787 0.0165 - 
Probability   0.0066 0.0001 0.0001 0.0060 0.0001 0.0001 
Equation (2): Ft- Pt+1 =α2+β2*(Ft - Pt)+ε2,t+1       
    α2 β2 F-Stat α2 β2 F-Stat 
Coefficient   -132.2801*** 0.9337*** 3151.8007*** -133.3589*** 0.9335*** 3187.6110*** 
Standard Error  48.3904 0.0166 - 48.1787 0.0165 - 
Probability   0.0066 0.0000 0.0000 0.0060 0.0000 0.0000 




Table 36. Wald Test Results of Fama (1984) Model 
Panel A: CBOE BTC Futures Contracts 
Rollover   Nearby 7 Days 
Equation (1): Pt-1-Pt=α1+β1*(Ft-Pt)+ε1,t+1 
    α1=0, β1=1 α1=0 β1=1 α1=0, β1=1 α1=0 β1=1 
F-statistic   3484.2530*** 5.1673** 3308.2470*** 3616.0850*** 5.8235** 3462.0300*** 
df  (2, 313) (1, 313) (1, 313) (2, 314) (1, 314) (1, 314) 
Probability   0.0000 0.0237 0.0000 0.0000 0.0164 0.0000 
Equation (2): Ft- Pt =α2+β2*(Ft - Pt)+ε2,t+1 
    α2=0, β2=1 α2=0 β2=1 α2=0, β2=1 α2=0 β2=1 
F-statistic   6.9956*** 5.1673*** 13.7553*** 7.8213*** 5.8235** 15.4107*** 
df  (2, 313) (1, 313) (1, 313) (2, 314) (1, 314) (1, 314) 
Probability  0.0011 0.0237 0.0002 0.0005 0.0164 0.0001 
                
Panel B: CME BTC Futures Contracts 
Rollover   Nearby 7 Days 
Equation (1): Pt-1-Pt=α1+β1*(Ft-Pt)+ε1,t+1 
    α1=0, β1=1 α1=0 β1=1 α1=0, β1=1 α1=0 β1=1 
F-statistic   4000.8910*** 7.4726*** 3151.8007*** 4069.5259*** 7.6619*** 3187.6109*** 
df  (2, 300) (1, 300) (1, 300) (2, 302) (1, 302) (1, 302) 
Probability   0.0000 0.0066 0.0000 0.0000 0.0060 0.0000 
Equation (2): Ft- Pt =α2+β2*(Ft - Pt)+ε2,t+1 
    α2=0, β2=1 α2=0 β2=1 α2=0, β2=1 α2=0 β2=1 
F-statistic   8.0422*** 7.4726*** 15.8842*** 8.1939*** 7.6619*** 16.1867*** 
df  (2, 300) (1, 300) (1, 300) (2, 302) (1, 302) (1, 302) 
Probability   0.0004 0.0066 0.0001 0.0003 0.0060 0.0001 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 37. Descriptive Statistics of Mispricing Term and Absolute Value of Mispricing Term 
Exchange   CBOE   CME 
Rollover   Nearby 7 Days   Nearby 7 Days 
Error Term   x abs (x) x abs (x)   x abs (x) x abs (x) 
 Mean  -0.2939 0.3082 -0.3440 0.3567  -0.3193 0.3297 -0.3701 0.3794 
 Median  -0.2741 0.2779 -0.3169 0.3238  -0.3072 0.3101 -0.3413 0.3444 
 Maximum  0.6466 0.7049 0.6466 0.7630  0.3705 0.7121 0.3705 0.7629 
 Minimum  -0.7049 0.0021 -0.7630 0.0119  -0.7121 0.0050 -0.7629 0.0050 
 Std. Dev.  0.2060 0.1838 0.2185 0.1971  0.1909 0.1724 0.1987 0.1802 
 Skewness  0.3613 0.3385 0.3667 0.2875  0.2200 0.3021 0.2797 0.2661 
 Kurtosis  4.1289 2.0015 4.0265 1.8848  3.2911 2.1240 3.4094 2.0116 
 Jarque-Bera  23.7310 19.2207 21.0208 20.7939  3.5141 14.2957 6.1069 16.0157 
 Probability  0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000  0.1726 0.0008 0.0472 0.0003 




Table 38. Results of Bitcoin Futures Contracts Mispricing Term Unit Root Tests 
The error term used for these unit root tests is defined following methodology suggested by MacKinlay and 
Ramaswamy (1988), Bhatt and Cakici (1990), and Switzer, Varson and Zghidi (2000). Both CME and CBOE's 
futures contracts daily data are used for the tests and the daily rate of 4-week U.S. T-bill is used for risk-free rate. 
Panel A: CBOE Futures Contracts (December 18, 2017 – March 22, 2019) 
  Nearby Contracts   Roll-over 7 days before expiration 
  ADF PP   ADF PP 
  Level 1st Diff. Level 1st Diff.   Level 1st Diff. Level 1st Diff. 
Stat. -1.80451* -18.3530*** -1.85708* -18.3528***  -1.638196* -17.1532*** -1.7274* -17.1472*** 
Prob.  0.0677  0.0000  0.0604  0.0000    0.0957  0.0000  0.0798  0.0000 
                    
Panel A: CME Futures Contracts (January 2, 2018 – March 22, 2019) 
  Nearby Contracts   Roll-over 7 days before expiration 
  ADF PP   ADF PP 
  Level 1st Diff. Level 1st Diff.   Level 1st Diff. Level 1st Diff. 
Stat. -1.28480 -17.7733*** -1.233471 -17.8079***  -0.792969 -19.8856*** -0.860488 -19.9025*** 
Prob.  0.1833  0.0000  0.1996  0.0000   0.3719  0.0000  0.3425  0.0000 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Table 39. Chronology of Major Bitcoin Exchange Hacks 
Year Month Exchange Amount Stolen (BTC) 
2012 March Bitcoinica                                    46,703  
2012 May Bitcoinica                                    18,000  
2012 August Bitcoin Ponzi                                  265,678  
2012 September Bitfloor                                    24,000  
2014 February Mt. Gox                                  850,000  
2014 July Cryptsy                                    13,000  
2015 January Bitstamp                                    19,000  
2015 February BTER                                      7,170  
2016 August Bitfinex                                  120,000  
2017 December NiceHash                                      4,736  
2018 April CoinSecure                                         438  
2018 June Bithumb                                      2,016  
2018 September Zaif                                      5,966  
2018 October MapleChange 919 





Table 40. Top 10 Cryptocurrencies by Market Capitalization 
Rank Name 
Market Capitalization 
(As of January 30, 2019) 
Initial Release 
1 Bitcoin $60,329,884,225 January 9, 2009 
2 Ripple (XRP) $12,444,402,901 August 11, 2013 
3 Ethereum $11,041,665,977 July 30, 2015 
4 EOS $2,098,395,149 June 26, 2017 
5 Tether $2,034,826,407 October 6, 2014 
6 Bitcoin Cash $1,983,990,236 August 1, 2017 
7 Litecoin $1,889,854,900 October 7, 2011 
8 TRON $1,653,533,859 September 12, 2017 
9 Stellar $1,551,518,489 July 31, 2014 
10 Bitcoin SV $1,119,643,115 November 25, 2018 
[Source 1: CoinMarketCap / https://coinmarketcap.com, accessed on Jan 31, 2019] 
[Source 2: coinbase / https://www.coinbase.cm/price, accessed on Jan 31, 2019] 
 
 
Table 41. Estimates of Daily Futures Mispricing Regression with Dummy Variables 
Estimation equation: x = α1+β1*hack_cum+ β2*newcoin 
hack_cum constitutes cumulative amount of stolen Bitcoin from December 2017. newcoin variable refers dummy 
variable of new cryptocurrency release. The dummy variable has value of 1 from D-1 to D+5 of new coin releases, 
otherwise 0. The datasets have two different types of rollover methodologies: nearby and 7 days before expiration, 
and each methodology is presented in Nearby and 7 Days rows, respectively. 
Exchange Rollover Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Stat Prob       
CBOE Nearby Constant -0.0706 *** 0.0259 -2.7314 0.0067       
  Cumulative Hack -2.4E-05 *** 0.0000 -9.6612 0.0000    
  New Coin -0.0325  0.0252 -1.2868 0.1991  R-square 0.2292 
 7 Days Constant -0.0869 *** 0.0268 -3.2424 0.0013       
  Cumulative Hack -2.7E-5 *** 0.0000 -10.5906 0.0000    
  New Coin -0.0538 ** 0.0265 -2.0330 0.0429  R-square 0.2636 
CME Nearby Constant -0.1288 *** 0.0257 -5.0207 0.0000       
  Cumulative Hack -1.9E-05 *** 0.0000 -7.8814 0.0000    
   New Coin -0.0709 *** 0.0243 -2.9113 0.0039   R-square 0.1781 
 7 Days Constant -0.1402 *** 0.0265 -5.2922 0.0000       
  Cumulative Hack -2.3E-05 *** 0.0000 -9.3695 0.0000    
    New Coin -0.0645 *** 0.0246 -2.6260 0.0091   R-square 0.2276 





Table 42. EGARCH Results of Daily Futures Mispricing Regression with Dummy Variables 
Estimation equation: X=C(1)+C(2)*hack_cum+C(3)*newcoin 
Variance equation: LOG(GARCH) = C(4) + C(5)*ABS(RESID(-1)/@SQRT(GARCH(-1))) + C(6)*RESID(-
1)/@SQRT(GARCH(-1)) + C(7)*LOG(GARCH(-1)) 
hack_cum constitutes cumulative amount of stolen Bitcoin from December 2017. newcoin variable refers dummy 
variable of new cryptocurrency release. The dummy variable has value of 1 from D-1 to D+5 of new coin releases, 
otherwise 0. The datasets have two different types of rollover methodologies: nearby and 7 days before expiration, 
and each methodology is presented in Nearby and 7 Days columns, respectively. 
Exchange CBOE CME 
Rollover Nearby 7 Days Nearby 7 Days 
C(1) -0.0633 -0.0191 -0.1175 -0.0855 
C(2) -3.0E-05 -3.8E-05 -2.8E-05 -3.4E-05 
C(3) -0.0198 -0.0791 -0.0825 -0.0512 
C(4) -2.2871 -1.9803 -2.2689 -2.2445 
C(5) 1.1256 1.1214 1.3440 1.2886 
C(6) 0.1823 0.1375 0.2019 0.1737 
C(7) 0.6922 0.7620 0.7555 0.7411 
Prob. (C(7)) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 *** *** *** *** 
     
R-squared 0.1742 0.1977 0.0186 0.1443 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
